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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the transatlantic relations have continuously 
been an issue of academic debate. Whereas, during the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union as the common enemy united Europe and the U.S., which led to close 
cooperation, the implosion of the communist regime put an end to the original 
purpose of the military alliance between Europe and the U.S., the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). This had an effect not only on the transatlantic 
cooperation in the fields of military, foreign and security policy but also affected 
the transatlantic relations in general. During the 1990s the U.S. and its European 
allies were occupied with the search for a new framework and purpose of the 
transatlantic cooperation. The perception that Europe and the U.S. were more 
and more parting ways was widespread. Differences between the two allies that 
seemed to have been concealed by the Cold War came to the surface and have 
been emphasized by government officials on both sides and exaggerated by the 
media. The climax of Europe’s estrangement from the U.S. became obvious in 
2003 when the dispute over whether the Iraq invasion by the Americans and 
British was justified or not resulted in a deep and troubling crisis of the 
transatlantic relations. For several months the media attention as well as 
academic discussions were focused on the U.S.-European relations. Books and 
articles telling about an unbridgeable gap in values as well as strategic and 
cultural differences made for good reading. Some authors even proclaimed the 
end of the West. However, when the U.S. announced the end of the combat 
operations in Iraq and the transatlantic relationship seemed to be in a deadlock 
situation as the fronts were frozen, public and academic attention shifted to other 
topics. Publishing about the transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. 
seemed to have been halted by then. 
 
Purpose and Framework 
This thesis has been written for the purpose of making a contribution to the 
academic discussion of the transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. 
with the particular focus on the U.S.-German and U.S.-French relationships after 
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the 2003 Iraq crisis. In contrast to many publications arguing for an estrangement 
between Europe and the U.S. or even portraying the end of the transatlantic 
relations, this thesis argues for a rapprochement that started in with the beginning 
of the second term of the George W. Bush administration, as a result of the 2003 
Iraq crisis.  
 
The timeline for the investigation has been set from the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 to the end of the George W. Bush administration in 2008. 
The years preceding the 2003 Iraq crisis must be taken into account. As in order 
to be able to analyze the effects of the crisis on the transatlantic relations in the 
years after 2003, it is indispensable to analyze how the disagreements 
manifested. In the prospects the timeline will be extended until January 2010, thus 
including the first year of the Barack Obama administration into the analysis. The 
focus on the two European countries, Germany and France, is reasoned by at 
least two considerations. Firstly and foremost, these two countries were the ones 
most involved in the transatlantic split over the Iraq invasion. Secondly, Germany 
and France are two of the most influential countries in Europe and, together with 
the United Kingdom, part of the so-called EU-3. Hence, they influence the 
transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Europe, in particular Western 
Europe, to a higher degree than other countries. The role that other Western 
European and Eastern European countries or Russia played in the dispute over 
the Iraq invasion in 2003 as well as the way in which they influenced the 
transatlantic relationship during that period of time and afterwards will be only 
very peripherally addressed. There is considerable literature about the crisis 
surrounding the Iraq War in 2003 and the share that each Western or Eastern 
European country played in it. Moreover, the U.S.-Russian relations are a topic of 
their own that should not be mixed with the transatlantic relationship and therefore 
goes beyond the focus of this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, when talking about German-American and French-American 
relations1, some limitations to the agenda need to be set. As the economic 
                                            
1 Throughout this thesis the terms ‘German-American’ and ‘U.S.-German’ as well as the terms 
‘French-American’ and ‘U.S.-French’ are synonymously used and refer to the relations between 
the United States and Germany and respectively the United States and France.  
  3 
relations between the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and France and their 
relations in the fields of science, technology or even intelligence cooperation 
remained unaffected by the Iraq crisis, these fields of cooperation will not be 
investigated in this study. Instead it will focus on the field of foreign and security 
policy in relation to the events in Afghanistan and Iraq. It aims to analyze which 
impact the Iraq War had on U.S.-German and U.S-French foreign and security 
policy relations with the main focus of attention being on the foreign policy 
relations. Thus, diplomatic exchanges and the roles that the heads of government 
played will be the center of attention. Moreover, the analysis will be supported by 
facts about coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, including troop deployment 
numbers as well as mission and operation extensions. 
Research Questions and Theses 
The overarching research question of the study is as follows: 
Analyzing the recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, what impact did the 
disagreement over the Iraq War have on the transatlantic relations between 
the United States and Germany on the one hand and France on the other 
hand in the years between 2003 and 2008? 
 
The thesis answering this question, which is the initial point of analysis and 
research of this study and source for further sub-questions and sub-theses, is as 
follows: 
The 2003 Iraq crisis had short-term effects on the German-American and 
French-American relations resulting in a deep rift between these allies. 
However, there has not been any serious rupture as the relations between 
these strategic allies are too important to allow for any long-term effects. As 
a consequence, after a period of cool-down in their relations, a period of 
rapprochement beginning with the second term of the George W. Bush 
administration set in. 
 
There are several sub-questions (SQ) and sub-theses (ST), which have further 
guided the research: 
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SQ 1: Which factors influenced the rapprochement in the U.S.-German and U.S.-
French relations? 
 
ST 1: There were external as well as domestic factors influencing the 
rapprochement of the German-American and French-American relations. 
Among the external factors were the events occurring on the grounds in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the overstretched U.S. military as a result of 
fighting two wars simultaneously, and developments in coalition efforts of 
the missions on the spot in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among the domestic 
factors there were the personalities in office as heads of governments and 
of important government positions, the political arrangements of the 
governments, and the approach to foreign and security policy by the 
administrations and governments. It is further argued that domestic politics 
in Germany, France, and the U.S. had considerably affected their foreign 
policies as well as their mutual relations.  
 
SQ 2: What role did the personalities in office as heads of government in 
Germany, France and the United States play in the 2003 Iraq crisis and the 
following rapprochement and what effect did the changes in leadership in 
Germany and France have on the rapprochement? 
 
ST 2: The personalities in office as heads of government in the years from 2001 
to 2005 (Germany), 2007 (France) and 2008 (U.S.) played a significant role 
in the dispute over the Iraq invasion and consequently also in the following 
period of rapprochement. This, in particular, was the case because the 
relationships between these political leaders were based on good personal 
relations.  
 It is assumed that the changes in leadership in Germany and France 
mattered quite a lot in regard to the rapprochement pursued by the U.S. 
and its allies. However, this was more the case for Germany than for 
France. While German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President George W. 
Bush spent three and a half years together in office, French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy and the American President did so for only one and a half 
year.  
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SQ 3: What effects did the 2003 Iraq crisis have on the military cooperation 
between the United States and its European allies in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
 
ST 3: The split between the U.S. and some Western European countries in 2003 
had a negative impact on the coalition efforts in Iraq and affected those in 
Afghanistan positively. In Iraq, the crisis resulted in the refusal of Germany 
and France and some smaller European countries to participate in military 
engagement. The Iraq War, for the most part, remained a taboo topic for 
military cooperation in the relations between Germany and the U.S. and 
France and the U.S. It can further be assumed that the rapprochement in 
the diplomatic relations also had its effects on the coalition efforts on the 
battleground of Afghanistan resulting in closer cooperation between the 
U.S. and European troops.  
Methodology 
 The research process has followed three stages with different methods 
applied. At the first stage exploratory expert interviews with scholars at 
Washington based think tanks were conducted in the summer of 2009. The 
purpose of these interviews was to gather ideas and to develop a research 
agenda, research questions, and research theses. However, the interviews were 
also particularly valuable since they offered insights and interrelations impossible 
to comprise by only referring to the available literature. In addition, they offered a 
good way of obtaining newsworthy information as, due to the topicality, it was not 
easy to find up-to-date literature. Since the thesis in large part is written from the 
perspective of the United States, it was particularly important to conduct 
interviews with American experts in the fields of U.S. foreign and security policy 
and transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. At the second stage, 
after the main research questions and theses had been generated, an extensive 
literature review including speeches by political leaders, transcripts of press 
conferences, news articles and online news, and statements of diplomatic 
exchanges was carried out. At a third stage, the findings relevant for addressing 
the research questions and theses were comprised and interpreted. Applying the 
hermeneutical approach the meanings of the texts were interpreted through 
continual references to their context.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis consists of six main chapters. The introduction presents the 
research agenda and purpose as well as the research questions and theses and 
the relevant methodology. The second chapter gives the necessary theoretical 
background about International Relations theories essential in order to analyze 
bilateral as well as multilateral relations between countries. The third chapter 
discusses the analyses of two scholars of the transatlantic relations between 
Europe and the U.S. in the years after 9/11. Each scholar follows a certain school 
of International Relations theories in his/her analysis. The fourth chapter unfolds 
the main part of the study. In this chapter the analysis of the transatlantic relations 
in the years from 2001 to 2008 is carried out. Following a chronological order it is 
divided into two larger sections, the first George W. Bush administration and the 
second George W. Bush administration. In each of the two parts the constellation 
of the Bush administration and its approach to foreign policy, the events and 
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the bilateral relations between the 
U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and France are analyzed. The fifth chapter 
summarizes and interprets the results of the analysis of the preceding chapter 
and addresses the research questions and theses of the first chapter. The last 
chapter gives some prospects in regards to the transatlantic relations under U.S. 
President Barack Obama and the changes that occurred from the Bush 
administration to the Obama administration. Furthermore, by putting the crisis of 
2003 and the ensuing rapprochement into the larger context of the evolution of 
the transatlantic relations since the end of the Second World War some prospects 
about the future of the transatlantic partnership in the coming years of the 21st 
century are anticipated.  
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II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
International Relations Theories 
The following pages are meant to present an overview of International 
Relations theories, including the two traditional theories realism and liberalism 
and their continuations in the form of neorealism and neoliberalism. Furthermore, 
constructivism will be discussed taking into account the discussion whether it is 
an approach to social sciences or a substantive theory of international relations. 
Finally, the doctrine of neoconservatism will be presented briefly. Considering the 
fact that neoconservatism is not a theory of international relations as it lacks the 
requirements that would establish neoconservatism as a theory; it is well worth 
being outlined in brief as it will be essential in order to address the research 
question.  
 
1. Realism and Neorealism 
It has often been asserted that realism dates back to the writings of the 
fifth-century (B.C.) Greek historian Thucydides about the Peloponnesian War 
between Athens and Sparta (see Lebow, 2007; Elman, 2007). In those days, 
however, neither was International Relations established as an academic 
discipline, nor did realism exist as a coherent worldview. It was only Carr’s 
publication of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, published in 1939, which established the 
realist school of international relations theory. This happened as a reaction to the 
writings by liberals of the interwar period who, as some claimed, were strongly 
tending towards idealism. As a consequence, the ‘first debate’ of International 
Relations theory, which was carried out “between idealists and realists before, 
during and immediately after the Second World War” (Kurki & Wight, 2007, 16) 
evolved. For twentieth-century classical realism, however, it is Morgenthau’s 
publication Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, going 
through six editions from 1948 to 1985, which is often claimed to be the standard 
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guide of reference to classical realism (Elman, 2007, 12). Morgenthau’s writings 
reflect the central role of power in politics that is inherent in realist thought.  
 
Mearsheimer (2007, 73ff) justifies the competition for power by five 
assumptions about the international system. First, great powers are established 
as the main actors in an international system that is characterized by anarchy. 
Second, each nation state possesses a specific amount of offensive military 
capabilities making all players on the world stage possible enemies. Third, in 
general there is no certainty concerning the intentions of their counterparts among 
the actors of international politics. Fourth, survival is the nation states’ main goal. 
Fifth, the behavior of states is guided by rationality. Partly overlapping with 
Mearsheimer's five assumptions, Holsti (1995, 36f) identifies five core premises 
that all classical realists share. First, the “causes of war and the conditions of 
peace” (ibid., 36) constitute the central questions for classical realists. Second, 
according to the Hobbesian worldview, conflict or chaos, to use Hobbes’ 
expression, is viewed to be the natural state of affairs. Third, to classical realists, 
reflecting “focus on geographically based groups” (ibid., 37), nation states are the 
principal actors and dominant units. Fourth, states behave in a rational manner. 
Fifth, nation states are unitary actors.  
 
As a consequence of this particular architecture of international politics 
inherent in realist thought, nation states continuously seek to increase their 
material capabilities as their survival depends on them. Elman (2007, 12) states 
that the desire for power “is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity”. Since the 
international system is characterized by anarchy, there is no higher authority that 
would restrain nation states from continuously seeking power. Thus, realists hold 
a pessimistic outlook for the world in general and for the possibilities of 
international cooperation in particular. Realists recognize the existence of multi-
national bodies though, but they disclaim that these bodies can influence the 
behavior of states. Furthermore, classical realists maintain that great powers are 
unable of exercising self-restraint. This often makes them “their own worst 
enemies” (Lebow, 2007, 68) as the unchecked search for power often results in 
conflict. 
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The concept of the balance of power is very essential in the realist school 
of international relations theory. In order to balance other states’ power, alliances 
are agreed. Sometimes, however, alliances are also built in order to increase the 
power of one nation state or ‘bloc’ of nation states. Thucydides, however, views 
them as “double-edged swords; they are as likely to provoke as to prevent 
conflict” (Lebow, 2007, 56). This is due to the fact that it is impossible to assess 
the capabilities and motives of other states. The distinction between offensive and 
defensive weapons, as some assert to exist, is difficult to maintain. This is 
because the strategy to accumulate weapons at the border to a neighboring state 
pursued by a defensive state could be regarded as defensive but also as the 
preparation of an attack. Hence, the realist assessment is that only a strong 
community, which states and their rulers feel attached to by common culture, 
conventions or personal ties, can restrain the competition for power (Lebow, 
2007, 58). 
 
Structural realism or neorealism, as it is also called, began to replace 
classical realism in the late 1980s when Kenneth Waltz first published his book 
Theory of International Politics in 1979. According to Waltz, the international 
system is defined by a structure and its interacting units (Elman, 2007, 13). The 
structure of the international system is defined by two elements, “first, by the 
ordering principle of the system, in our case anarchy, and second, by the 
distribution of capabilities across units” (Waltz, 1995, 74). The distribution of 
capabilities defines how many poles exist in the international system. There can 
be one (unipolarity), two (bipolarity), or three or more (multipolarity). Thus, 
structural realists differ from classical realists, who analyze international relations 
from the state level of analysis, by analyzing international relations from the 
systemic level of analysis. Nevertheless, like classical realism, structural realism 
is also based on power politics and the concept of the balance of power. 
However, whereas classical realists worry about the relative gains of power in 
comparison to other states by itself, structural realists are concerned about 
relative gains of power in comparison to other states in order to keep the 
international system balanced. Consequently, the balance of power concept is 
even more important for structural realism. 
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Furthermore, neorealism emphasizes the structure of the international 
system. Nation states remain the principal actors on the world's stage in 
neorealist thought, though they become functionally alike units due to the 
constraints of the structure of the international system. Waltz argues against the 
classical realists’ assumptions of leaders’ motivations and state characteristics. 
Structural realists therefore differ from classical realists “on the source and 
content of states’ preferences” (Elman, 2007, 13). In neorealist theory, states do 
not strive for power because of human nature, but owing to the structure or 
architecture of the international system. The survival of nation states is not 
defined by the individual state’s capabilities, as assumed by classical realists, but 
by the structure of the international system. Thus, structural realists assume that 
nation states seek power as a means to an end and not as an end in itself, as 
assumed by classical realists.  
 
The disagreement with the question of how much power a nation state 
should strive for led to a split into defensive and offensive neorealism. Defensive 
neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue for an “‘appropriate amount of power’” 
(Waltz, 1979, 40, quoted in Mearsheimer, 2007, 75). Structural factors are 
expected to limit the amount of power a state can obtain. If some states tried to 
maximize their power, which, in the worst case, could eventually lead to 
overexpansion, other states would take balancing measures. The offence-defense 
balance is said to be usually in the defender's favor (Mearsheimer, 2007, 76). 
Offensive neorealists, like John Mearsheimer, on the contrary argue that 
structural factors encourage states to maximize their share of power. States are 
even expected to strive for hegemony, as it is the best guarantee for a state’s 
survival. Balancing may occur but defensive neorealists argue that it is often 
inefficient as buck-passing2 is frequently opted for by threatened states (ibid.). 
Whereas defensive neorealists perceive states more in terms of maintaining the 
status quo, offensive neorealists argue that states are aggressive and 
expansionist by nature (Chernoff, 2007, 51). 
 
                                            
2 Buck-passing occurs if a threatened state decides not to act against the aggressor but to let 
somebody else ‘do the work’. 
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The realist school of international relations theory has been criticized by its 
challengers in several ways. Realism accounts for merely a poor predictive and 
descriptive power and its prescribing policy has been questioned. Besides, 
realism fails to meaningfully address the new issues, cleavages and actors on 
today’s global agenda, such as the transnational interdependence, transnational 
networks or nonstate actors (Kegley, 1995, 6f). The last critique in particular led to 
a decreased interest in the realist thought in the 1970s when the focus shifted 
from nation states to these new issues and actors. Structural realism managed to 
revive the realist school of international relations theory when the pendulum 
swung against it then. International events in the last decade of the 20th century, 
however, with an even increased degree than in the 1970s, further led to realism’s 
decline. In particular, the peaceful and surprising end of the Cold War 
simultaneous with the voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wave of 
democratization throughout East Europe as well as the continuation of European 
integration in Western Europe in the absence of the Cold War challenged the 
theories and the assumptions of the realist and neorealist school of International 
Relations theory (Jervis, 2002, quoted in Elman, 2007, 14). In the wake of the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, realist thought has again been revived since it is considered more capable 
of addressing threats to national security (Elman, 2007, 14f). Elman (ibid.), 
however, notices the irony that realism owes its comeback to transnational 
terrorist networks and religious extremism, both of which lie well outside the 
domain of realist thought.  
 
2. Liberalism and Neoliberalism 
The liberal school of International Relations theory is not as simple to 
conceptualize as is its counterpart, the realist school. Unlike publications by 
Morgenthau, Carr or Waltz, which incorporate the roots and the fundamental logic 
of realism and neorealism, “a systemic presentation of liberal international theory 
is not offered in any well-known texts” (Zacher & Matthew, 1995, 107). Even 
Doyle, an International Relations scholar often cited when referring to liberalism, 
highlights in one of his most famous texts Liberalism and World Politics that 
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“[t]here is no canonical description of liberalism” (Doyle, 1986, 1152). MacMillan 
therefore argues that “liberalism is better understood […] as a cluster or matrix of 
underlying values, principles, and purposes that provide a guide and framework” 
(MacMillan, 2007, 21). 
 
Liberalism has its roots in the liberal political theory, which developed in the 
seventeenth century. It is generally asserted that it was in the Enlightenment era 
when liberal thought emerged as a coherent worldview and was first transformed 
into a systematic statement after World War I by the proclamation of Woodrow 
Wilson's Fourteen Points (see Zacher et al., 1995; MacMillan, 2007). Hence, 
liberalism is the older school of international relations theory. Even though some 
scholars identify the writings of the Greek historian Thucydides as realist, realism 
did not exist as a coherent worldview until the 1930s. It was Carr’s publication of 
The 20 Year's Crisis (1939), which established realism in response to the writings 
by liberals of the interwar period.  
 
Since International Relations was only established as an academic 
discipline at the beginning of the twentieth century, the major contributors to 
liberal theory were “political philosophers, political economists, and people 
generally interested in international affairs” (Zacher et al., 1995, 108). 
Consequently, in his effort to conceptualize liberalism, Doyle discusses the 
writings of three political philosophers who have been regarded as major 
exponents of liberal International Relations theory to this day. In his text 
Liberalism and World Politics Doyle distinguishes between Schumpeter’s liberal 
pacifism, Machiavelli’s liberal imperialism, and Kant’s liberal internationalism.  
 
Schumpeter’s liberal pacifism is based on the interaction of capitalism and 
democracy. In his Sociology of Imperialism, which was published in 1919, he 
argues that if free trade is established, war becomes unnecessary since “[f]oreign 
raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they 
were in its own territory” (Schumpeter, 1955, 75f, quoted in Doyle, 1986, 1153). In 
addition, Schumpeter makes a compelling argument in favor of liberal institutions 
and principles and their pacifying effects (Doyle, 1986, 1152). By contrast, 
Machiavelli considers that imperial expansion as the best guarantee of a state's 
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survival. According to his liberal imperialism, free republics represent the best 
form of government to pursue imperial expansion, which is why they are not 
pacifistic [sic] (ibid., 1153). Kant's liberal internationalism is based on his work on 
Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, in which he presents three Definitive Articles for 
peace. They, however, do not cease war, but only “introduce republican caution” 
(ibid., 1160) as liberal states will still go to war. If they do though, it is rarely with 
other liberal states but more commonly with nonliberal states.  
 
While some arguments of all three approaches of liberalism have survived 
in modern twentieth-century liberalism, it is the Kantian theory that has found 
most resonance. According to Doyle (1986, 1155ff), modern liberal international 
theory is defined by two legacies. The first legacy is the “pacification of foreign 
relations among liberal states” (ibid., 1155f), which establishes a “zone of peace” 
resonating Kant's Third Definitive Article, in which he calls for a “pacific federation” 
or “pacific union” (ibid., 1156). Thus, a separate peace exists among liberal states 
because the peaceful restraint exercised by liberal states only seems to work 
among themselves and not with states governed by different civil constitutions. 
This is what Hume called international “imprudence” (Hume, 1963, 346f, quoted in 
Doyle, 1986, 1156) and is carried by the second legacy. 
 
Even though one has to refer to several authors to present an overview of 
contemporary international liberalism, Zacher et al. (1995) identify three central 
theses out of the multitude of texts associated with liberal thought.  
 
1. The first thesis concerns international liberals’ belief in a transformation 
of international relations, which evolves gradually and irregularly along 
different paths with the objective to promote greater human freedom. 
This goal is to be achieved by establishing peace, prosperity and 
justice. International liberals, however, do not believe that this evolution 
of international relations is teleological. Thus, they do not predict a 
particular final state in which perfect human freedom would be realized 
(Zacher et al., 1995, 109).  
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2. The second thesis concerns the assumption that evolution of 
international relations and the establishment of “peace, welfare, and 
justice are realized significantly through international cooperation” (ibid., 
117). This “can include an acceptance of moral norms, adherence to 
international law, or collaboration through international organizations” 
(ibid.).  
3. The third thesis is constituted by the means that drive international 
cooperation. These are interdependent forces which are viewed “as 
aspects of the process of modernization” (ibid.). The five key 
components of the modernization process are “liberal democracy or 
republican government; international interdependence; cognitive 
progress; international sociological integration; and international 
institutions” (ibid., 110). These five components, however, were not 
considered as core elements by all pre-World War II liberal writers, 
which again shows the incoherence intrinsic to liberal thought. Yet, it 
can be said that “liberal democracy, a growth in economic transactions 
and interdependence, and the expansion in humankind's knowledge 
and reasoning capacities” (ibid., 118) were present in the thought of 
nearly all adherents of liberal international theory from the 18th to the 
mid-20th century. 
 
Zacher et al. further identify some general assumptions that most 
proponents of liberal international theory would share. First, individual human 
beings constitute the primary international actors. States are regarded as the 
most important collective actors, yet they are viewed as pluralistic actors. Second, 
the interests of states are multiple and changing. Third, these state interests as 
well as individual human interests are shaped by domestic and international 
conditions. Fourth, there is a belief in a growing influence of patterns of interest on 
international outcomes compared to the impact of coercion. In particular, 
cooperation does not necessitate a hegemonic power in order to be successful, 
rather international regimes can be sustained by mutual interests (ibid., 118).  
 
According to the above presented theses and assumptions, a number of 
differences between liberal internationalism and realism can be identified. The 
  15 
following summary of aspects of correspondence and divergence is drawn from 
Chernoff (2007, 60-64). First and foremost, adherents of liberal internationalism 
reject the negative worldview that realists have, especially concerning 
international cooperation. Realists believe that international forums for 
cooperation are established by great powers in order to deliver their interests. For 
them, the achieved international outcomes are the same with or without 
international organizations. Liberal theories in general share a positive and 
optimistic worldview about the possibilities of international cooperation and 
believe that institutions strongly influence the patterns of international 
cooperation. In international organizations or institutions they see a way to 
overcome the conflict-promoting effects of anarchy, which characterizes the 
international system. Another aspect of divergence is the states’ pursuit of self-
interest. Although liberals agree with realists that states seek their own self-
interest in a rational manner, they disagree with the realists' definition of self-
interest in terms of zero-sum games. Whereas realists following a zero-sum 
framework look primarily at relative gains, liberals argue that states consider 
absolute gains when evaluating their options. Moreover, in contrast to realists, 
liberals argue that some governments look for private self-interest instead of 
pursuing the collective interest of a state. Furthermore, liberals and realists differ 
on the status of units of analysis. For realists all units of analysis are alike. 
Conversely, liberals believe that there are different units of analysis. There is the 
individual level, the state level, the systemic level of analysis and some liberal 
theories even include nonstate actors. For liberals there are also particular types 
of states that pursue different foreign policies, an argument generally denied by 
realists. Moreover, adherents of a relatively new strand of liberal thinking, the 
neoliberalism, believe that a system will behave differently depending on the 
types of regimes that operate within the system. After all, there are two points of 
agreement between realists and liberals as well. These are the belief in fixed 
preferences and identities of states and the assumption that states behave 
rationally.  
 
When the realist school of international relations theory was born in a 
reaction to and criticism of the liberal writings, some of the interwar period liberals 
became equated with idealists. Although “[i]dealism has a great deal of overlap 
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with liberalism” (Chernoff, 2007, 64), it is, however, important to note that there 
are three differences by which idealists should be clearly distinguished from 
liberals. First, idealism maintains a moral component that liberalism denies. 
Idealists believe that human beings have moral obligations, which make a person 
in a position of leadership act morally. In contrast, liberals justify the actions of a 
person in a position of leadership by reasoning that it is the long-term self-interest 
of a state (ibid.). Second, as a consequence, idealists almost exclusively operate 
on the individual level of analysis since it is impossible to argue that states, 
bureaucracies or systems act morally. Third, whereas both liberals and realists 
take “material means-ends considerations” into account, idealists argue “that 
states sometimes follow a value-laden ideology” (ibid., 65).  
 
In the postwar period of the twentieth century liberal international theory 
developed into six different strands: republican liberalism; commercial liberalism 
and military liberalism, which both fall into interdependence liberalism; cognitive 
liberalism; sociological liberalism; and institutional liberalism. Of those six strands 
republican liberalism, commercial liberalism, and institutional liberalism “can be 
regarded as the backbone of a traditional liberal understanding of progress in 
international relations” (Zacher et al., 1995, 139). Especially institutional liberalism 
has attracted more attention when it developed in the 1980s and later on when it 
evolved into a new strand of liberal thinking called 'neoliberalism'. Before going 
into greater detail about liberal institutionalism and neoliberalism, however, two 
interrelated criticisms directed at liberal international theory should be considered. 
First, it has been criticized for its general assumptions and its complex causal 
processes. Both are supposed to hinder providing “a good understanding of 
international relations or a clear research agenda” (ibid.). Second, liberal 
international theory has been criticized for its inability to stand on its own. In order 
to present a complete understanding of international politics, it has to be 
supplemented with other theories (ibid.). 
 
According to Grieco (1995, 151), liberal institutionalism has been the major 
challenge to the realist thought of international relations. Adherents of liberal 
institutionalism consider the body of international institutions not only as a 
dependent variable. They also see it as an independent variable, which strongly 
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influences prospects for further cooperation. International institutions can be 
transnational value or belief systems, substantive regimes, or international 
organizations (Zacher et al., 1995, 133). Liberal institutionalists seek in their 
various forms of theoretical conceptions to rebut the realist understanding of 
international politics. They reject the realist proposition that states are the central 
actors in international politics and instead see new key actors in international 
agencies, labor unions, political parties, multinational corporations, or 
transnational coalitions. In addition, they also reject the realist assumption that 
states are unitary or rational actors. Furthermore, liberal institutionalists argue that 
power and security were becoming less important for states, which view other 
states increasingly as partners and not as enemies. Of course, they also reject 
the pessimism that realists maintain concerning the capabilities of international 
institutions (Grieco, 1995, 153ff).  
 
Neoliberalism, which was established in the 1980s, differs from prior liberal 
institutional thought in some respects. It accepts that states are the central actors 
in international politics and agrees with realists insofar as states are unitary-
rational agents. However, neoliberals strongly differ with realists on the potential 
for international cooperation. They argue that “countervailing forces […] that 
cause states to keep their promises” (ibid., 156) in international arrangements do 
exist. Neoliberal theory sees two ways in order to “manage verification and 
sanctioning problems” (ibid., 158). One way is to limit the number of partners in 
international arrangements. It is, however, of greater importance to neoliberals to 
establish international institutions since they “reduce the verification costs, create 
iterativeness, and make it easier to punish cheaters” (ibid., 158). Additionally, they 
argue for cooperation on a conditional basis in order to resolve the problem of 
cheating. Realists have accused neoliberals for their exclusive focus on the 
problem of cheating because they see the problem of relative gains as a worse 
hindrance to international cooperation. Since neoliberals, however, define states 
as atomistic actors which lay out their interests individually, they do not see the 
problem of relative gains among states. This divergence in their views of the 
problem of cooperation is due to different interpretations of the meaning of 
anarchy by realists and liberals in general. Whereas for liberals anarchy means 
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the “lack of a central agency to enforce promises”, for realists it means that “there 
is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence” (ibid., 160).  
 
3. Constructivism 
The roots of Constructivism can be traced back to the ‘third debate’3, which 
was caused by the emergence of a reflectivist opposition to the positivist and 
rationalist approaches to the study of International Relations. Chernoff (2007; see 
Chapter 4) subsumes critical theory, poststructuralism and interpretive 
constructivism under the notion of reflective theories. In contrast, realist and 
liberal theories are referred to as rationalist theories. To put realism and liberalism 
with their almost contrary conceptions of the nature of the state and the condition 
of anarchy “under the common banner of rationalism is explicable only through 
reference to the fleeting convergence of traditions that accompanied the ‘neo’ 
ascendancy of the 1980s” (Phillips, 2007, 69). 
 
The ‘third debate’, which some scholars have not attributed an ordinal 
number but instead just called the ‘interparadigm debate’ (see Kurki & Wight, 
2007, 18f), was carried out between rationalists and scholars of the critical theory. 
It prevailed in the discussions of the discipline of International Relations in the 
1980s. The critique of the mainstream International Relations theories by scholars 
of critical theory, however, coincided with the ascendency of neorealism and 
neoliberalism. This led mainstream International Relations scholars to react in a 
rather imperturbable way to the critique by critical theorists. Moreover, the divide 
between rationalist and critical theorists was debilitated before it could manifest 
itself as the end of the Cold War revealed weaknesses on both sides. Thus, the 
end of the Cold War “served as an intellectual circuit breaker, exposing the 
limitation of existing approaches and providing an opening for the development of 
a more diverse range of explanations for the contemporary international 
phenomena” (Phillips, 2007, 62). It was the “more fluid disciplinary context of the 
immediate post-Cold War period” (ibid.) in that constructivism developed. 
                                            
3 The ‘second debate’, carried out between traditionalists and behaviorists (Kurki & Wight, 2007, 
17f), has not been mentioned because it is insignificant in the context of the thesis. 
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Whereas some refer to the “‘dialogue’ over constructivism” (Fierke, 2007, 168) as 
the ‘fourth debate’ in the discipline of International Relations, others see it tied to 
the interparadigm debate between rationalists and critical theorists and therefore 
refer to it as only the ‘third debate’ (Kurki & Wight, 2007, 19). 
 
Chernoff (2007, 139f) identifies two important differences that distinguish 
reflectivist/interpretive theories from naturalist/rationalist theories. The first 
important difference lies in the distinct meanings of “causation” that rationalists 
and constructivist hold. For rationalists, one event causes another, which is 
perceived as the outcome of a first event. Both events can be analyzed 
independently of each other. The first event “brings about the occurrence of a 
separate and independent [second] event” (Chernoff, 2007, 139f). For 
reflectivists, however, one event constitutes another. The two events cannot be 
analyzed independently of but only in connection to each other. A causation does 
not exist because both events are interrelated to one another. They are mutually 
constitutive of each other, a term elaborated in greater detail below. The 
relationships that rationalists and reflectivists attribute to two events occurring 
consecutively are distinct because of their dissimilar understanding of structure.  
 
The second important difference between rationalist and reflective theories 
concerns “reflexivity”. Chernoff (2007, 142) defines reflexivity as “the effects of 
theories on the behavior of leaders and states”. Scholars of reflective theories 
argue that international relations theories are reflexive in the way that they change 
the “subject matter they are studying by affecting the decisions leaders make” 
(ibid., 140f). As an example Chernoff mentions the actions that President Wilson 
took during and after the First World War. Influenced by the study of Kant's theory 
of a perpetual peace Wilson created the first real world institution, the League of 
Nations. Institutions then became a subject matter studied by international 
relations scholars resulting in the theory of liberal institutionalism. Rationalist 
theories lack this “reflexive effect” (ibid., 142) because they deny its existence. 
 
Constructivism has introduced a social dimension into the analysis of 
international relations by stressing the significance of norms, rules, and language. 
Constructivists reject the rationalists’ perception of one single objective reality and 
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maintain that the actors’ interests and identities are socially constructed. Thus, 
constructivism argues for a social ontology by emphasizing that objects cannot be 
analyzed separately from their normative meaning since the meaning shapes the 
objects’ identities and possible ways of action. The notion ‘ontology’ “refers to the 
nature of being and focuses on the types of objects the world is composed of” 
(Fierke, 2007, 169). A popular example for illustration, often referred to in the 
literature, are chess pieces. In a chess game, the knight cannot be analyzed 
separately from its normative meaning, as it would then only be a piece of wood 
shaped differently from the other chess figures. The identity of the knight and the 
moves it can conduct can only be analyzed in connection with its normative 
meaning attributed by the rules of the game. In the context of a chess game, the 
knight is a social fact, which “exists because of the meaning and value attributed” 
(ibid., 171) to it, rather than a material fact reducing its meaning to a piece of 
wood or plastic. Constructivists argue that the majority of international relations 
are social facts established by human acts of construction. The example of the 
knight in a chess game can be applied to international institutions, sovereignties, 
states or many more objects of international relations. They are all social facts 
defined by their normative meaning attributed by human beings. 
 
To emphasize again, constructivists maintain that the objects’ identities are 
constituted by their “doing” (Chernoff, 2007, 144) and therefore are not fixed as 
assumed by rationalists. Referring again to the example of pieces in a chess 
game, the identity of a knight is constituted by its moves. If the rules of the chess 
game were altered in a way that the knight were to move like a pawn, the identity 
of the knight would change as well, rendering it less important. How states 
interact with other states in the international arena constitutes their identity. 
Identities and actions are constitutive of one another. However, this “constitutive 
nature […] depends on the social structure” (ibid.), which leads to the next point of 
divergence between rationalists and constructivists.  
 
Constructivists differ significantly from rationalists in their understanding of 
the relationship between agents and structures. According to rationalists, 
structures constrain an agent’s actions. Within these constraints an agent pursues 
rational acts that are to produce a result. Thus, agents of rational theories are 
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guided by “logic of consequence” (Fierke, 2007, 170). According to 
constructivists, however, structures do not only constrain an agent's actions, but 
“they also constitute the identity of actors” (ibid.). A particular structure allows 
agents to carry out certain actions, which then constitute their identity. Agents of 
constructivist theories are guided by “logic of appropriateness” (ibid.). Thus, 
agents and structures are “mutually constituted” or “cogenerated” (Chernoff, 2007, 
147). The term mutually constitutive is applied not only to the relationship 
between agents and structures. As demonstrated above, identities and actions 
are also mutually constitutive of each other, as are identities and interests. In all of 
these relationships “constructivists focus on the constitutive role of norms and 
shared understandings” (Fierke, 2007, 170).  
 
Whereas the concept of ontology separates constructivists from 
rationalists, the interpretation of epistemology splits constructivists among 
themselves. Epistemology “deals with the origin and nature of knowledge” (Fierke, 
2007, 172). Some constructivists have adopted a positivist epistemology and 
thereby gained considerable legitimacy among their peer scholars of the 
positivist/rationalist camp. This first group of constructivists is called “conventional 
constructivists” (see Chernoff, 2007; Fierke, 2007) or “American constructivists” 
(see Chernoff, 2007). They are seen as inhabiting “a ‘middle ground’ between 
rationalist and poststructuralist approaches to IR” (Fierke, 2007, 172). Others 
have argued, though, that adopting a social ontology and a positivist epistemology 
is inconsistent and have adopted a social epistemology instead. This second 
group of constructivists is referred to as the “consistent” (see Fierke, 2007) or 
“interpretive” (see Chernoff, 2007) constructivists. The social or constructivist 
epistemology is “a product of the linguistic turn” (Fierke, 2007, 173f) and holds 
that the word or language used for an object is inseparable from itself and its 
meaning. Referring again to the knight in a chess game, the name of this 
particular chess piece is inseparable from the material object. Only in combination 
with the word “knight” do we know about the meaning of this piece of wood or 
plastic, its identity and moves, which are defined by the rules of the game. 
Following the constructivist epistemology, language is part of the world and not a 
mirror of the world, as assumed by adherents of a positivist epistemology (Fierke, 
2007, 175f).  
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There have always been doubts about constructivism of whether it is an 
approach or a theory. Interpretive constructivism with its social ontology and 
social or constructivist epistemology has been referred to as a metatheory. In that 
context interpretive constructivism would represent “a way of studying social 
relations” (Fierke, 2007, 174), in particular international relations, as opposed to 
the rationalist way of studying social sciences. In contrast, Wendt, who is probably 
one of the most famous constructivist international relations scholar, argues in his 
publication Social Theory of International Relations, published in 1999, that 
constructivism has the status of a substantive theory. Wendt, however, accepts 
tenets of the positivist methodology and epistemology and thereby could be put 
into the camp of conventional constructivism. Many proponents see conventional 
constructivism as a substantive theory of international relations (see Fierke, 2007; 
Chernoff, 2007). Others, like Phillips (2007, 67), however, argue against 
“constructivism's emergence as a commensurable peer competitor with 
established grand traditions”. Phillips substantiates his argumentation with two 
factors. First, constructivism is not grounded in a political philosophy like realism 
and liberalism are. It therefore lacks internal coherence. Second, constructivism is 
willing to ask questions about the processes through which entities are constituted 
and about the establishment of constitutive norms. Thus, putting constructivism 
on the same level with realism and liberalism would understate its effort in 
questioning the practices and institutions of traditional, rationalist mainstream 
theories (Phillips, 2007, 69f). Constructivism has often been criticized for not 
being falsifiable. This explains the small amount of specific substantive principles 
it has produced (Chernoff, 2007, 71).  
 
4. Neoconservatism or Democratic Realism 
Neoconservatism or democratic realism, as it is also called, has to be 
distinguished from the former three theoretical concepts in that it is neither a 
specific approach to foreign policy, nor a substantive theory of International 
Relations. It is more generally referred to as “a broader set of principles not 
specifically focused on IR [International Relations] or foreign policy” (Chernoff, 
2007, 52). Probably because neoconservatism does not limit its purpose on 
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foreign policy when it comes to dealing with foreign policy topics, 
neoconservatives adopt realist principles as well as liberal and idealist principles. 
On the one hand, neoconservatives share with realists, for example, the 
emphasis on power in the international system, the skepticism concerning the 
capabilities of forums for international cooperation, or the focus on the state as a 
unit of analysis. On the other hand, however, neoconservatives support the liberal 
“democratic peace” thesis. In addition, similar to the idealist thought of the 
interwar period, neoconservatives add a moral component to their set of 
guidelines. They claim that the United States should act morally and will be 
successful in doing so (Chernoff, 2007, 53). 
 
 Ilan Peleg (2009, 51) identifies eight major ideas neoconservatism is based 
on: “(1) assertive nationalism (or patriotism); (2) radicalism (reflected in complete 
rejection of the status quo [of world politics in favor of the pursuit of global 
hegemony]); (3) militarism, especially in terms of switching from a defensive 
posture of deterrence and containment to an offensive posture of preemption and 
prevention; (4) exceptionalism4; (5) a mixture of optimism and Hobbesian 
pessimism; (6) imperial universalism in the name of two different but connected 
ideas, democratization and benevolent hegemony; (7) evangelism; and (8) 
unilateralism”. As their “fundamental goals” Peleg identifies the worldwide spread 
of democracy, especially to countries opposed to the U.S., the inducement of 
regime change in several but mostly countries hostile to the U.S., and the 
establishment of American global hegemony (ibid., 55).  
 
There are several reasons why democratic realism or neoconservatism is 
not regarded as a “legitimate theoretical approach to IR” (Chernoff, 2007, 53). 
Neoconservatives have never published their views in any academic journal but 
instead used newspapers and popular journals as mediums to spread their 
thoughts. Moreover, democratic realism lacks definitive publications comparable 
to Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Waltz’s Theory 
of International Politics, Keohane’s After Hegemony, or Wendt’s Social Theory of 
                                            
4 “Exeptionalism is the belief that America is not merely special but truly unique and even superior 
to other nations of the world, because of its historical experience, inherent social values (such as 
equality), and political institutions (especially its vibrant democracy)” (Peleg, 2009, 57).  
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International Politics, which would allow for discussion and comparison with other 
approaches to International Relations theory. In addition, the way in which 
democratic realism is formulated, with its moral imperatives, does not allow for 
any testing. Even if neoconservatism were regarded as testable, it could only be 
tested by the single case of Iraq. 
  25 
III. Analysis of the Transatlantic Relations by Scholars 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how two scholars, each using 
different approaches of international relations theories, have analyzed the 
transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Europe. Robert Kagan, a scholar 
adhering to the neoconservative ideology, has applied on a double approach, 
mainly realist and partly idealist. Stephanie B. Anderson, a scholar with a 
background derived from the critical theory, has analyzed the transatlantic 
relations from a constructivist standpoint. Some criticism will be raised after a brief 
presentation of their works.  
 
1. Robert Kagan: “Power and Weakness” 
Robert Kagan’s article “Power and Weakness” issued in 2002 in the 
scholarly journal Policy Review and published in 2003 as a book with the title “Of 
Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order” has become 
an almost indispensable piece of literature to observers of the transatlantic 
relations between the U.S. and Europe. Smith (2003, 863) even views it as 
“required reading for observers of relations between these traditional allies [U.S. 
and Europe]”. This is it not only because Kagan has triggered much discussion on 
both sides of the Atlantic but also because of “the essay's fabulous timing” 
(Bratspies, 2003, 898). By this Bratspies refers to the underlying “neoconservative 
vision” (ibid.) put forward at a time when a strongly neoconservative 
administration took office two years earlier, in 2001. 
  
In his essay Kagan asserts that the U.S. and Europe would differ “on major 
strategic and international questions” (Kagan, 2002, 3) so much as if they lived in 
two different worlds. The European countries have turned away from power as a 
means of conducting their foreign policy and instead refer to negotiation, 
diplomacy, commercial ties, international laws, or seduction (ibid.). The U.S., 
however, still relies on the use of force, military capabilities, coercion or even 
unilateralism if necessary as means of conducting its foreign policy. As a 
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consequence Kagan suggests that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are 
from Venus” (ibid., 3). His analysis of this “strategic chasm” (ibid., 11) is based on 
two argumentations. The first relates to the disparity in military power between the 
U.S. and Europe, which he refers to as the power gap. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the defense budgets of the European countries, and thus their military 
capabilities, have been steadily declining. The defense budget and the military 
capabilities of the U.S., however, have been rising since 1945. According to 
Kagan, a psychology of power and weakness is inherent in his so called power 
gap. Since Europe possesses only few military capabilities, it has no other choice 
but to live with the dangers of the world. In contrast, due to their military strength, 
Americans do not accept just living with problems but they want to solve them. 
Their great power, however, makes them the primary target of terrorist or other 
attacks, which is why Americans often refer to most of the dangers of the worlds 
as intolerable “threats”. Conversely, due to their military weakness Europeans 
regard most of the dangers in the world as “challenges” and those few that are 
experienced as threats are appraised as tolerable (ibid. 32ff).  
 
 The second argumentation of Kagan’s essay refers to the different 
experiences of the U.S. and Europe with history after the Second World War. By 
realizing the project of the European integration, Europeans made the so far 
unique experience that an establishment of peace is possible without the use of 
force but by setting up self-enforcing rules, by following bureaucratic processes 
and by obeying international (in this case European) law. It has been this 
particular historical experience of the peaceful project of the European integration, 
which Kagan views as the enemy of European military power and which made 
Europe become militarily weak. As a consequence the European countries 
adopted a strategic culture that assigns a less important role to power. The 
historical experience of the U.S. after 1945 was, however, to provide the security 
umbrella for the Europeans so that they could fully concentrate on their project of 
the European integration. Kagan even goes so far as to refer to the European 
integration and the European weakness as “the product of American foreign 
policy stretching back over the better part of nine decades” (ibid. 70). Thus, their 
historical experience rendered Americans a strategic culture that still assigns an 
important role to power. In order to demonstrate the strategic difference between 
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the U.S. and Europe, Kagan picks up a caricature and claims that “Europeans 
have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of 
perpetual peace” (ibid., 57). The U.S., however, must have remained in the 
Hobbesian world of anarchy in order to defend the Kantian paradise of perpetual 
peace for the Europeans against outside forces. 
 
  Kagan’s thesis, put forward in “Power and Weakness”, has ruffled feathers 
on both sides of the Atlantic and also caused a considerable amount of debate. 
Lotheringen (2003, 979) essentially criticizes Kagan for generalizing about the 
European countries since “they vary in their weakness and they vary in their 
attitudes to war from case to case”. The lack of a “homogenized European 
strategic culture” (ibid.) has become particularly evident in the wake of the Iraq 
war. Bratspies criticizes Kagan for his generalization as well as for his 
simplification. His acceptance of military force as the one and only form of power 
leads to an “overly narrow conception of power”, which presents “a fundamental 
flaw” not only for Bratspies (2003, 894). Also, Henrikson (2003, 5f) regards 
Kagan's unidimensional view of power as a point of critique since he thereby 
despises Europe's capabilities. Bratspies also criticizes Kagan’s simplified 
depiction of weakness by maintaining that instead of just “a state of ‘unpower’” 
weakness “is a nuanced proposition” (ibid., 896). Additionally, she challenges the 
“a priori status” (ibid., 892) that the attributes ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ maintain in 
Kagan's analysis. By this she refers to Kagan’s thesis that the dispositions of 
strong and weak “have naturally produced differing strategic judgements, differing 
assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats” (Kagan, 
2002, 6, emphasis added). Bratspies further criticizes Kagan for confusing cause 
and consequence. Whereas Kagan argues that Europe has a different strategic 
culture because it has few military capabilities, Bratspies contends that Europe 
adopted a specific set of values, and thereby a strategic culture that is different 
from the U.S. And, as a consequence, it has rejected the use of force and large 
weapon arsenals. Thus, the weak military capabilities resulted from a different 
foreign policy approach and not the foreign policy approach from the weak military 
capabilities, as Kagan would assert (Bratspies, 2003). 
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 Smith (2003, 864) criticizes Kagan’s exaggeration of the differences 
between the U.S. and Europe by maintaining that the “placement of Americans 
and Europeans in different worlds is literally absurd”. Dilling (2003, 969) also 
criticizes Kagan for his “exaggeration of the role the American military power” was 
playing in post-war Europe. He rather views the presence of U.S. military power 
as a “latent structure” (ibid., 966) that might have kept order but as such is 
impossible to verify. Henrikson (2003, 4), however, has not only criticized Kagan 
for exaggerating the differences but also for polarizing them so much that the 
effect of his analysis “could prove to be exactly the opposite” of his intention. 
Paulus (2003, 871) shares Henrikson’s concern by pointing out that “Kagan’s 
work confirms rather than challenges the prejudices and stereotypes of both sides 
[the U.S. and Europe]”.  
 
 In his analysis of the transatlantic relations Kagan uses a realist approach, 
which becomes immediately evident when reading the title of his essay. This 
further becomes evident by Kagan’s continuous reference to power in order to 
explain the differences between the U.S. and Europe. In addition Henrikson 
claims that Kagan also uses an idealist and a constructivist argumentation and 
therefore criticizes him for his theoretical inconsistence. The idealist 
argumentation can be found in the part where Kagan writes about the historical 
experiences of the U.S. and Europe. The mix of realist and idealist 
argumentations creates the “neoconservative vision” (Bratspies, 2003, 898) that 
Kagan is trying to persuade his readers of. The constructivist argumentation is not 
elaborately developed, which, Henrikson suggests, might be the case because 
Kagan himself is not convinced of it.  
 
2. Stephanie B. Anderson: Crafting EU Security Policy  
In her book Crafting EU Security Policy. In Pursuit of a European Identity 
Stephanie Anderson explores the motivations behind the creation of the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as well as its impacts on the U.S. and 
NATO, the European Union and the European nations domestically. Disproving 
realist arguments, Anderson argues that the ESDP has not been launched for the 
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purpose of defense or deterrence. Neither, she argues, has the ESDP been 
created in order to aid international actors or institutions to manage global 
problems and dangers. Thus, she also disproves an international institutionalist 
argumentation. Anderson further argues against an integrationist argumentation 
according to which the ESDP is the next stage in the evolution of the European 
integration. The thesis put forward in her book rather maintains that “the ESDP is 
a necessary nation-building tool” (Anderson, 2008, 8) that has been established in 
order to create a European identity. Accordingly, Anderson applies a constructivist 
approach to reveal the motivations behind the creation of the ESDP. In context of 
her thesis Anderson also addresses the transatlantic relations and the differences 
between the U.S. and Europe when she writes about “the role of the Unites States 
in the European integration process” (ibid., 7). 
 
 Her analysis of the U.S.-European relations draws on the “minimal group 
paradigm” (ibid., 68) as its theoretical basis. It alleges that identities are often 
created through inclusion and differentiation, which result in the foundation of an 
“in-group” and an “out-group”. The designation of an “other” minimizes the 
distinction between the members of the “in-group” and simultaneously maximizes 
their similarities. The U.S. presents itself as the best actor for designating an 
“other” because the “EU member states’ relationship with the Unites States is one 
of the most potent forces binding them together” (ibid., 70). Following this line of 
argumentation in their European political cooperation, the EU member states 
have been trying to apply policies different of those of the U.S. Hence, Anderson 
views the roots of the ESDP “in distinguishing itself from the policies of the Unites 
States, and not in defense per se” (ibid. 68). The European Security Strategy 
(ESS) was thereby created for the purpose of showing how different the European 
strategic culture was from that of the U.S. and “became a vital tool in creating a 
European identity” (ibid. 90).  
 
 Therefore, according to Anderson's thesis, the differences between the 
U.S. and Europe are a consequence of Europe's search for a European identity. 
In contrast, to Kagan’s analysis, which is mainly driven by a realist and partly by 
an idealist argumentation, Anderson in her construction of a European identity 
follows a constructivist argumentation. The rift in the transatlantic relations is not 
  30 
caused by a gap in the military capabilities of the U.S. and Europe or because of 
Europe’s idealist “mission civilisatrice” (Kagan, 2002, 18) that sees the military 
power of the U.S. and its exercise as a threat to Europe’s mission. The 
divergence between the U.S. and Europe is caused by the Europeans seeking to 
create a European identity by distancing themselves from the U.S.  
 
 Anderson’s explanation for the transatlantic rift is not completely new. The 
argument that the achievement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was motivated by the EU’s desire to differentiate itself from the U.S. was 
also raised, for example, by Henrikson (2003, 6) five years earlier. Anderson’s 
constructivist European identity thesis has not been as seriously debated as has 
Kagan’s realistic “power equation” thesis (Kagan, 2002, 6). The reason for that 
might be that Anderson’s analysis of the transatlantic relations is not only less 
provocative but also shared by other scholars. Nevertheless, there are also some 
flaws inherent in Anderson’s analysis as will be explained below.  
 
 Again, one has to ask if cause and consequence have not been confused. 
Anderson argues that the establishment of the ESDP is the consequence of the 
need to create a European identity. The question may also be put if the opposite 
way is not more plausible, which would mean that the creation of a European 
identity is the consequence of the establishment of the ESDP. This would then 
contradict Anderson’s constructivist argumentation of the motivations behind the 
establishment of the ESDP. A realist argumentation can be clearly excluded since 
the military capabilities of the ESDP are too few. However, it might be the case 
that Anderson was too quick in disproving an international institutionalist or an 
integrationist argumentation. The underlying reason for the creation of the ESDP 
might well be the EU's desire to be a global player in international politics, even if 
its assistance can only be a minor contribution due to its limited military 
capabilities. Furthermore, Anderson’s argument that “adding a military dimension 
was a conscious decision to break with past images of the EU as a civilian power” 
(Anderson, 2008, 33) and not the next stage of European integration, is difficult to 
verify and seems to be her personal opinion. After all, the member states of the 
EU wanted to integrate their defense policies as early as in the 1950s.  
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 The arguments presented above seem to be reasoned by preferences for 
different schools of international relations theory. What appears to be a real flaw, 
however, is that Anderson talks of a European identity when she refers to EU 
policy. The obvious problem is that European countries that are not members of 
the EU would not possess a European identity since they do not integrate their 
defense policies. Consequently, Switzerland or Norway, countries that share very 
similar values with the six founding countries of the European Union (before 1994 
referred to as the European Community), would not possess a European identity. 
Bulgaria and Rumania, countries that probably share more common values with 
their neighboring non-EU countries Serbia and Macedonia than with the six 
founding countries, however, would possess a European identity only because 
they coordinate their defense policies.5 To counteract that flaw Anderson would 
have to talk of a EU identity.  
 
 Finally, Anderson sees the ESS as “a vital tool in creating a European 
identity” (ibid., 90) and therefore as a means by which Europe distances itself 
from the U.S. It is to be challenged, however, if the ESS is really that different 
from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the U.S. in their pursuits of foreign 
policy goals. Even though the NSS does not mention multilateralism as explicitly 
as the ESS does, it still does not regard unilateralism as the basis for the 
achievement of its foreign policy goals.  
 
                                            
5 At this point the six countries that founded the European Union are taken as guide of reference 
for EU identity since they from the beginning set up the value system necessary to establish any 
identity. Other applying countries had to orientate themselves to this value system in order to be 
admitted to the EU.  
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IV. The Transatlantic Relations from 2001-2008 
  
This chapter unfolds the main part of the thesis, the analysis of the U.S.-
German and U.S.-French relations in the years between 2001 and 2008. In the 
course of the analysis the main research question and thesis as well as its sub-
questions and sub-theses will be addressed. The chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part has the transatlantic split over the 2003 Iraq War as well as its 
make-up and time afterwards as subject. The second part addresses the 
transatlantic rapprochement that is argued to have been pursued by both the U.S. 
and its European allies during Bush’s second term in the years from 2005 to 
2008. In each of the two parts the constellation of the Bush administration and its 
approach to foreign policy, the events and developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and 
France are analyzed. 
 
 
1. The Transatlantic Split: George W. Bush’s First Term 
  
In order to assess the impact the 2003 Iraq crisis had on the transatlantic 
relationship between the U.S. and Germany on the one hand and France on the 
other hand, it is necessary to give a short overview of how the disagreements 
between these allies evolved. Starting with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, a sketchy impression of the European reactions to the disaster that had 
happened to the U.S. is given. Following on that, a brief outline of the military 
engagements by the U.S. troops and by the troops of the international coalition in 
Afghanistan is presented. Furthermore, the diplomatic exchanges in the make-up 
of the Iraq War as well as the military engagements in Iraq are elucidated. Lastly, 
the time immediately after the 2003 split until the end of 2004 when the parties 
exchanged first signs of reconciliation is subject to this chapter. 
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1.1. The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration in Its First 
Term 
There has been a lot of discussion about the foreign policy pursued by the 
George W. Bush administration, in particular during its first term. Many scholars 
see Bush’s foreign policy as being heavily influenced by neoconservative 
principles and have been very critical of the policies pursued by the Bush 
administration. However, others perceive Bush’s approach to foreign policy as 
being largely guided by realist (IR theory) principles and do not see a big 
deviation from U.S. foreign policy tradition. They acknowledge that there were 
neoconservatives appointed though, however, none of them was in a leading 
position.  
 
According to Peleg (2009, 1), adhering to the first group of scholars, 
American foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration was shaped by 
five important factors: “the personality of President George W. Bush, the foreign 
policy decision-making process established by his administration, the impact of 
the extremely traumatic events of September 11, 2001, the challenge to the 
United States’ unipolar supremacy within an ever-changing international system, 
and the influence of a determined intellectual elite often referred to as 
Neoconservative”. Peleg maintains that the combination of factors resulted in a 
unilateral, hegemonic, and militaristic foreign policy, adopted by the Bush 
Administration, which was based on ideology rather than on facts. Under the 
influence of the powerful neoconservative group of policy advisors in Bush’s team, 
American foreign policy was adhering to Wilsonian idealistic principles such as 
the democratization of hostile regimes. However, it abandoned the Wilsonian 
multilateralism and did not recognize the legitimacy Wilsonians attribute to 
international organizations (Gärtner, 2009, 73f). In embracing this new foreign 
policy style, the Bush administration not only “deviated from accepted norms in 
American foreign policy and from the well-established, bipartisan Washington 
consensus, […] some analysts have called liberal internationalism” (Peleg, 2009, 
7). It also “accelerated and energized processes unfavorable to the United States 
and intensified worldwide anti-Americanism” (ibid.).  
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Neoconservatism as the Ideological Basis 
The most important one of the five factors stated above was probably the 
influence that the neoconservative elite had on the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration. Peleg (2009, 45) claims that “[n]eoconservatism has been the 
basis of the foreign policy of the Bush administration”. Peleg’s argument can be 
supported by several elements of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, which 
indicate that it strongly leaned towards the neoconservative ideology. The pursuit 
of fixing other countries’, especially Iraq’s, internal policies as well as 
democratizing them (ibid., 50) would relate to the imperial universalism identified 
by Peleg as one of the eight major ideas neoconservatism is based on (see 
Chapter II. 4.). The strong emphasis on military power and the preference of hard 
power over soft power were in accordance with neoconservatism’s tendency to 
stress the militaristic aspect of foreign policy. The perception of international 
politics as “a struggle between good and evil” (ibid.) drew from the evangelism 
(ibid., 68) that prevailed the administration, which was largely made up of born-
again evangelicals. Also, moralization of the war policy and unilateral behavior 
were in the “Neoconservative mode of thinking and argumentation” (ibid., 50).  
 
The Bush Doctrine of preemption, which was articulated in a speech at 
West Point in June 2002 and further advanced in the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) 2002, determined the U.S. foreign policy after 9/11. While Peleg holds that 
it was a predominantly neoconservative document, Renshon (2007, 3) maintains 
that the Doctrine’s “assumptions in some key respects are perfectly compatible 
with traditional ‘realism’”. In his argumentation he refers to and quotes Robert 
Jervis who writes, “[o]ffensive realism perhaps provides the best explanation for 
what the US is doing” (Jervis, 2003, 316 quoted in Renshon, 2007, 15). 
Alexander, publishing in the same book as Renshon, also argues against the 
radical departure of the Bush Doctrine from major schools of foreign policy 
thought. He claims that “the neoconservative foreign policy thinking embodied in 
the Doctrine is a variant of realism, specifically a variant of a variant of realism, 
“balance-of-threat” realism” (Alexander, 2007, 39f). 
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President George W. Bush’s Personality 
Among President Bush’s most important characteristics Peleg (2009, 84) 
lists his Manichean worldview, referring to a tendency to divide the world into 
good versus evil forces, “his pessimistic and conflictual view of the world”, “his 
closed-mindedness toward alternative views”, and “his lack of flexibility in 
reexamining his own political positions” (ibid., 84). Lesch (2006, 233) adds Bush’s 
“stubbornness, his sense of self-righteousness, and his apparently willful 
disregard of realities on the ground” to this enumeration. Furthermore Bush has 
also been criticized for his lack of knowledge of and interest in international 
politics, which made the President largely dependent on his policy advisors’ 
counsel (Peleg, 2009, 84f). In this regard Renshon holds a different view of the 
President. While he admits that “when he entered the presidency, Mr. Bush was 
unschooled in foreign affairs” (Renshon, 2007, 8), he strongly argues against 
portraying Bush as a “dunce” who was unable to learn about foreign affairs during 
his time in office as President. While most scholars, including Peleg, maintain that 
Bush was not a neoconservative before he assumed the presidency, he 
“gradually moved in the idealistic, neoconservative direction and eventually 
adopted it completely as the overarching policy of his administration” (ibid., 83). 
Renshon and others, however, maintain that even if his policies were determined 
by the neoconservative thinking and argumentation, President Bush himself 
remained a realist. 
 
Another point of discussion represented Bush’s appointments, of which 
some were highly controversial. It seemed as if Bush did not make his 
appointments on the basis of a person’s expertise but on their identification with 
the neoconservative principles, their loyalty to, and their interpersonal 
relationships with the President. As a consequence, not only was Bush not 
counseled in the best ways possible, but the administration was also at risk of 
falling prey to groupthink6 (Peleg, 2009, 76, 85, 101, 112). While some decisions, 
in particular the one concerning the invasion of Iraq, showed “many 
characteristics of groupthink” (ibid., 112), the split within Bush’s Cabinet into a 
                                            
6 The term groupthink can be defined as “a tendency to limit outside advice to those who already 
supported the administration’s viewpoint and policy preferences (Hook & Spanier, 2007, 358). 
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neoconservative and a realist fraction hindered the establishment of classic 
groupthink though.  
 
Several attempts have been made to classify or categorize President 
George W. Bush and to attribute a label to him. Two of those attempts are as 
follows. Gerard Magliocca (2009, 475) maintains “that the circumstances beyond 
his control forced him [George W. Bush] to act as an affiliated and as a 
reconstructive leader at the same time”. As an “affiliated leader” Bush adapted to 
existing structures rather than repudiating them (ibid., 479f). The events of 
September 11, however, created a situation in which Bush was able to challenge 
preexisting arrangements and to craft a new policy. This crisis rendered Bush a 
reconstructive leader (ibid., 483ff). Peleg (2009, 79) classified Bush as an “active-
negative” President. Such Presidents “want to get power, keep it, and even 
expand it, but they do not really derive satisfaction from the job” (ibid.). Moreover, 
such Presidents are likely to have split personalities. On the one hand they 
achieve great accomplishments, but on the other hand they also disclose great 
failures.  
The Decision-Making Unit (DMU) 
The decision making process of the George W. Bush Administration 
primarily occurred in two circles of policy formation. The first and more important 
one was what Peleg (2009, 104) referred to as the “decision-making unit (DMU) 
within the White House”, essentially the Cabinet. The second circle consisted of 
the “foreign policy, defense, and intelligence bureaucracy” (ibid.). The DMU of the 
Bush Administration was characterized by its political homogeneity. Members of 
both, first-term and second-term, Cabinets were “politically conservative, 
ideologically consistent, and generally pro-life and pro-business” (Warshaw, 2006, 
75). In his first-term Cabinet, twelve of the fourteen Administration officials 
belonged to the conservative wing of the Republican Party (ibid.). The other two 
officials were the Democratic holdover from the Clinton Cabinet, Norman Mineta, 
and the moderate Republican, Colin Powell. Moreover, most of them were 
Evangelical Christians; not a single non-Christian was taken on.  
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Like Ronald Reagan’s Cabinet, Bush’s first-term Administration consisted 
of some political ideologues7 (Warshaw, 2006, 68). They formed the bigger 
“hawkish in-group dominated by the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis” (Peleg, 2009, 105), 
which was in large part guided by neoconservative principles. The smaller 
“moderate, dovish, Realist out-group” (ibid.) was led by Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and also included Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and 
Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State (DoS) Richard Haass. 
Thus, President Bush’s split personality was reflected in the Cabinet, which was 
divided into a neoconservative and a realist fraction. While Bush had supported 
Powell’s realist pragmatism before 9/11, the realist fraction was gradually 
marginalized following the terrorist attacks (ibid., 108). As a consequence, also 
the entire DoS was marginalized, which was mirrored in two ways: First, “Powell 
was systematically kept out of the president’s ‘loop’” and second, the Pentagon, 
rather than the DoS, was entrusted with the control of post-war Iraq (ibid., 117). 
The rift between the realist and neoconservative fractions in the Administration 
also represented the traditional struggle between the DoS and the Department of 
Defense (DoD), which is inherent in every Administration but exacerbated during 
Bush’s first term.  
 
However, the events of September 11, resulting in the adoption of a foreign 
policy that stressed the military aspect and therefore in a privilege of the DoD, 
were only part of the explanation for the treatment of the DoS in Bush’s first term. 
Ideological differences and personal relations accounted more for the treatment of 
the DoS. From the beginning, members of the neoconservative camp, especially 
Rumsfeld and Cheney, sought to limit Powell’s realist influence on the President. 
Also the relationship between Powell and Bush had never been in good shape. 
This circumstance proved to be disadvantageous for Powell since with President 
Bush “everything was personal” (ibid.). The importance of personal relations in the 
Bush Administration was demonstrated by the improvement of the relationship 
between the White House and the DoS when Condoleezza Rice became 
                                            
7 The author is aware of the fact that the word ‘ideologues’ or ‘ideology’ can have a negative 
connotation and distances herself from this context. The description of some in the Bush 
administration’s team as neoconservative ‘ideologues’ is widespread in the academic literature 
and has been used to indicate that those people indentified with neoconservative principles more 
profoundly than others.  
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Secretary of State. Notwithstanding her realist foreign policy background, Rice 
was absorbed by the neoconservative thinking. However, she again adopted an 
increasingly realist foreign policy on international affairs when Rumsfeld was 
replaced by the realist Robert Gates in 2006.  
 
In contrast to Peleg, Renshon (2007, 7) regards the existence of “a small, 
highly influential group of neoconservatives”, the so-called “Neoconservative 
Cabal” that dominated U.S. foreign policy under Bush, as a myth. Moreover, he 
also argues against classifying Powell, Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld as 
neoconservatives. If anything, he analyzes, they were “conservative nationalists 
and maybe even “realists”, but not neoconservatives” (ibid., 8). While Powell is 
more associated with realism and Rice is often regarded as to have followed the 
predominant chorus of the Bush Administrations by switching between 
neoconservatism and realism, Rumsfeld and Cheney had close ties to 
neoconservatism. Together with I. Lewis Libby and Paul Wolfowitz Cheney 
oversaw the draft of the Defense Planning Guidance, which was written by the 
first two and is regarded as the neoconservative policy foundation of the Bush 
Doctrine. Moreover, Cheney and Rumsfeld were “charter signatories of the 
Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a pressure group tied to the 
neoconservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI) that was founded in the late 
1990s to advocate hardline U.S. policies in the Middle East” (Institute for Policy 
Studies, 2009a, [online]). Thus, even while critical sources of Cheney and 
Rumsfeld acknowledge that they were not neoconservatives but “hardline 
nationalist” (ibid.), both had very close ties with the neoconservatives. Moreover, 
they were profoundly influenced by I. Lewis Libby, the Vice President’s former 
chief of staff, and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Both are widely 
regarded as neoconservatives and Wolfowitz is even referred to as “[a] key 
intellectual figure associated with neoconservatism” (ibid., 2009b, [online]). 
The September 11 Terrorist Attacks and the Unipolar Supremacy of the U.S.  
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center had a 
considerable impact on the foreign policy of the George W. Bush Administration. 
According to Peleg (2009, 7), the “[a]ssertive, overly militaristic unilateralism 
became the preferred option” for foreign policy making. However, far more 
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substantial than an Administration acting “in an even more unilateral, hegemonic, 
and militaristic manner than before” September 11 (ibid., 7) was the “intimidation 
factor of 9/11” (ibid., 124). The Congress supported major foreign policy initiatives 
by the President and authorized the use of force in a bipartisan vote, as was the 
case for the Iraq invasion. This rather unusual behavior was justified by the 
Senators’ and Representatives’ fear of the public’s rage if they worked against the 
President’s proclaimed War on Terrorism. Moreover, in a fear of being judged as 
unpatriotic “the American media was exceptionally nonaggressive and nonprobing 
in questioning the administration’s decisions” (ibid.). It was only after the Iraq 
disaster and when the flaws about the invasion became clear that the media 
shifted to a more critical coverage of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as of 
the Administration’s policies. Public excuses for their uncritical coverage were 
announced by famous journalists and reporters working at the New York Times, 
the Washington Post or at CBS (ibid.). 
 
Even though the Bush Administration intensified its unilateral approach to 
foreign policy after 9/11, it “had already established a full-fledged unilateralist 
behavioral pattern” (ibid., 70) by the time the terrorist attacks happened. It 
denounced five multilateral initiatives in its first year: the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, the International Criminial Court (ICC), the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaty, and the Kyoto 
Protocol8 on climate change. To be sure, unilateralism has always been part of 
American foreign policy, however, the extent to which the Bush Administration 
acted unilaterally was largely made possible by the “unipolar moment”9 that 
evolved after the Cold War. Yet, while the previous two Presidents of the post-
Cold War period, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, exercised a “restrained 
unipolarism” (ibid., 46), George W. Bush’s on the whole unreserved unilateral 
behavior was reasoned by the neoconservative thinking that for the most part 
determined his foreign policy.  
 
                                            
8 However, in reference to the Kyoto Protocol it needs to be mentioned that the U.S. Senate voted 
against the multilateral treaty with a vote of 95:0 still in 1997 under President Bill Clinton. Thus, 
criticism of the Bush administration is only justified concerning its omission to revitalize the treaty 
but not for its denunciation.  
9 The “unipolar moment” is an expression coined by Krauthammer (1991), which refers to a time-
limited unipolar system. Beginning in 2093, the Iraq War is seen as to have ended that period.  
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Summing up, many scholars see in the Bush revolution a profound 
departure from traditional schools of foreign policy thought and the adherence to 
neoconservative principles in foreign policy making. They argue for a change in 
terms of the means, which includes unreserved unilateralism, the use of force 
rather than diplomacy, the Bush doctrine of preemption, and even a policy of 
prevention10. Furthermore, they argue for a change in terms of goals, which 
includes the spread of democracy (even with militaristic means if necessary), 
regime change in “rogue states” and in other regimes hostile to the U.S., and the 
sustaining America’s status as regional hegemon with global ambitions (Peleg, 
2009, 55). Others, however, argue against a revolution in foreign policy making 
during the Bush Administrations and defend the Bush Doctrine as being in line 
with the realist school of foreign policy thought.  
 
1.2. 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan 
European Solidarity with the U.S. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, triggered a wave of solidarity 
with the United States in Europe. The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, in 
his government statement of September 12, 2001, in the Deutsche Bundestag 
(the nationally elected chamber of the German parliament), claimed that the 
people of Germany stood by the United States and that the terrorist attacks 
represented a declaration of war against the entire civilized world. He assured the 
President of the United States of Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” and guaranteed 
the people of the United States all the help they would need: 
 
 
                                            
10 Preemption is referring to the right to use force in face of an imminent threat (Gordon et al., 
2004, 68). The Iraq War is generally referred to as a preemptive war. However, some analysts 
argue that the danger emanating from Iraq was not imminent but potential and therefore refer to 
the Iraq War as preventive war. Prevention refers to the use of force in face of a potential threat. 
The application of the policy of preemption on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), as Bush did, is 
troubling since it is almost impossible to foresee a terrorist act. This renders all threats emanating 
from terrorists to be potential threats. According to international law, however, the use of force is 
only justified if there is a manifest threat, which would deprive the GWOT of its legality. There has 
been much debate aroused around this issue. 
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“Meine Damen und Herren, ich habe dem amerikanischen Präsidenten 
das tief empfundene Beileid des gesamten deutschen Volkes 
ausgesprochen. Ich habe ihm auch die uneingeschränkte – ich betone: 
die uneingeschränkte – Solidarität Deutschlands zugesichert. … Die 
Menschen in Deutschland stehen in dieser schweren Stunde fest an 
der Seite der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. … Selbstverständlich 
bieten wir den Bürgern und Behörden der Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika jede gewünschte Hilfe an, … Die gestrigen Anschläge in New 
York und Washington sind nicht nur ein Angriff auf die Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika; sie sind eine Kriegserklärung gegen die gesamte 
zivilisierte Welt.” (Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/186, 
18293f) 
 
 His party colleague and then chairman of the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD) Peter Struck became famous for his statement, “Today we 
are all Americans” (original: “Heute sind wir alle Amerikaner”; ibid., 18294f) and 
asserted that, together with the government, the SPD would not abandon its 
American friends. The former chairman of the coalition partner BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN, Rezzo Schlauch, also confirmed Germany’s solidarity with the people, 
the President and the government of the United States (ibid.). So too did the 
former chairmen of the opposition parties, Friedrich Merz of the Christlich 
Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU), Wolfgang Gerhardt of 
the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), and Roland Claus of the former Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), which since 2007 has called itself DIE LINKE 
and has usually been critical of the policies of the United States.  
 
Statements of solidarity with the United States were also issued on the 
local level. The mayor of the city of Hamburg claimed, similarly to Peter Struck, 
“We are all Americans” (original: “Wir sind alle Amerikaner”; in: “Die ganze Stadt 
hält den Atem an”, 2001, September 13). Moreover, all parties adjourned their 
campaigns for the Hamburger Bürgschaft, the state parliament of Hamburg, in 
order to express sympathy for the people of the United States (“Hamburg trauert – 
Parteien stoppen Wahlkampf”, 2001, September 12). The terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
however, did not only overshadow Germany’s politics but its media coverage as 
well. Articles expressing Germany’s solidarity with the U.S., its sympathy with the 
American people, and its dismay at the terrorist attacks dominated the news and 
press coverage of national journals such as Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung or Süddeutsche Zeitung.  
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Furthermore, the people of Germany themselves showed great sympathy 
for the United States and its people. In Hamburg, hundreds of people signed 
books of condolence and for days on end churches opened their doors days long 
for prayers and devotions (“Die ganze Stadt hält den Atem an”, 2001, September 
13). In Berlin, thousands of people gathered in front of the embassy of the United 
States and lighted candles, laid down flowers or just stood there to express their 
commiseration (Bullion & Kammerer, 2001, September 13). At the Brandenburg 
Gate two hundred thousand people gathered spontaneously in order to show their 
solidarity (Pond, 2004, 10). In Washington, the German embassy organized a 
charity for the victims and survivors of the terrorist attacks with the prospect of 
attracting some tens of thousands of dollars. In the end the embassy was able to 
give USD 42 million in donations (ibid., 11). 
 
In France, still on September 11, President Jacques Chirac stated that the 
French people were on the side of the American people and expressed France’s 
solidarity and amity with the Americans. He further assured President Bush of his 
“unreserved support”.  
“Dans ces circonstances effroyables le people français – je tiens à le 
dire ici – tout entier, est aux côtés du peuple américain. Il lui exprime 
son amitié et sa solidarité dans cette tragédie. J’assure naturellement 
le Président George W. BUSH de mon soutien total.” (Intervention de 
M. Jacques Chirac, 2001, September 11) 
 
On September 19, in an address in front of the French community in New 
York, Chirac claimed that since September 11 all French people had an American 
part in their hearts (Allocution de M. Jacques Chirac, New York, 2001, September 
19). And on the same day, in an address to the French people in Washington 
D.C., he once again declared France’s solidarity with the United States and that 
the bond between France and the U.S. had always been the most solid one 
(original: “le lien unissant la France et les États-Unis s'est toujours montré le plus 
solide”; in: Allocution de M. Jacques Chirac, Washington, D.C., 2001, September 
19). Also, the French Premier Ministre Lionel Jospin declared his profound 
solidarity with the American people in a statement on the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 (Déclaration suite aux attentats aux Etats-Unis, 2001, September 
11). A day later, however, in an interview of an evening news program, Jospin 
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also made the U.S. aware of its responsibility (Intervention de Lionel Jospin, 2001, 
September 12). Moreover, there were announcements of solidarity in the French 
media. The French newspaper Le Monde became famous for its article written by 
Jean Marie Colombani with the heading “Nous sommes tous Américains”. The 
author alluded to John F. Kennedy’s famous statement proclaimed in 1962, “I am 
a Berliner”. Other acts of solidarity by the French people included, for example, 
laying flower bouquets in front of the American embassy in Paris (Moisi, 2001, 
September 13).  
 
Also the European Union, in response to the terrorist attacks, issued 
several official documents in which it declared its solidarity with the United States. 
The heads of state and government of the European Union, the President of the 
European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy “declared 14 
September a day of mourning” in a joint declaration and urged all European 
citizens to take “a three-minute silence to express our sincere and deepest 
sympathy for the victims and their families“ (Joint Declaration, 2001, September 
14). They further assured the President of the U.S. and the American people of 
their “complete solidarity and full cooperation” (ibid.). The Council of the European 
Union emphasized “its complete solidarity with the government of the United 
States and the American people“ (September 11 Attacks in the US, 2001, 
September 13). The President of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, also 
assured President Bush „that the people of Europe stand shoulder to shoulder 
with the people of the United States at this time of tragedy“ (Terrorist Attacks in 
the United States, 2001, September 12).  
 
This wave of overwhelming solidarity did not only overturn the rather 
negative pre-9/11 view of the United States held by Europeans. It also covered up 
the predestined clash between the neoconservative Administration in Washington 
and the center-left governments of Germany and France that would emerge two 
years later over the war in Iraq (Pond, 2004, 8 & 10). Yet, already in his 
government policy statement of September 19, 2001, German Chancellor 
Schröder remarked that the assistance Germany would provide for the United 
States in the war against terrorism would have to be in accordance with 
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Germany’s constitution. Furthermore, he pointed out that Germany’s responsibility 
as a NATO ally corresponded with its right on information and consultation. 
Schröder emphasized that Germany would be ready to take “risks in military 
engagements” but “it would not be ready for adventures”. A sentence that 
Schröder would use repeatedly a year later in his campaign for the Deutsche 
Bundestag to show his disagreement with Bush’s Iraq policy. He also indicated 
that fighting terrorism would not mean to fight one particular country. 
“Um welche Form der Unterstützung wir auch gebeten werden: Es ist 
eine absolute Selbstverständlichkeit, dass wir bei den Entscheidungen 
das Grundgesetz und die Rechtssprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts – dabei insbesondere die Rechte dieses 
Hohen Hauses – strikt beachten. … Mit der Bündnispflicht, die wir 
übernommen haben, korrespondiert ein Recht und dieses Recht heißt 
Information und Konsultation. … Ich betone: Zu Risiken – auch im 
Militärischen – ist Deuschland bereit, aber nicht zu Abenteuern. … Man 
kann es nicht oft genug betonen: Wir befinden uns nicht im Krieg 
gegen irgendeinen Staat.” (Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 
14/187, 18301ff) 
 
The Architecture of the International Engagement in Afghanistan 
Apart from European expressions of commiseration, also Russia, China, 
Pakistan and the majority of the Arab countries declared their solidarity with the 
United States. This led to the spontaneous development of an anti-terror alliance 
outside of institutionalized alliance patterns that the Bush Administration would be 
using in the war in Afghanistan (Krech, 2002, 27). The NATO countries declared 
solidarity with the U.S. as well and invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty11 
for the first time in the alliance’s history. Therefore the Bush Administration could 
also have decided to wage the war in Afghanistan through the institutionalized 
alliance pattern of the NATO the way the Clinton Administration did in the 1990s 
in the Balkan wars.  
  
However, under no circumstances wanted the Bush Administration to follow 
the approach of the Clinton Administration. Bush and his team shared the view 
                                            
11 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that […] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking […] 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area.” (The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington D.C. 4 April 1949) 
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that the Clinton Administration had been too sensitive to the concerns of its 
European allies. Clinton had delayed important foreign policy decisions because 
he sought to achieve transatlantic consensus. The Bush Administration desired to 
“distance itself from both the positions and the methods of its predecessor” 
(Gordon & Shapiro, 2004, 50). Despite the United States’ unique military capacity 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Clinton had kept up the tradition of 
cooperation and consultation of the Cold War era. In contrast, the Bush 
Administration, in view of the United States’ unprecedented power, saw an 
opportunity to break with this tradition. What was needed in order to form a 
coalition was decisive U.S. leadership rather than the institutionalized patterns of 
consultation and cooperation that had been used in the past decades.  
 
 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged the Administration in 
one of its National Security Council meetings to include the European allies in the 
military part of the mission in Afghanistan. However, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld did not want to integrate European units just for the sake of “cosmetic 
reasons” (Woodward, 2003, 202). He felt that they would only disturb the military 
mission. The Bush Administration saw no reason for including or consulting its 
European allies in greater detail either. It “was convinced that U.S. allies and 
partners would eventually follow the American lead while simultaneously allowing 
the United States to maintain its freedom of action” (Gordon et al., 2004, 50). 
 
 As early as the day after the terrorist attacks, in a meeting of the National 
Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued for a coalition of 
countries as broad as possible for the war in Afghanistan (Woodward, 2003, 65). 
Powell was of the opinion that the war in Afghanistan could only be fought 
together with partners, though this did not necessarily need to happen within the 
framework of NATO. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who was even more 
reluctant to use institutionalized alliance patterns or international organizations, 
stated that “[t]his war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single 
purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating 
coalitions of countries” (Clark, 2003, 121). The term “floating coalitions” became 
one of the slogans of the foreign policy approach of the Bush Administration. In 
one of the National Security Council meetings Rumsfeld said he neither wanted 
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the United Nations nor the NATO to participate in the war in Afghanistan. He 
rather preferred a coalition of countries under a common command, similar to a 
“coalition of the willing” (Woodward, 2003, 337) – another slogan was coined for 
Bush’s new way of engaging with other countries. Rumsfeld, however, probably 
became most famous for the following statement, which he uttered on several 
occasions, “The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not 
determine the mission” (McGregor & Wolfe, 2002, quoted in Beard, 2007, 136). 
Rumsfeld believed that the U.S. could not allow the coalition partners to decide on 
the mission since then the mission would be accomplished only on minimal 
common agreements of the coalition partners (The White House Bulletin, quoted 
in Beard, 2007, 136).  
The Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom 
The architecture of international engagement in Afghanistan was set up 
according to the above described approach on foreign policy by the Bush 
Administration, which put serious strain on the transatlantic partnership. Except 
for the United Kingdom, European or NATO allies were not included in any 
planning of the military part of the mission in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Afghanistan was a joint venture by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and indigenous Afghan opposition troops of the Northern Alliance. 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was established by the U.S. in reaction to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, as part of the global war on terrorism. It is 
based on the right of collective and individual self-defense granted in Article 51 of 
the UN-Charta (Luif, 2007, 373). Apart from OEF-Afghanistan, there are also 
some other smaller operations subsumed under the umbrella of OEF, such as 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of 
Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara, or Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Chad (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005 [online]; Auswärtiges Amt, 2009, 
[online]). OEF is a U.S.-led mission in which approximately 20 other nations take 
part (Auswärtiges Amt, 2009, [online]). Since OEF is mainly associated with the 
war in Afghanistan, however, OEF-Afghanistan will be referred to as only OEF 
throughout the thesis.  
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The Northern Alliance, the more common term for the United Islamic Front 
for the Salvation of Afghanistan, was a political and military coalition of anti-
Taliban factions comprising of the ethnic groups of Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and 
Pashtuns. It included (Berger/Kläy/Stahel, 2002, 123): 
• The Islamic Party of Aghanistan (Jamiat-I Islami-yi Afghanistan), which 
consisted of Tajiks and was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Its military 
and more influential leaders were Ahmed Shah Massoud and, after his 
assassination, General Mohammed Fahim, who had about 15.000 
combatants under his command. 
• The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbish-I Milli-yi 
Afghanistan), a national Uzbek movement led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, 
who was in command of about 10.000 combatants under his command. 
• The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-I Wahdat-I Islami-yi 
Afghanistan), a union of Hazara tribes led by Karim Khalili. 
• The Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami), led by the Pashtun Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar. 
• The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Harakat-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan), 
a small Shiite party led by Tajik Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini. 
• The Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (Ittihad-I Islami 
Bara-yi Azadi), a small Sunni party made up of Pashtuns and led by the 
Wahabbite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. 
 
This coalition of anti-Taliban opposition factions was responsible for the 
fighting on the ground while the American and British forces conducted air strikes 
on preselected targets in and around Heart, Shindand, Shibarghan, Mazar-i-Sharif 
and Kandahar. During the combat operations, the U.S. allowed for only a limited 
number of ground forces consisting mainly of CIA agents and of Special Forces. 
They were infiltrated into the country before the official start of the operation in 
order to contact the Afghan opposition forces. OEF started on October 7, 2001, 
and on November 11, Mazar-i-Sharif became the first city to be liberated from the 
Taliban regime. In the following days Kabul (November 13), Jalalabad (November 
14), and Kunduz (November 26) fell. On December 7, Kandahar, the last 
stronghold of the Taliban regime, fell. The combat operations then shifted to the 
mountains of Tora Bora and by December 17 the last cave complex was taken. 
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The day after, on December 18, the bombings came to a halt for the first time 
since the beginning of OEF two and a half months earlier (Lambeth, 2005, 73ff & 
119ff). 
 
Even though the U.K. “lobbied hard for the inclusion of additional European 
allies” (ibid., 117), the British and the Canadians remained the only two other 
countries materially involved in the mission in Afghanistan (ibid.). Furthermore, 
“Britain was the only NATO ally that took part in the missile attacks and the air 
strikes at the beginning of the campaign” (Kouzmanov, 2003, 33f). According to 
Kouzmanov (2003, 26ff), there were at least three considerations for the Bush 
Administration to favor a U.S.-led broad coalition over a NATO-led operation: first, 
international terrorism needed to be addressed by a broad coalition of partners 
that included both states and non-state actors; second, the U.S. did not want to 
have its freedom of action constrained by a NATO-led operation; third, the 
capabilities gap between the U.S. and its European allies seemed to be so big 
that it would only have impeded cooperation. The first consideration is 
comprehensible. However, a broad coalition of partners does not conflict with 
NATO-led combat operations. The second and the third considerations draw on 
the U.S. experiences with the NATO-led Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 
1999. The participation of some European allies in Operation Allied Force was 
affected by internal policies or military capability constraints. Moreover, the target 
approval process, in which the U.S. had to consider European concerns about 
possible targets, slowed down the entire operation and affected its effectiveness. 
The OEF strikes had to be carried out fast and unexpectedly as some of the 
targets were dynamic. The mission in Afghanistan required rapid decisions that 
the U.S. wanted to take without taking into account European concerns, which 
would have delayed important decisions. Moreover, since the military capabilities 
gap between the U.S. and the European allies was that substantial, “the burden 
for providing support to the allies would [have] be[en] much greater” (ibid., 31) 
than the advantage the U.S. would have taken of European assistance. “Only the 
British had the sealift and in-flight refueling capabilities to get troops to the region 
under their own steam and to keep them supplied once in place“ (Walker, 
2001/02, 4). It was more than a month after the start of the initial combat 
operations that the Bush Administration did accept “the allies’ offers of thousands 
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of combat and support troops, and then only in limited numbers and outside 
NATO’s chain of command” (Valasek, 2001/02, 19).   
 
 The European allies were clearly disappointed with the way the Bush 
Administration pursued the mission in Afghanistan, especially when the U.S. 
spurned the offer of help by the NATO countries (Pond, 2004, 11). The retired 
U.S. General Wesley K. Clark, who had held the two positions of the U.S. 
European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
simultaneously during the Kosovo war in 1999, was probably most aware of the 
difficulties the U.S. would face with its European allies during Operation Enduring 
Freedom. He viewed the U.S. rejection of NATO’s offer of assistance as “a 
strategic error” (Clark, 2003, 126). “[T]he few weeks after 9/11 constituted a 
unique window through which the international community, international law, and 
the firm commitments of our NATO allies could have been fully engaged” (ibid.). 
However, according to Clark, the U.S. “squandered the chance to create a strong 
international coalition that could address the problems of terrorism 
comprehensively, beyond the limits of sheer U.S. military power” (ibid.). 
Recreating the State of Afghanistan 
 From November 28 until December 12, 2001, the United Nations hosted 
the Bonn Conference in Germany. This was a meeting of representatives of the 
Afghan opposition factions, neighboring and other major countries involved in the 
situation in Afghanistan, organized by the United Nations Security Council. At the 
end the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, briefly the Bonn Agreement, 
was concluded. As a result of the Bonn Agreement the Afghan Interim Authority, 
chaired by Hamid Karzai (Annex IV), was set up and an International Security 
Force (Annex I) was established. This multinational force, which was meant to 
guarantee the security and protection of the interim Administration in Afghanistan, 
was officially authorized by the United Nations through the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386, on December 20, 2001. Whereas in 
the Bonn Agreement the multinational force was mentioned as International 
Security Force, in the UNSCR 1386 “[t]he word ‘assistance’ was inserted into this 
force’s official title at US insistence to underscore the limited nature of its 
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mandate” (Dobbins 2009, 143). The mandate of International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) was further limited to a period of six months and to the geographic 
region of Kabul and its surrounding areas. The United Nations, 
„Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the 
establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance 
Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of 
security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim 
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in 
a secure environment.“ (UNSCR 1386, 2001, 2) 
 
A letter of the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was attached to the 
UNSCR 1386 as an appendix that arranged the cooperation of ISAF and U.S. 
troops, which were not deployed in ISAF at the beginning. The reason for that 
were French and German worries that ISAF troops could be attached to U.S. 
troops operating in OEF (Krech, 2002, 126). More than 40 countries have been 
contributing to ISAF. Great Britain was the first nation to command ISAF for a 
period of six months. In June 2002, Turkey assumed command and after another 
six months ISAF was led by a German/Dutch corporate command. On August 11, 
2003, NATO assumed command of the ISAF operation, putting an end to the six-
month national rotations. The assumption of ISAF command by NATO was a big 
relief since it ended the struggle to find new nations to lead the operation and to 
set up new headquarters every six months (ISAF – International Security 
Assistance Force, 2010, [online]). 
 
The UN mandate of ISAF was extended for another six months beyond 
June 6, 2002, through UNSCR 1413, and then for a year beyond December 20, 
2002, through UNSCR 1444. Each of the two resolutions, UNSCR 1510 of 
October 13, 2003, and UNSCR 1563 of September 17, 2004, extended the 
mandate for another year. In addition, UNCSR 1510 put an end to the geographic 
limitation as the United Nations authorized the expansion of the mandate of ISAF 
in order “to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the 
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its 
environs“. It was only after the Iraq war in the fall of 2003 that the U.S. voted for 
an expansion of ISAF beyond its regional limitations. In the previous years the 
U.S. had continuously blocked negotiations on regional expansion of ISAF. 
Furthermore, in UNSCR 1510 the United Nations for the first time stressed the 
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need for cooperation between ISAF and OEF,  
“Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,  
2. Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to 
work in close consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its 
successors and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the 
implementation of the force mandate, and to report to the Security 
Council on the implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1.“ 
(UNSCR 1510, 2003, 2) 
 
1.3. The 2003 Iraq Crisis 
The Issue of Iraq in the Bush Administrations 
Whereas moderate policy advisors in Bush’s team, such as Secretary of 
State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, did not 
regard Iraq as constituting a serious threat, Iraq had continuously been an issue 
for the Bush Administration since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
Due to its alleged programs on biological and chemical Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) Iraq was assumed to threaten international security. However, 
as expressed by Powell, Iraq did not constitute an imminent threat (Gordon et al., 
2004, 93f). Several resolutions by the UN Security Council had forced Iraq to 
allow the UN weapons inspectors’ return after they had been expelled in 1998, 
and to give up its WMD programs and to disarm. The Iraqi dictator, Saddam 
Hussein, however, had messed about with the international community by 
complying with the resolutions as much as to prevent the Security Council 
members from using force and as little as to keep them discontented with Iraq’s 
disarmament process. Thus, Saddam Hussein’s tyrant regime had been a thorn in 
the U.S. flesh for years.  
 
The extent of the terrorist attacks on September 11 was so vast that the 
U.S. could not imagine that they were carried out only by Osama bin Laden’s 
terrorist network al Qaeda and suspected state sponsorship behind the attacks as 
well. Iraq was the first guess by many policy advisors in the Bush Administration. 
As the members of the 9/11 Commission Report found, also “President Bush had 
wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam Hussein’s regime might 
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have had a hand in it” (Kean et al., 2002, 334). Both Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and his Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz were strongly in favor of 
attacking Iraq. Wolfowitz “argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the 
terrorist problem and should be therefore attacked” (ibid., 335). Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, however, was skeptical about striking Iraq because there was (and 
would be) no proof of a link between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Iraq as 
assumed by some in the Administration. Also President Bush had strong 
reservations concerning an invasion of Iraq. He feared that some neoconservative 
policy advisors in his team, in particular Vice President Richard Cheney and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who had been part of his father’s 
Administration wanted to settle old accounts of the first Gulf War by finishing with 
Saddam Hussein12 (Woodward, 2003, 102). Even though the neoconservatives in 
the Bush Administration lobbied hard for striking Iraq, the President decided not to 
invade Iraq right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Kean et. al., 2002, 335). However, 
Bush asked Rumsfeld later on, in November 2001, to set up a war plan for 
attacking Iraq and was briefed on it in February 2002 (Szabo, 2004, 20f). Thus, 
“the momentum toward a policy of confronting Iraq grew steadily over the course 
of the winter and spring of 2002” (Gordon et al., 2004, 95). When the U.S. could 
neither prove that Iraq was connected to the 9/11 attacks nor that there existed a 
link between Iraq and al Qaeda, the American justification of a military invasion of 
Iraq was centered on Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDs. As it turned out, 
however, the ultimate motivation for the war in Iraq, anticipated by some hawks in 
the Administration, was regime change.   
 
Powell, who adhered to the realist (IR theories) camp in the Bush 
Administration and was never fully convinced of the invasion of Iraq, believed that 
the Department of Defense overestimated U.S. capabilities if it believed that the 
U.S. was able to fight two wars simultaneously. He pointed out that the U.S. 
needed coalition partners for an invasion of Iraq and that such coalition partners 
                                            
12 The first Gulf War (1990-1991) ended when Iraq annulled its annexation of Kuwait and had its 
troops rolled back. For George H. W. Bush, who was following a realist approach on foreign policy, 
the goal to release Kuwait had been achieved and therefore the U.S. engagement ended. 
Neoconservatives in the Bush father administration, however, also had wanted to achieve regime 
change in Iraq by toppling the tyrant Saddam Hussein. When the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred, 
they saw their chance to finish the, in their eyes, undone business. 
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needed to be convinced of the urgency of attacking Iraq. Powell further believed a 
unilateral war against Iraq would be a big mistake and tried to convince the 
Administration to seek international assistance. On the other hand, Rumsfeld, a 
proponent of the neoconservative camp in the Bush Administration, had always 
been convinced that the war against terrorism had to be pursued at more than just 
one front. He believed in the unique military capabilities of the U.S. and saw no 
need for international assistance, even if the U.S. was to fight two wars at the 
same time. He saw no reason to convince allies of the need to fight Iraq since 
they would follow if only the U.S. showed decisive leadership. In case the 
traditional allies did not follow the U.S. in its execution of the mission, the coalition 
needed to be altered in order to accomplish the mission (Woodward, 2003, 202).  
European Reactions: German-American Relations 
Already in late September 2001, when German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer and Wolfowitz met, the Deputy Secretary of Defense indicated that “after 
the Taliban was removed, the next goal would be the elimination of Saddam 
Hussein” (Szabo, 2004, 16). In his State of the Union speech on January 31, 
2002, President Bush declared Iraq, in addition to Iran and North Korea, to be part 
of the so-called “axis of evil”. When German Chancellor Schröder met with 
President Bush in Washington some days after Bush’s State of the Union 
address, in February 2002, Schröder put forward four prerequisites concerning 
any German involvement in a war in Iraq, which were never to be met (ibid.): 
• First, the alliance against terrorism in Afghanistan should not be 
affected by a military engagement in Iraq; 
• Second, a link between Iraq and al Qaeda had to be proved; 
• Third, the U.S. had to provide for an exit strategy before it started a war; 
• Fourth, the war had to be fought under U.N. mandate 
 
Three months later, on May 22/23, 2002, a meeting between Schröder and 
Bush took place in Berlin, which has been regarded as the last friendly encounter 
between the two. At the meeting both explicitly agreed that neither would raise the 
issue of a war with Iraq before the German elections on September 22, 2002. 
President Bush furthermore assured the German Chancellor that he would consult 
him on any decisions he would take on Iraq and that nothing would happen before 
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the German elections. However, the prospects of a war in Iraq mounted over the 
summer of 2002. On August 26, Cheney spoke to a veterans’ group in Nashville, 
Tennessee, leaving the impression “that there was indeed going to be a 
preventive war” (ibid., 24) against Iraq. Schröder rating badly at the polls with his 
party and the SPD-Green coalition, took a decisive step for his campaign strategy 
over the summer months by picking up the issue of Iraq. Shortly after Cheney’s 
speech, Schröder told an audience in Berlin that a strike on Iraq “was exactly the 
type of ‘adventure’ that Germans should have no part of” (ibid., 27). In response to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the German Chancellor had repeatedly stated that 
Germany showed solidarity with the U.S. and that it would be willing to take risks 
in military engagements but was not ready for any military adventures. By playing 
the “anti-American card”, Schröder was able to shift attention away from the 
domestic and economic problems Germany was facing. In addition, the strong 
opposition to the American Iraq policy enabled him to mobilize important 
electorates: the SPD and Green constituencies and the pacifists and nationalists 
of eastern Germany (ibid., 28). 
 
President Bush felt personally betrayed by Schröder since he had broken 
his agreement not to raise the issue of Iraq on the hustings. Schröder, for his part, 
however, referring to Cheney’s speech, claimed that it was the U.S. that had not 
kept its promise. Bush had not kept Germany informed about the developments 
concerning the U.S. policy on Iraq as agreed, instead Schröder had learnt about 
them via the media. Moreover, he argued that the promise not to raise the Iraq 
issue in the election campaign “was based on the goal of controlling WMD and not 
on the goal of regime change” (ibid., 26). Cheney’s indication of a preventive war 
against Iraq was, however, based on regime change. The icing on the cake 
occurred in the last week of the campaign, when German Minister of Justice Herta 
Däubler-Gmelin mentioned President Bush and Adolf Hitler simultaneously in her 
remarks on Bush’s Iraq policy.  
 
In the end Schröder won the election by 6,000 votes, but the personal 
relationship between him and Bush had been severely damaged. Due to Bush’s 
“highly personalized approach to foreign policy” (ibid., 32), the damage was 
somewhat greater in Washington than in Berlin though. Due to the international 
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and domestic environments in which the dispute occurred, the clash between the 
two leaders was even more divisive. The conflict between Schröder and Bush was 
largely due to Schröder’s exploitation of the Iraq issue for his election campaign. 
However, Schröder’s strong opposition to Bush’s Iraq policy rose, according to 
some scholars, only partly out of electoral opportunism, for the other part he acted 
on principle. Nevertheless, Bush and his Administration team were also 
responsible for the clash between the two allies. The foreign policy style of the 
Bush Administration created anger against the American President in many 
European countries. Steve Erlanger asserts that “the German government simply 
capitalized on anti-Bush feelings, which were created by the Bush people 
themselves” (Steve Erlanger, quoted in Szabo, 2004, 33).  
 
While personalities matter, Szabo (2004, 9) claims that “the Bush-Schröder 
clash was part of a longer tradition of disagreement between Germany and the 
United States” that had already started still in the 1990s. Furthermore, Pond 
(2004, 61) contends that “[t]he frost was partly personal, partly a matter of policy, 
partly a reflection of historical modesty still expected of Berlin”. By historical 
modesty Pond refers to Germany’s solidarity to the U.S. that has its source in the 
American support of the German state and its people in the immediate post-World 
War II period and throughout the later years of the 20th century. As a 
consequence, Germany developed a strong transatlantic orientation and has been 
very supportive of U.S. policies throughout the second half of the 20th century. 
Thus, Schröder’s vehement opposition of the U.S. policy on Iraq surprised many 
in the Bush Administration.  
European Reactions: French-American Relations 
 The French reactions to Cheney’s August 26 speech and the growing 
momentum of striking Iraq were less extreme than the German reactions. Like 
Schröder, French President Jacques Chirac was opposed to a war in Iraq but he 
felt that a “categorical opposition similar to Germany’s would only lead the United 
States to act without even making an attempt to revive the UN weapons 
inspections process” (Gordon et al., 2004, 104). The French Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin denounced Iraq for not complying with UN weapons 
inspections and with the international rules set up by the Security Council. 
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Therefore, France would have accepted the use of force if Saddam Hussein had 
further defied the UN weapons inspections, as long as the decision was taken in 
the UN Security Council. However, any unilateral measures taken by the U.S. 
were strongly opposed by France. The key element of the French position was 
Chirac’s proposal for two Security Council Resolutions. The first one was to be set 
up in order to allow the weapons inspectors to resume their inspections on the 
suspicion that Iraq possessed any WMD. In case Saddam Hussein prevented the 
inspections to proceed, a second resolution was to determine “if there should be 
or not an intervention” (“THREATS AND RESPONSES: 
PERSPECTIVES/Jacques Chirac; French Leader Offers America Both Friendship 
and Criticism”, 2002, September 9, [online]). The chance that France would 
eventually support the use of force and war in Iraq, helped to persuade Bush to 
seek a new U.N. Security Council resolution concerning the return of weapons 
inspectors (Gordon et al., 2004, 105). Many Americans perceived the French 
position as France playing its usual role “as a difficult and contentious ally, but in 
the end, it will not stop the concerted will of America and Britain” (Holbrooke, 
2002, August 27, A15).  
The Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis 
 President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder, being both opposed to an 
invasion into Iraq, aligned with each other against Bush’s war policy. As a result of 
the German-Franco alignment the question arose as to whether Germany’s move 
toward Paris represented “a longer-term historical change in German foreign 
policy” (Szabo, 2004, 50). Instead of following the ever since pursued transatlantic 
orientation in German foreign policy, “Chancellor Schröder seem[ed] to have 
come to the view that Germany must help construct a Europe whose power can 
balance that of the United States” (ibid., 50). In this context Christian Hacke, 
argues “that this approach represent[ed] a shift from the continuity of an Atlanticist 
perspective to a new Carolingian one based on the Europe of Charlemagne, 
which rested on a Franco-German base” (ibid. quoted in Hacke, 2003, 13).  
 
 Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir Putin joined the German-Franco 
anti-war couple causing news headlines, which talked about the French-German-
Russian alliance that aligned against the United States. The heads of government 
  57 
further fueled the situation by arranging demonstrative mini-summits between 
their countries. The first of such summits took place in April 2003 when Putin 
invited Schröder and Chirac to St. Petersburg. It was followed by further summits 
taking place over the course of the following years. The “re-newed” alliance 
between France, Germany and Russia raised fears in Eastern European countries 
as they felt reminded of past alliances between these countries during the 19th 
and 20th century. The conditions for the Eastern European countries in such 
constellations were normally not beneficial as they were absorbed by or, as in the 
case of Poland, split between Germany and Russia.  
 
 Apart from cooperation with Russia, French President Chirac and German 
Chancellor Schröder also took into consideration to cooperate with China. 
However, it did not take long until Schröder and Chirac figured out that it was 
almost impossible to cooperate with Russia and China in the same way as they 
did with the United States. As former Director of Research at the “Center on the 
United States and Europe” at the Brookings Institution, Jeremy Shapiro, analyzed,  
“It’s a totally different world and the Russians and Chinese were not 
interested in the French or the Germans, they weren’t, they did not 
have the same sort of frame of reference in terms of world order and 
legalism and, you know, support of the UN. They couldn’t have had 
that sort of a discussion. Whereas with the United States, even if they 
did not like the outcome of the discussion, but they could have had it.” 
(Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009) 
 
The struggle at the United Nations 
 On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1441 by 
a unanimous vote of 15-0 and achieved the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. 
The language of the resolution, however, was a compromise of U.S.-British and 
French diplomatic exchanges that had happened over the course of the previous 
six weeks. It allowed for diverging interpretations by the Security Council 
members and did not represent a united international position on Iraq. The 
ambiguity of UNSCR 1441 was expressed by John Negroponte, the U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations, when he a explained, “If the Security Council 
fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does 
not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat 
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posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world 
peace and security” (“Diplomatic License”, 2002, November 9, [online]). According 
to the U.S. interpretation of UNSCR 1441, Iraq’s noncompliance with the 
resolution already authorized Washington to the use of force. In contrast, 
according to the French interpretation of UNSCR 1441, the use of force against 
Iraq could only be authorized by the Security Council, which would make its 
decision based on a report by the weapons inspectors. Thus, France did not 
accept the automaticity of the use of force if Iraq did not cooperate, which was 
inherent in the interpretation of the resolution by the U.S., and expected the 
Security Council to convene in case of Iraq’s noncompliance. As Gordon et al. 
(2004, 113f) stated, the resolution “provided a useful mechanism for dealing with 
the scenarios of either blatant noncompliance or full compliance”, but it “failed to 
establish an agreed mechanism if members of the Security Council disagreed 
over whether Saddam’s actions constituted compliance”. Thus, the members of 
the Security Council did not only disagree on the consequences of 
noncompliance, they also disagreed on what constituted noncompliance. The 
United States did not accept anything less than full compliance. On the contrary, 
the French “had never expected full cooperation” but considered “70 percent a 
reasonable […] level of cooperation” to be expected by Saddam Hussein (ibid., 
143). In addition, UNSCR 1441 did not contain any benchmarks by which to 
measure the level of compliance.  
 
After Chirac’s diplomatic advisor, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, had 
returned from a meeting with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage in Washington on January 13/14, 2003, he told the French President 
that he now believed the U.S. would invade Iraq no matter what happened. 
Moreover, the massive troop deployment in the neighboring countries of Iraq, by 
mid-January the Pentagon had deployed more than 100,000 troops in that region 
(ibid., 124), indicated that war in Iraq had become inevitable. When by January 
2003 the Europeans had given up all hope of avoiding war, the French opposition 
“had become a matter of principle – and of politics” (ibid., 146). Many Americans 
later accused France of never having considered the use of force against Iraq as 
a serious option. Even though the French favored the containment of Saddam 
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Hussein over toppling him by a military intervention, Gordon et al. (2004, 142) 
claim that it was probably not the case that Chirac opposed the military option 
from the beginning. On January 7, 2003, in his speech to the army the French 
President, mentioning UNSCR 1441, urged the French soldiers “to be ready for 
any eventuality” (Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, 2003, January 7). Moreover, 
Chirac had dispatched a general to Washington in order to discuss “a potential 
French contribution of some 15,000 troops, 100 airplanes, and use of significant 
naval assets, including an aircraft carrier group in case of French military 
participation in Iraq” (ibid.). Thus, France was ready to participate and support war 
in Iraq but only under certain conditions which included blatant noncompliance by 
Iraq. Since Saddam Hussein, however, pressured by UNSCR 1441, showed at 
least some cooperation with the weapons inspectors, the French opted for the 
policy of containment, which was also politically more popular in Europe (ibid.). 
 
While the French were not the only ones skeptical if the U.S. would accept 
Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441, even if Iraq disarmed, the United States, on 
the other hand, was less willing to back away from its decision to invade Iraq. 
Regime change in Iraq, which had been the goal of the neoconservatives in the 
Bush Administration for more than a decade, was pursued no matter what the 
result of the report of the weapons inspections said. While this is impossible to be 
known for sure, some activities that “had begun even while the UN inspections 
were still under way” (Clark, 2003, 12), give strong indication of the immovable 
position of the U.S. The CIA, for example, had inserted teams of paramilitary 
operatives into Iraq in order to contact dissident groups and leaflets were dropped 
“long before the anticipated beginning of the military action” (ibid.). The more 
troops the U.S. deployed to the region around Iraq, the more costly it became to 
withdraw all those deployed forces. Moreover, the less possible it became for the 
U.S. to change from a policy of invasion to one of containment since it would put 
great harm to its credibility. In addition, the U.S. came under pressure to act if it 
wanted to go to war in Iraq and avoid fighting in the heat of the summer months.  
 
The U.S. did not want to risk delaying the invasion of Iraq for several weeks 
by forging a second resolution at the U.N. Security Council. Apart from that, 
according to its interpretation of UNSCR 1441, the U.S. also viewed devising a 
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second resolution at the U.N. Security Council unnecessary. Nevertheless, for the 
war in Iraq, Bush needed the United Kingdom to come along. Tony Blair, 
however, needed a second U.N. resolution to support the war because in 
December 2002 he had promised his public to only go to war with U.N. approval. 
Thus, in February 2003, the U.S. began pursuing a second resolution to assist 
Blair’s Great Britain to come along. The French, who had argued for a second 
resolution from the start, now lobbied hard against a second resolution. They 
were unwilling to retreat from their opposition to war but did not want to veto a 
U.S.-supported resolution either, which they had done for the last time in 1956 
(Gordon et al., 2004, 148). The solution for Bush, Blair and Chirac, but also for the 
nonpermanent members of the Security Council, who had been lobbied hard by 
France and the U.S. to vote either against or for a second resolution, came on 
March 10. In a televised interview Jacques Chirac declared “that France would 
veto any new ultimatum to Iraq” (ibid., 152) no matter what the circumstances 
were. This enabled Blair to argue in front of the British public that it was 
impossible to achieve U.N. approval for the war against Iraq since France would 
bloc any new resolution. Only ten days after Chirac’s interview the war in Iraq 
began.  
The Conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 After the 48 hours-ultimatum on March 17 that President Bush gave the 
Iraqi dictator to go into exile had lapsed, the invasion of Iraq started in the 
morning of March 20, 2003. The war was fought without U.N. mandate, which 
raised serious legal questions not only about launching the war in Iraq but also 
about the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. In September 2004, this would lead 
former U.N. General Secretary Kofi Annan to regard the invasion of Iraq as illegal: 
“I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of 
view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal“ (“Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan”, 
2004, September 14). Annoyed by the struggle at the United Nations and upset 
about the Europeans’ unwillingness to go to war with Iraq, the United States 
formed a “coalition of the willing”. As in the war in Afghanistan, with the “coalition 
of the willing” the U.S. again ignored all other institutionalized patterns of coalition 
building. However, whereas the anti-terror alliance in the war in Afghanistan 
developed out of spontaneous acts of solidarity with the U.S., the ad-hoc coalition 
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for the war in Iraq was pursued by Bush’s “divide and conquer” strategy. Six out of 
the EU-15 countries and 13 out of the EU-25 countries fought in the so-called 
“coalition of the willing”. In comparison, all of the EU-15 countries and 23 out of 
the EU-25, excluding Malta and Cyprus, had been supporting the Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Austria (EU-15) and Slovenia (EU-25), all 
countries that had assisted the mission in Afghanistan in some way, were not in 
any way participating in the operations in Iraq (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009, [online]).  
 
This split in support of the Iraq war was the consequence of Bush’s 
disaggregation policy pursued toward Europe. Even though the Bush 
Administration could later claim to have been supported by the majority of the EU-
25 countries, back in 2003 it was not able to convince half of the EU-15 member 
countries of the necessity of a war in Iraq. Furthermore, public opinion in almost 
all European countries, also in the ones that contributed to the “coalition of the 
willing”, strongly opposed the war in Iraq. When, on April 11, Hussein’s home 
town Tikrit fell, the invasion phase was assumed to have come to an end. On May 
1, President Bush officially “declared an end to substantial combat activities” 
(Clark, 2003, 87). The brief period of combat operations, with the major objectives 
of the invasion having been achieved after three weeks, while simultaneously 
being engaged in another war in Afghanistan, convinced the United States of its 
unique capabilities of a lonely superpower. However, this impression was soon to 
change when the looming troubles of post-war reconstruction emerged. Even 
when combat operations had ended by summer 2003, the United States refused 
to cede significant authority to the United Nations or any other international 
institution. This, however, “was critical if governments in Europe were to provide 
forces and resources to assist postwar efforts” (ibid., 92). Thus, the antiwar 
coalition of Germany, France and Russia blocked any U.S. attempts at the U.N. to 
gain assistance for the postwar reconstruction efforts (Szabo, 2004, 47).  
 
Whereas Germany publicly and officially opposed the war in Iraq 
vehemently, it indirectly assisted the United States in its operations in Iraq 
considerably. As Pond (2004, 74) found, referring to Spanish Prime Minister José 
María Aznar and to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, “[i]ronically, the 
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Spanish fan of Bush contributed far less to support the war than did the German 
opponent of Bush”. Germany did not participate in the Iraq War but it fulfilled its 
NATO commitments at great length. The German government granted the United 
States the use of German airspace and the unconstrained use of U.S. bases in 
Germany while even providing security for American soldiers. German soldiers 
participated in AWACS surveillance flights in the Turkish region and 2,600 troops 
were assigned to guard American military installations in Germany in order to 
release American soldiers for the combat operations in Iraq. Germany further 
loaned Patriot antimissile systems and armored Fuchs biological and chemical 
weapons detectors and decontaminators to Israel in case Saddam Hussein would 
strike Israel in an act of revenge for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. It also left in 
place all the Fuchs weapons detectors and decontaminators in Kuwait that 
Schröder had threaten to withdraw. It sent Patriots to Turkey in case the combat 
operations would draw the NATO ally Turkey into the Iraq war. In addition, 
Germany increased its military role in Afghanistan and assumed command of 
ISAF forces in February 2003 (Pond, 2004, 65; Szabo, 2004, 44). Thus, 
“Germany’s political and diplomatic opposition to the war did not impede its 
military cooperation in efforts outside Iraq” (Szabo, 2004, 44). 
 
1.4. Postwar Reconciliation 
Repairing the relations with Europe was not a priority issue for the Bush 
Administration at first. It actually had a very low ranking in Bush’s hierarchy of 
concerns. The maxim of how to deal with the defected European allies was 
expressed by the famous slogan “punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive 
Russia” (Gordon, September/October 2007, [online]). This formula was reported 
to have been suggested in policymaking councils by National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice in spring 2003. As then-Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution Philip H. Gordon analyzed, “Rice never officially acknowledged using 
these words, but they did seem to describe the Bush Administration's policies as it 
sought to deal with continental Europe's three major powers during the first Bush 
term” (ibid.). 
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German-American Reconciliation  
To start with Germany, the Bush Administration not only ignored Germany 
for half a year after the outbreak of the Iraq war but had pursued this policy 
already since summer/fall of 2002. After Schröder had won the German national 
elections in September 2002, he wanted to repair the relations with the United 
States. However, the White House did not allow U.S. officials to respond to 
German signs of reconciliation. At the meeting of NATO defense ministers in 
Warsaw on September 24/25, 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
received orders from the White House not to talk to German Defense Minister 
Peter Struck. Also, the idea of having a private meeting of the American President 
and the German Chancellor at the NATO session in Prague two months later, in 
November, was instantly turned down. The German government, in its endeavor 
to try to repair the relationship, kept on with its efforts by taking command of ISAF 
in Afghanistan, by granting the U.S. the unrestricted use of German airbases in 
the event of war, and by supplying Israel with Patriot missiles. Nevertheless, it 
was only on September 24, 2003, a year after the German elections, when U.S.-
German relations had become even more troubled, that the two heads of 
government met for a private conversation. The meeting, however, took place in 
the course of a session of the United Nations General Assembly and was the first 
mini-summit Bush and Schröder had had since their last meeting in May 2002. 
Thus, the two leaders had not talked privately to each other for more than a year. 
The talks lasted for forty minutes, ten minutes longer than originally intended, and 
“suggested a modulation in the White House maxim from ignoring the Germans to 
tolerating them” (Pond, 2004, 94). 
 
When Bush finally welcomed Schröder at the White House on February 27, 
2004, the crisis between the two leaders was regarded as formally settled. The 
diplomatic exchange produced a joint statement by the American President and 
the German Chancellor on “The German-American Alliance for the 21st Century”, 
in which the two leaders renewed their determination to work together. Bush, at 
the subsequent press conference, declared that “we have both committed to put 
the differences behind us and move forward. Germany is an important nation. […] 
And it’s essential that America have good relations with Europe” (President Bush 
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Welcomes German Chancellor Schroeder to White House, 2004, February 27). 
He also acknowledged the German military presence in Afghanistan in his 
remarks. 
 
Both meetings were, however, overshadowed by the deep and highly 
personal rift between the two heads of government. On June 8-10, 2004, in the 
course of the G8 Summit on Sea Island, in Georgia, another diplomatic exchange 
between Schröder and Bush took place, which was far more comfortable than the 
previous two. President Bush called the German Chancellor again by his first 
name. In a background briefing a senior administration official characterized the 
meeting as “a very good and positive exchange” and asserted that “the two 
leaders are clearly on a rapidly converging path with respect to Iraq” (Briefing on 
Meeting with German Chancellor Schroeder, 2004, June 8). The U.S. understood 
that German troops would not be going to Iraq and respected Germany’s position 
(ibid.). However, even though the U.S. official emphasized three times that it had 
been the warmest meeting between the two leaders since 2003 (ibid.), it was not 
until 2005 that the relations between these two allies really started recovering. 
The repair of the damage was started by Bush in 2004, when the situation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan deteriorated but because he faced presidential elections that fall, 
it became apparent only in 2005.  
French-American Reconciliation  
Concerning French-American relations, the Bush Administration sought to 
punish the French in several ways. In particular, the Pentagon took some actions 
to humiliate the French for their lack of loyalty to the U.S. It “banned high-level 
U.S. military participation in the annual Paris Air Show and lobbied defense 
industry executives not to attend the show” (Gordon et al., 2004, 172). 
Furthermore, it disinvited French officials from Red Flag, a major U.S. military 
exercise in which the French had participated for decades. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld did not invite the chief of the French air staff to participate in a 
U.S.-hosted conference of air force commanders and prohibited U.S. officials from 
any telephone contacts with their French counterparts. In addition, in 
Congressional cafeterias French fries were renamed into “Freedom fries” and on 
board of Air Force One French toast was changed into “Freedom toast” (ibid.). 
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Secretary of State Colin Powell felt uncomfortable with the Defense Department’s 
reactions and “wrote a memo saying that punishing the French was not U.S. 
policy” (Priest, 2005, July 3). While the State Department and the CIA lobbied 
against this aggressive policy toward France, Rumsfeld even a year later still 
prevented the French Air Force from participating in the Red Flag operation of 
2004. Despite these humiliating acts by the Pentagon, relations between the 
intelligence services in France and the U.S. were not affected by the transatlantic 
dispute over Iraq since cooperation in this field was too vital to be risked by a 
diplomatic uneasiness of the heads of government (ibid.).  
 
In contrast to Schröder, Bush and Chirac had a private meeting that took 
place in the course of the G8 Summit in Evian on June 2, 2003. In his remarks 
President Bush, in reference to the dispute over the Iraq war, claimed that he 
understood the French President’s position. He furthermore emphasized that 
Chirac “made it [France’s position about Iraq invasion] very clear to me in the very 
beginning” and that “[t]here was no question where Jacques Chirac stood” 
(President Bush Meets with French President Chirac, 2003). This was meant to 
be as a rebuke of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who failed to make his 
position clear to the American President from the beginning and then turned to 
categorical opposition against the U.S. Yet, in spite of the conversation between 
the two Presidents at the G8 Summit, similar to the German-American 
relationship, the repair of the relations between France and the United States was 
seriously pursued but became apparent only in 2005.  
Russia 
 For the sake of completeness, only some brief comments on the policy 
towards Russia are to be given, as it is not part of the research outline of the 
thesis. Not only did President Bush take the trouble to travel to St. Petersburg for 
a private meeting with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, on June 1, 2003, but 
he also invited Putin to a two-day reception at Camp David (Pond, 2004, 94). This 
special treatment stands in no relation to the 40 minutes’ talk with German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the UN General Assembly in New York in 2003. 
Thus, the policy toward Russia was the softest of all Bush pursued toward the 
defected three of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. Jim Hoagland, however, in a 
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column for the Washington Post urged Bush to “pause before absolving Vladimir 
Putin alone, especially after the Russian President's sarcastic attacks Friday on 
the U.S. war effort as ‘some new form of colonialism’” (Hoagland, 2003, April 13).  
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2.  Transatlantic Rapprochement: George W. Bush’s 
Second Term 
 
When asked about the reasons for the rapprochement that occurred in the 
second term of the Bush administration, there were primarily two answers laid out 
in the interviews. One argumentation was that the elite opinion and the American 
public “were not with the administration” (Hamilton, p.i., 11/10/2009) on the way it 
pursued its policies. The American public, which is generally very multilateralist 
and “always favors strong relations with Europe” (Hamilton, p.i., 11/10/2009), 
wanted the U.S. to again work with its allies in the world and “turned against this 
idea that you could do things just on your own” (ibid.). In addition, “the 
Washington world” (ibid.), representing the academic elite opinion shaped by 
universities and think tanks, also largely turned against the neoconservative 
strategy of spreading democracy and freedom around the world by an assertive 
use of military force in a unilateral way. Thus, the elite and public opinion exerted 
pressure on the administration, which expressed itself in deteriorating approval 
ratings of the President and his administration. The other argumentation was that 
things in the world, especially in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, were going badly 
(Shapiro, personal interview (p.i.), August 4, 2009, Hamilton, p.i., 11/10/2009, 
Goldgeier, p.i., 11/8/2009). U.S. President George W. Bush realized that “he 
needed to reach out [to the Europeans] in the second term” (Goldgeier, p.i., 
11/8/2009) as the U.S. was not capable to manage the deteriorating situations by 
herself. As a consequence Europe and the U.S. “naturally looked to each other” 
(Shapiro, p.i., 8/4/2009).  
 
These inputs gained in the exploratory interviews have been subject to an 
elaborated study pursued by an extensive literature review. The results will be 
presented in the following pages of this chapter. It is argued that both 
argumentations presented above resulted in a rearrangement of the personnel of 
the second Bush administration, its policies, and its style of the foreign policy and 
were the main reasons for the rapprochement pursued by the U.S. in the years 
from 2005 to 2008. Throughout the thesis, however, more attention is given to the 
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second argumentation as the paper focuses on the U.S.-German and U.S.-French 
relations in the field of foreign and security policy. Whereas it was the U.S. who 
initiated the rapprochement, it also needed the European disposition. Hence, it is 
further argued that there were also changes in the personnel of the German and 
French governments, their policies and their approaches to cooperate with the 
U.S. that had their share in the rapprochement. 
 
2.1. U.S. Foreign Policy during the Bush Administration’s 
Second Term 
 
At his inaugural speech President Bush was overwhelmingly confident that 
he had enough political capital that his second-term would differ from the ones of 
preceding Presidents. Yet, in 2005, Bush experienced his probably worst year of 
his presidency with approval ratings reaching an unprecedented low. As a 
consequence, centrist policies and a toned down rhetoric ruled Bush’s sixth year. 
In 2007, he even “reached out to the Democrats on domestic policy” (Greenstein, 
2007, 60f). Thus, while pragmatism found its way back into American policy 
making and the Bush Administration in a way abandoned the hard-lined unilateral 
approach on foreign policy, it would be wrong to see a fundamental 
rearrangement of mindset in Bush’s second term (Gärtner, 2009, 41). While 
“[i]deology is not dead […], it is ideology without a military edge” (Sanger, 2007, 
86). The overarching theme in U.S. foreign policy during Bush’s second term was 
to learn “to live within the limits of American power” (Robbins, 2007, 91). 
“Second Term Blues” 
 President’s second terms are usually less successful than their first terms 
and the expression “Second Term Blues”, used by Fortier & Ornstein as the title 
of their book, very well expresses the mood inherent in second terms. Fortier & 
Ornstein (2007, 2ff) list several characteristics that account for this phenomenon: 
hubris, lack of new ideas, scandals (even though most scandals began in the first 
term but were successfully covered up in order to enable reelection and leaked in 
the second term), party infighting, salvation abroad, and mid-term election losses.  
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Even though, at his inaugural speech, President Bush argued that he 
would use his “political capital” in order to pursue a second term different from the 
precedents of previous second-term Presidents, nearly all symptoms applied to 
his second term (ibid., 1). Bush’s confidence in winning reelection led to 
expectations that clearly exceeded the reality. In particular, when Bush turned to 
pursuing domestic policy issues, he largely overestimated his possibilities. As 
Magliocca (2009, 489f) analyzes, “the transformative freedom that Bush had in 
security matters probably spilled over into the domestic real”. Thus, Bush thought 
he could achieve Social Security reform or Immigration reform with similar support 
by the Congress and the American people as his foreign policy accomplishments 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. His failed domestic policy initiatives resulted in a blow to 
his leadership. Furthermore, the “perception of strength of leadership also waned 
because the president was not decisive in responding to Hurricane Katrina” 
(Frontier et al., 2007, 7). Katrina demolished large parts of support of Bush’s 
presidency in the second term. As Zaborowski (2006, 223) claims, “the 
inadequacy of the federal response and especially the failure to evacuate early 
the 20,000 people trapped in Louisiana Superdome have damaged the myth of 
the invincibility of American armed forces and of the President himself”. 
Zaborowski sees Iraq, Katrina, and a crisis of confidence as the three 
developments that mostly contributed to the transatlantic rapprochement on the 
U.S. side.  
 
Like Reagan’s and Clinton’s, also George W. Bush’s second term was 
plagued by scandals. In October 2005, in the course of his investigations 
concerning the disclosure of CIA agent Valerie Plame, Special Prosecutor Patrick 
Fitzgerald indicted Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” 
Libby, who resigned as a consequence. Libby’s indictment resulted in a serious 
image damage of Cheney’s office, which affected Cheney’s influence within the 
administration negatively. In addition, other scandals of Republican House 
members “proved terribly damaging politically in the midterm elections” (Balz, 
2007, 24) in 2006. As expected, the Republican Party experienced terrible losses 
at these elections.  
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Party infighting also occurred in Bush’s second term. Despite the uniformity 
and political homogeneity pursued by Bush, “[t]he Republican coalition fractured 
on immigration, spending, and social issues” (ibid., 18) and “cracks began to 
appear among the neoconservatives” (Pond, 2004, 95). In addition, the 
Democratic opposition regained its strength and was willing to challenge the 
President so that “[b]y early 2005 Democrats were ready for a fight” (Balz, 2007, 
28). Moreover, not only were the Democrats criticizing Bush for the Iraq War, but 
also the Republicans exerted pressure on President Bush to redesign his Iraq 
policy. Calls from Republicans to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq were cumulating 
in Bush’s second term. Conversely to the first-term Congress that had followed 
Bush no matter what he did in foreign policy, during the second term the 
Republican Congress was willing “to oppose a president of its own” (Fortier et al., 
2007, 11) and “to exert its power and authority” (Johnson et al., 2006, 11) again. 
 
Concerning the “salvation abroad” as a characteristic of second terms, 
Bush did not follow the pattern normally pursued by U.S. Presidents. Unlike 
achieving domestic policy issues in the first term and sealing his legacy with 
foreign policy accomplishments in the second term (Fortier et al., 2007, 6), Bush’s 
presidency proceded in the opposite way. External events, in particular the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, resulted in a first-term agenda dominated by 
foreign policy where no space was left for domestic policy issues. The latter were 
pursued in the second term, resulting in a distraction from the foreign policy 
projects that had been started in first term. As a result, instead of achieving great 
success with his foreign policy initiatives, Bush received a lot of criticism as the 
conditions in the conflicts abroad deteriorated. Thus, his success was limited to 
the improvement of diplomatic relations, in particular with France, Germany and 
Russia.  
 
In 2004, President George W. Bush’s approval ratings were around 50% 
and he was thus “running for reelection with only a modest level of public support” 
(Greenstein, 2007, 54). Nevertheless, Bush won the 2004 presidential elections 
with 50.7% majority of the popular vote (ibid., 55). However, within weeks after his 
successful reelection his approval ratings slipped below 50%. Bush’s decline in 
public support, which resulted in a drain on his power, did not only continue but 
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was also most visible in 2005. In June 2005, disapproval ratings of Bush’s job 
performance exceeded his approval ratings (ibid., 57f). In October, his approval 
ratings reached a new low when they fell below 40% (Balz, 2007, 20). As a result 
of “the damage inflicted by Iraq, Social Security, gasoline prices, Katrina, the 
embarrassment of scuttled Supreme Court nomination Harriet Miers, and the CIA 
leak investigation” Bush’s “approval ratings had plummeted into the 30s” (ibid., 
35) by the end of 2005. For all the negative events that had happened and Bush’s 
further decline in public support this first year of Bush’s second term became 
known as annus horribilis (ibid., 18). The Bush Administration hit the rock bottom 
of its downslide at the midterm elections in 2006 when the Republicans lost 30 
seats in the House of Representatives and six seats in the Senate to the 
Democrats.  
Changes in the Personnel 
Second terms represent a possibility for the President to change structures 
and personnel of his administration. As a consequence, within the first year of the 
second term, there normally appears something referred to as shakeup. 
Concerning the White House structure, President George W. Bush only “made 
minimal organizational changes” (Patterson, 2006, 54). Similarly, Bush did not 
attempt to “reorganize his personal White House staff […] to any major extent” 
(ibid., 61). However, considerable changes occurred within his Cabinet personnel. 
Six cabinet officers announced their resignations within the first two weeks of 
Bush’s reelection and three more did so in the following three weeks. Altogether 
the nine Cabinet members that resigned in 2004 produced the first major shake-
up of the White House. The second major shake-up happened when Joshua 
Bolten succeeded Andrew Card, who had resigned as White House Chief of Staff 
at the end of March 2006. Bolton was expected to be the fresh face that should 
“get the beleaguered White House back on track” (Stolberg, 2006, June 19 
[online]). Following Bolton’s nomination, three heads of departments resigned and 
some other changes occurred. Thus, “[w]ithin the first eighteen months of Bush’s 
second term there were to be twelve resignations of cabinet members” 
(Greenstein, 2007, 56). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, one of the three 
remaining cabinet officers, followed many calls by the military and the public and 
resigned a day after the midterm elections on November 8, 2006. The other two 
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cabinet officers survived both White House shake-ups while, however, only one of 
them served throughout both terms from 2001 to 2009. Thus, compared with the 
Clinton administrations, a lot of changes took place and there was only little 
continuity from the first to the second term of the Bush administration.  
 
Despite the numerous changes, no new faces were added to the decision-
making unit. President Bush pursued the strategy of moving his White House 
advisers to the Cabinet “in order to tighten his control over the policy-making 
process” (Lesch, 2006, 221). The most noteworthy appointments were the 
following three:  
• Former National Security Council Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, replaced 
Colin Powell as Secretary of State. Her appointment was to ease the 
conflict between the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense that had been exacerbated by the ideological differences of 
Rumsfeld and Powell. Rice’s Undersecretary became the former NSC 
Director, Robert Joseph, with whom three other members of the NSC 
staff were sent to the State Department.  
• Former White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales followed John Ashcroft 
as Attorney General. Together with Gonzales three senior members of 
the Counsel’s staff moved to the Department of Justice.  
• Former White House Domestic Policy Council chief Margaret Spellings 
became Secretary of Education, following Rod Paige (Patterson, 2006, 
52).  
 
Moving White House staff to the cabinet is not new; “there is clearly 
precedent in recent second-term administrations” (Warshaw, 2006, 75). However, 
moving three members of the White House senior staff into leadership positions of 
departments at the same time is quite exceptional. The motivation behind those 
recruitments is without doubt “that the president’s policies and positions are more 
certain to be incorporated into departmental perspectives” (Patterson, 2006, 52). 
Washington Post columnist David S. Border expressed Patterson’s academic 
analysis more pointedly, “the president has assured himself that the lines of 
authority to the Oval Office will be unchallenged and that his whishes will be seen 
as commands” (Broder, 2004, December 15).  
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Most of the second-term appointments were from the conservative ranks of 
the Republican Party and, above all, loyal to the President. Thus, identical to the 
first-term cabinet, the building up strategy for the second term was to pursue 
uniformity and political homogeneity. One of the major differences between the 
two cabinets was “the absence of moderates in the [second] cabinet” (Warshaw, 
2006, 77). With Colin Powell and Tom Ridge leaving, Democratic holdover 
Norman Mineta was the only exception in the conservative, loyalist, Republican 
cabinet team. It was only in 2006, when Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld 
as Secretary of Defense that a moderate Republican was again part of the 
President’s cabinet. While the failure to add new faces to the DMU shortened the 
administration’s learning curve (Johnson et al., 2006, 12), the increase of 
conservatives and loyalists in the second-term cabinet further narrowed the focus 
in the decision-making structures.  
 
Furthermore, Bush’s restructuring process of the Cabinet caused quite a 
stir as he undertook some controversial appointments. Among them were Alberto 
Gonzales, who held a controversially narrow definition of torture, Condoleezza 
Rice, who had been criticized for her Iraq policy, Peter Goss, who had been 
appointed as Director of Intelligence and “ensured that the White House would 
tame the CIA” and “would receive only the information and conclusions that Bush 
wanted to hear” (Lesch, 2006, 224), John D. Negroponte as director of the new 
national intelligence office, who had been in charge of the Contra operations 
against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and John Bolton as 
Ambassador to the United Nations, who “had exacerbated tensions with North 
Korea” (ibid.). Another controversial appointment, though not within the 
administration, was Paul Wolfowitz’s nomination as President of the World Bank.  
 
Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s failure to add new faces and its 
controversial appointments, it adopted a “modified approach to foreign policy” 
(Gordon, 2006, [online]) as many of those closely associated with the 
neoconservative ideology, amongst the most prominent Wolfowitz, Feith, and 
Bolton, were replaced by “pragmatists such as Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, and North Korea negotiator 
Christopher Hill” (ibid.). In particular the replacement of Secretary of State Colin 
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Powell by Condoleezza Rice was a decisive factor for the repair of the relations 
between the U.S. and Europe (Lequesne, 2007, 10). This was not so much 
reasoned by Powell’s ideology since he was regarded as one of the few 
moderates in Bush’s first administration team. It was more that “Rice’s travel 
schedule […] indicated a greater effort to reach out to allies than that of the 
supposedly multilateralist Powell” (Gordon, 2006, [online]). Compared to Powell’s 
12 trips to 37 countries that he took in 2001, Rice took 19 trips to 49 countries in 
her first year and spent 70 percent of her time abroad in Europe (ibid.). 
Furthermore, Rice, again adopting a more realist approach to foreign policy in 
Bush’s second term, was one of the driving forces of what Gordon describes as 
the “counterrevolution”. By this term he refers to the modified approach to foreign 
policy in the years from 2005-2008, which was based on more realist principles 
and countered the neoconservative revolution of the first term. The new tone and 
style that characterized the foreign policy of Bush’s second term was apparent in 
Rice’s confirmation hearing as newly appointed Secretary of State when she 
stated that “the time for diplomacy is now” (ibid.). Thus, when Rice went to Paris 
even before Bush’s visit of the institutions of the European Union on February 8, 
2005, she won a decent hearing (Lewis, 2005, 21).  
Changes in the Policies 
However, President Bush did not only undertake personnel changes, he 
also altered his policies. The War on terrorism had prevented President Bush 
from pursuing his domestic policy agenda in the first term, which he wanted to 
catch up with in the second term. Since the situation in Iraq seemed to improve at 
the beginning of his second term, Bush decided to turn away from Iraq and to 
Social Security reform (Balz, 2007, 26). In addition to Social Security he 
ambitiously pursued other domestic policy issues, such as tax reform and 
immigration reform (Greenstein, 2007, 59). Yet, these domestic policy initiatives 
remained largely unsuccessful.  
 
Furthermore, the U.S. administration also changed its foreign policy and 
reviewed its points of view towards Iran and North Korea. While in his State of the 
Union Address, in 2002, President Bush had called North Korea and Iran 
members of the “axis of evil”, “the administration cautiously was backing 
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multilateral negotiations – while also pressing for Security Council sanctions – to 
try to roll back both countries’ nuclear programs” (Robbins, 2007, 92). As Nye 
(2006, [online]) analyzes, “The shift has been more than rhetorical: Bush’s 
diplomacy toward North Korea and Iran has recently been much more multilateral 
than it was during his first term”. U.S. diplomats who had been prohibited to 
maintain any contacts in the first term, were then allowed to resume bi- and 
multilateral negotiations with these two countries. U.S. diplomat William Burns 
met with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Javier Solana, and an Irani official in July 2008. Condoleezza Rice met with the 
North Korean Foreign Minister in the same month. And the U.S. joined the 
multilateral talks with North Korea and, against the opposition of the 
neoconservatives, negotiated an agreement on the dismantling of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons (Robbins, 2007, 92; Gärtner, 2009, 18f).  
 
The shift in Bush’s Iran and North Korea policies has, for a big part, been 
reasoned by the overstretched military of the United States, which will be dealt 
with in greater detail in the following chapters IV.2.2. and IV.2.3. In his second 
term, the Bush administration realized that Iran and North Korea represent far 
more dangerous nuclear threats than Iraq. However, being tied up in Iraq as well 
as in Afghanistan, “the United States could not risk a confrontation over North 
Korean [or Iranian] nuclear ambitions” (Sanger, 2007, 81). Of course, the political 
elites in Iran and North Korea realized that the U.S. had its hands tied and 
continued with their nuclear programs. Thus, the U.S. lost its “credible threat of 
coercion” (ibid., 82) against these two countries.  
Resume 
 While some scholars argue for continuity in the Bush presidency, the above 
presented analysis of the Bush administration’s second term offers support for 
notion of a change from the first term. Arguments for this thesis can be found in all 
three preceding sub-chapters. First, the typical second-term characteristics 
caught up with President George W. Bush and affected his way of governing. 
Scandals within the administration and of Republican Congressmen as well, party 
infighting and friction in Bush’s coalition, a strengthened Democratic opposition, 
and the mishandling of hurricane Katrina had a negative impact on Bush’s public 
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support. In a weakened leadership position, President Bush was unable to govern 
in the same way as he used to in his first term when his approval ratings ranked 
high. He had to make compromises and focus more on pragmatism.  
 
Second, the personnel changes that President Bush undertook further 
impacted his governing style. The most important change in this respect was 
Condoleezza Rice, who, as Secretary of State, pursued an aggressive public 
diplomacy campaign. It is considered unlikely that she would have done the 
same, had she stayed in the National Security Council. Moreover, while Bush 
made controversial appointments, a lot of neoconservative ideologues, Paul 
Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby amongst the most prominent, were gone in 
the second term. The last hardliner, Donald Rumsfeld, was replaced in 2006 by 
the moderate Republican Robert Gates.  
 
Third, the impacts of the characteristics of second terms and of the 
changes of personnel could be noticed in the shifts of the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy. The confrontational course with Iran and North Korea was replaced 
by the pursuit of diplomacy and multilateral negotiations. These impacts were also 
perceptible in Bush’s toned down rhetoric (Robbins, 2007, 108).  
 
2.2. Developments in Afghanistan 
The Rise of Insurgency Attacks in Afghanistan 
While, in 2002, the U.S. troops were largely in control of Afghanistan’s 
security situation, circumstances began to deteriorate in 2003. Remnants of the 
Taliban units entrenched in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Over the course of the winter of 2002/03 they prepared for a summer offensive. In 
2003, the first Taliban insurgencies, after their ouster in 2001, were reported. 
Several thousand Taliban were fighting under the command of Mullah 
Muhammad Omar, who in 2001 had managed to evade U.S. troops in the last 
minute. By the end of 2003, the Taliban regained control in four provinces at the 
Pakistani border (Krech, 2004, 39). Krech (2004, 39f) sees the main reason 
behind Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation in the exclusion of Pashtun 
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and other tribal representatives from the government. As a consequence the 
Pashtuns Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Tajik Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, and the Usbek Rashid Dostum formed an opposition against President 
Hamid Karzai and isolated him politically. It is likely that they reached out to 
militant Afghani and recruited them for their paramilitary troops. Both the 
reorganization of the Taliban and the political opposition against President Karzai, 
were responsible for the escalating security situation in 2003. In these unsafe 
environments, the U.N. withdrew its aid organizations and only the United States 
was ready to install a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In 2004, the 
situation further destabilized, in particular in the south and north of Afghanistan.  
 
After the international community had achieved some stability during the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, “the Afghan Taliban 
stepped up its attacks on coalition forces” (Bruno & Kaplan, 2009, [online]) in the 
following years. In addition, the Human Rights Watch (2007, 2f) observed that 
“Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, and other armed groups in Afghanistan have carried out 
an increasing number of armed attacks” and that “[c]ivilian deaths from insurgent 
attacks skyrocketed in 2006”. In 2007, insurgent attacks on coalition forces and 
civilians continued. Suicide bombings even increased by 69 percent in the first 
eight months of 2007 compared to the same period in 2006 (Rhode, 2007, 
September 9, [online]). In addition, the Taliban took control of some territory in the 
north of the southern Helmland province (Bruno & Kaplan, 2009, [online]). In June 
2008, BBC News announced a further deterioration of Afghanistan’s security 
situation (“Taleban ‘to boost Afghan attacks’”, 2008, June 27, [online]). As Rhode 
(2007, October 30, [online]) pointed out, the increasing number of insurgency 
attacks since 2006 was in part due to foreign combatants from Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Chechnya, and various Arab countries who were willing recruits for 
the Taliban’s insurgency. He analyzed that “[t]he foreign fighters are not only 
bolstering the ranks of the insurgency. They are more violent, uncontrollable and 
extreme than even their locally bred allies” (ibid.). 
ISAF’s Expansion  
In the years from 2004 to 2008, ISAF’s mandate was extended for 12 
months each year by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1623, 1707, 1776, and 
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1833. In addition to its mandate, ISAF also expanded its geographic reach 
through the installation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) throughout the 
entire country. The commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (in 
the Netherlands), which strategically operates ISAF, has four main components at 
his disposal in order to support the government of Afghanistan (Gauster, 2006, 
32f):  
1. The ISAF headquarters in Kabul, which is responsible for the strategic 
command of ISAF. 
2. The Region Command Capital, previously called Kabul Multinational 
Brigade, consisting of troops that are responsible for the security in 
Kabul and its surroundings.  
3. The Air Task Force, which is in charge of all operations of the ISAF air 
forces. 
4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), which provide the main 
settings for operations by ISAF troops outside of Kabul in the northern, 
western, southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Following the 
model of an institutionalized civil-military cooperation, military personnel 
and civil engineers work in close cooperation in groups of 50 to 500 
people, in order to protect the local population and build up an 
infrastructure for them.  
 
At the beginning of 2003, the first PRT was installed by the United States in 
the town of Gardez, in the east of Afghanistan. It was the result of a change of 
mind and strategy in Washington. President Bush, who had decidedly opposed 
nation building as a task for U.S. troops during his presidential campaign in 2000, 
realized that relying on exclusively military means would not lead the mission in 
Afghanistan to any major success. OEF was not only unable to achieve any major 
accomplishments by applying on conventional combat operations, it was also met 
with disapproval by the Afghan population (ibid., 41ff). In the summer of 2003, 
Great Britain was the second nation to establish a PRT in the region of Mazar-e-
Sharif. With the take-over of the US-led PRT Kunduz by German ISAF troops, the 
first ISAF PRT was established in October 2003. In the following twelve months 
ISAF took over four additional PRTs in the northern provinces of Afghanistan and 
by October 2004 the first stage of the expansion of ISAF’s mission throughout the 
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country was completed. In its second stage ISAF expanded to the west, starting 
with its announcement in February 2005. In May and September of the same 
year, ISAF established four additional PRTs, two in each month. In July 2006, 
ISAF assumed command from US-led coalition forces in the south, marking the 
third stage of its expansion. ISAF was now responsible for six additional Afghan 
provinces and four additional PRTs, culminating in a total of 13 PRTs. 
Whereupon, in October 2006, ISAF implemented its fourth and final stage by 
expanding to the east of the country and taking over an additional 12 PRTs from 
the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (ISAF – International Security 
Assistance Force, 2010a, [online]). With the completion of its last stage of ISAF’s 
expansion 12,000 troops were transferred from OEF to ISAF, leaving 8,000 troops 
to remain in OEF, and the international security force assumed full responsibility 
for the entire country (Fiorenza, 2006b, 4). By December 2007, 19 PRTs were 
established under the command of ISAF. The number was increased to 26 PRTs 
by December 2008. Currently, as of April 2010, ISAF commands 27 PRTs, half of 
which are deployed under the Regional Command East (ISAF – International 
Security Assistance Force, 2010a, [online]).  
U.S. and European Troop Deployments in Afghanistan 
 According to the announcement of ISAF’s second stage of expansion in 
February 2005, there were 17,000 troops from various countries under the 
command of OEF and only 8,500 under the command of ISAF. By its completion 
in September 2005, there were 10,500 troops deployed under ISAF command. 
When ISAF had concluded its third stage of expansion, in July 2006, the 
multinational force counted 19,000 troops. In October of the same year, when the 
final stage of ISAF’s expansion was accomplished, the proportion of troop 
deployments between OEF and ISAF had reverted: 31,000 troops were deployed 
under ISAF command and 8,000 troops under OEF command (Ministère de la 
defense, 2010, [online]). In January 2007, the total ISAF troop numbers amounted 
to 35,460 raised by 37 troop contributing nations. These numbers increased 
throughout the year to 41,741 troops supplied by 39 troop contributing nations in 
December 2007. One year later, in December 2008, there was a total of 51,350 
troops placed at ISAF’s disposal by 41 troop contributing nations (ISAF – 
International Security Assistance Force, 2010b, [online]).  
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In 2001, Germany’s parliament, the Deutsche Bundestag, decided to 
participate in OEF and has annually renewed Germany’s mandate at OEF ever 
since. In October 2008, the German parliament decided to prolong the mandate 
for participation in OEF, however, not for OEF-Afghanistan. Germany’s mandate 
has since then been limited to the OEF at the Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), where it, 
together with other nations, carries out the naval component of the mission as 
part of a multinational force (Auswärtiges Amt, 2009b, [online]. In 2007, the share 
of Germany, which had been the third largest troop contributing nation after the 
U.S. and the United Kingdom (UK) since NATO took over command of ISAF in 
2003, amounted to roughly 8.5% and sank continuously to some 4.6% of all ISAF 
troop deployments until 2010. The respective figures for European ISAF troops 
deployments accounted to roughly 16.4% in 2007 and went down to some 13.3% 
until 2010 (ISAF – International Security Assistance Force, 2010b, [online]). 
However, the total number of German troops operating under ISAF command 
rose from 2,250 to currently 4,665 from October 2004 to April 2010. The largest 
step-up was undertaken in September 2005, still under German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, when troop levels rose from 2,250 up to 3,000 
(einsatz.bundeswehr.de, 2010, [online]).  
 
In comparison to Germany, France had only made “minor” contributions at 
first. While from the beginning deploying in both, ISAF and OEF, France’s 
contribution to ISAF amounted to 530 troops in January 2002 (Ministère de la 
defense, 2010, [online]). France more than tripled its troop levels in 2005 when 
the total number of French troops including both deployments, OEF and ISAF, 
increased to 1,800 (ibid.). Nevertheless, by January 2007, there were only 1,100 
French troops operating under ISAF command rendering France only the sixth 
largest troop contributing nation, behind the US, the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. In January 2007, President Jacques Chirac withdrew the 
French Special Forces from OEF but left the 1,100 serving with ISAF untouched 
(Ministère de la defense, 2010, [online]). Despite an increase of 292 troops 
throughout the year, France still ranked sixth. This only changed in 2008 when 
France more than doubled its deployment to 2,785 troops (December 2008) and 
overtook the Netherlands and Italy (ISAF – International Security Assistance 
Force, 2010b, [online]). While France’s overall share of ISAF troops amounted to 
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some 3% and its share of European ISAF troops equaled some 5.5% in 2007, 
these numbers rose to 5.5% (overall ISAF) and 10% (European ISAF) in 2008. 
While the share of French troops in all ISAF troops decreased again to some 
3.7% in 2010, the share of European ISAF troops slightly increased to some 
10.7%. The surge of French troops that occurred in 2008 is to be traced back to 
the change of leadership in France. President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has been in 
office since May 16, 2007, sought to raise France’s share in the coalition fighting 
in Afghanistan “as a proof of France’s willingness to bear its full part of the NATO 
burden in Afghanistan” (Hammick & Lewis, 2008, 7). At the NATO summit, which 
took place in April 2008, in Bucharest, he announced to increase French troop 
levels and thereafter asked the parliament to raise French deployment in 
Afghanistan (novelobs.com, 2008, [online]).    
 
Throughout the Bush presidency, European countries accounted for the 
majority of the coalition forces of the ISAF operations in Afghanistan. This did not 
even change after ISAF had taken over command of OEF-led PRTs, thereby 
transferring U.S. personnel from OEF to ISAF. From January 2007 to December 
2008, the European share was in a range of 52% to 57% of all ISAF troops while 
the U.S. share ranged between 36% and 39.5%. Simultaneously, absolute troop 
numbers of both European countries and the U.S. were rising throughout those 
two years. From January 2007 to December 2008, U.S. troops deployed under 
ISAF command rose from 14,000 to 19,950, which made up for 5,950 additional 
troops. This accounted for only 20 troops more compared to the increase of troop 
levels by the EU-3 (Germany, France, UK), which amounted to 5,930 troops. 
Overall ISAF troop levels of all European countries rose by 9,030, from 18,340 in 
January 2007 to 27,370 in December 2008 (ISAF – International Security 
Assistance Force, 2010b, [online]). Thus, taking European and U.S. military 
capacities into account, the increase of American troops in ISAF was relatively 
minor compared to the increase of European contributions. However, one must 
not forget that while most European countries deployed their troops only in ISAF, 
the U.S. troops operated in both ISAF and OEF. In a report conducted by the 
Congressional Research Service O’Bryant & Waterhouse (2008, 4) found that of 
the 33,000 U.S. troops that were deployed in Afghanistan in April 2008, “60% of 
U.S. personnel serve[d] in the NATO-led peacekeeping force called the 
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‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),’”. The remaining 40% served in 
the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. “The U.S. forces under NATO 
command have served in that capacity since October 2006, when NATO/ISAF 
took over peacekeeping responsibility for all of Afghanistan” (ibid.).  
 
Thus, despite the closer cooperation of OEF and ISAF, which eventually 
resulted in a fusion of the command structure of the two operations (see below), 
U.S. troop contributions in ISAF remained minor compared to its American military 
capacities as well as compared to European troop contributions in Afghanistan. 
Heightened attention attributed to the situation in Iraq, which eventually resulted in 
a surge of 30,000 U.S. military personnel in 2007, and neglect of the precarious 
security situation in Afghanistan can be mentioned as reasons for the U.S. 
restrained military engagement in Afghanistan during the Bush presidency. This 
changed only when the Obama administration came into office, which attributed 
more attention to the War in Afghanistan than to the War in Iraq. Still in 2009, the 
numbers of U.S. and European ISAF troop deployments roughly equaled and 
both accounted for a share of some 46% to 47%, however, in April 2010, U.S. 
troops deployments outnumbered European ones. While European ISAF troop 
numbers increased by 3,654 from October 2009 to April 2010, U.S. troop 
numbers doubled from 31,855 to 62,415 over the same period of time. 
Table 1: Troop Deployments in Afghanistan, Total Numbers & Percentages 
 Jan. 2007 Dec. 2007 Dec. 2008 Oct. 2009 April 2010 
Total 35,560 41,741 51,350 67,700 102,554 
U.S. ISAF 
 % of Total 
14,000 
39.48% 
15,038 
36.03% 
19,950 
38.85% 
31,855 
47.05% 
62,415 
60.86% 
Europe ISAF 
 % of Total 
18,340 
51.72% 
23,895 
57.25% 
27,370 
53.30% 
31,464 
46.48% 
35,118 
34.24% 
Germany 
 % of Total 
 % of Europe 
3,000 
8.46% 
16.36% 
3,155 
7.56% 
13.20% 
3,600 
7.01% 
13.15% 
4,245 
6.27% 
13.49% 
4,665 
4.55% 
13.28% 
France 
 % of Total 
 % of Europe 
1,000 
2.82% 
5.45% 
1,292 
3.1% 
5.41% 
2,785 
5.42% 
10.18% 
3,070 
4.53% 
9.76% 
3,750 
3.66% 
10.68% 
Source: ISAF – International Security Assistance Force (2010b). ISAF Placemat Archives. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-archives.html>, May 23, 2010. Numbers of Troop Deployments prior to January 
2007 are not displayed on the ISAF’s Website. Percentage numbers are based on author’s own calculations. 
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Cooperation between ISAF and OEF 
While in 2003 the UN Security Council for the first time pointed out the 
importance of cooperation between ISAF and OEF in UNSCR 1510, only in 2006 
first signs indicated that this recommendation was going to be implemented. 
Already at a NATO defense ministerial meeting in December 2003, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld raised the suggestion “to consolidate 
NATO’s military operations with the U.S.-led Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) 
at some future date” (Hill, 2004, 5). This suggestion, however, was met with 
caution by European allies. Their reaction is for the most part reasoned by their 
strict differentiation between OEF and ISAF missions. OEF is seen as the anti-
terror alliance, whose duty is to hunt down al-Qaeda terrorists and fight against 
the Taliban. Conversely, ISAF’s duties are to assist the Afghan interim 
government as well as to reconstruct the country. As can be read on the 
homepage of the German Foreign Ministry “mandate and organization of the 
peace troop ISAF are strictly to be separated [from OEF]” (Auswärtiges Amt, 
2010, [online]; translated SP). Almost a year later, during the NATO defense 
ministers’ meeting on 13-14 October 2004, when US representatives formally 
proposed to merge OEF and ISAF, the German and French Defense Ministers 
“both declared that the merger of ISAF into OEF was not opportune since the two 
forces have distinct tasks in Afghanistan” (Tudor, 2004, 5). This strict separation 
between ISAF and OEF allows for interpretation of a dichotomy of good versus 
bad. If both operations were to merge, the good one would also carry out bad 
duties. 
 
 Yet, ISAF’s expansion to the south and east of Afghanistan has not only 
put the security force in charge of the entire country but also of operations such 
as fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which had so far been pursued by the U.S.-
led Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan (Fiorenza, 2005, 6). Thus, since 
OEF and ISAF are in charge of similar duties, some nations expected that both 
operations were to merge. When the UK took over command of ISAF from May 
2006 to February 2007, the British, being in favor of the merger, pushed ISAF to 
work more closely with the U.S.-led coalition. Together with the U.S. they laid out 
proposals for the unification of ISAF and OEF, which, however, were vetoed by 
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Spain, Germany and France (Ripley, 2005, 6). Yet, “new command arrangements 
[were] agreed between ISAF and Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan to 
ensure close cooperation” (ISAF – International Security Assistance Force, 2010, 
[online]).  
 
The command structure was revised in a way that there would be “two 
distinct chains of command but a double-hatted commander at the head of both 
operations” (Skinner, 2005, 5). This commander, the so-called COMISAF 
(Commander ISAF), has the overall command responsibility over the entire ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan. In order to get the Germans and French to agree to the 
new arrangement, “a way was being sought that would allow France and 
Germany to permit the operation but not participate” (ibid.). In addition, on June 8, 
2006, the first meeting of defense ministers of NATO and non-NATO ISAF 
contributing nations took place (ibid.). Gauster (2006, 40) talks of a “fusion of 
certain ISAF and OEF structures” in the years 2006 and 2007. In the course of 
this fusion the PRT concept of the US, which is different from the German and 
British PRT concept, was increasingly integrated in the PRTs operated by ISAF.  
 
 The next step was the establishment of a composite headquarters with a 
balanced proportion of U.S. and European representatives in leadership positions. 
Thus, after the UK’s mandate for command of ISAF expired in February 2007, a 
composite headquarters headed by U.S. General Dan K. McNeill took over with a 
mandate lasting for 12 months (compared to the UK’s 9-month mandate). Even 
though ISAF was expected “to be involved in more fighting after the spring thaw” 
(Fiorenza, 2007, 10), it primarily remained OEF’s duty “to search for Taliban and 
Al Qaeda members” (Fiorenza, 2006a, 5). Having served for 16 months, General 
McNeill was replaced by General David D. McKiernan, who served as COMISAF 
for one year as from June 2008 to June 2009. General McKiernan was followed 
by General Stanley A. McChrystal who had been in command of ISAF since June 
2009. Most recently on July 4, 2010, General David H. Patreus had replaced 
General McChrystal, who had been deposed as a result of his unqualified 
comments about the Obama administration.  
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ISAF’s New Upper Command Structure under the Obama Administration 
In August 2009, the local upper command structure of ISAF in Afghanistan 
was adjusted. The adjustment “was motivated by a significant evolution of ISAF’s 
scope and scale of responsibility since 2006” (NATO – North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 2010, [online]). This includes the expansion of ISAF throughout the 
country by establishing PRTs or taking over U.S.-led PRTs, the increase of troops 
operating under ISAF command, the founding of NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan, “and the increased need for cooperation with Afghan authorities and 
other international partners” (ibid.). During the George W. Bush Administrations 
the ISAF command structure consisted of one operational headquarter, which 
was located in Kabul and led by a four star Commander, so called COMISAF 
(Commander ISAF). Under the new command structure the COMISAF will have 
command responsible to three intermediate headquarters, the ISAF Joint 
Command, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, both headed by three star 
Generals, and the Special Operations Forces, headed by a one star General. This 
decision was motivated by the need to separate strategic and routine operations 
in order to enable the COMISAF to concentrate better on political-military aspects. 
The COMIJC (Commander ISAF Joint Command), who is exclusively a NATO 
Commander, “will be responsible for executing the full spectrum of tactical 
operations throughout the country, on a day-to-day basis” (ibid.). In contrast, the 
COMISAF is “dual-hatted as the Commander of ISAF and US Forces in 
Afghanistan” (ibid.). He thus coordinates ISAF and OEF operations and is 
responsible that the two do not conflict with each other. Also the Commander of 
the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan will be dual hated “as NATO/ISAF 
Commander and Commander of the US-led Combined Security Transition 
Command – Afghanistan” (ibid.). 
 
2.3. The Deteriorating Situation in Iraq 
Iraq remained a very difficult issue during the second term of the Bush 
Administration. Germany, France and the U.S. came to terms that they had 
disagreements about the invasion in Iraq, but they also agreed that they would no 
longer allow having their relationships affected by these disagreements. This was 
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best pursued by not raising the Iraq issue, thus rendering it a taboo topic during 
most of the time from 2004 to 2008. Within the North Atlantic alliance the Iraq 
issue, however, continued to split its allies. French President Jacques Chirac and 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder strictly opposed any military involvement of 
NATO in Iraq. The alliance’s duties were to be strictly limited to the training of 
Iraqi security forces and even this was not to take place within but outside Iraq. In 
this context Schröder got his position straight when he said “‘[…] We have made 
clear that we don’t want to see German soldiers in Iraq’” (Sariibrahimoglu, 2004, 
5). 
The Rise of Insurgency in Iraq 
 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted that “the Department 
of Defense (DoD) was granted lead responsibility for post-War planning and 
administration of Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the occupation” (Koch, 2006, 
4). However, that planning and administration failed, which resulted in 
continuously deteriorating conditions within the country and led to a steadily 
growing insurgency. As a consequence “the security situation in Baghdad [and 
elsewhere] began to unravel at an ever-increasing pace over the past year” (ibid.). 
The fact that the DoD rather than the Department of State or other civilian 
agencies ran the larger strategy for the War on terror was in some ways 
preventing successes in Iraq and elsewhere. It “led to excessive focus on finding 
and killing or capturing individual terrorists at the expense of trying to combat the 
underlying causes of terrorism or formulating a coherent global strategy to do so” 
(ibid.).  
 
 In the summer of 2003, the insurgencies began to erupt in Iraq. 
Interestingly, “[t]he initial focus of insurgent attacks wasn’t the U.S. military but 
allies of the U.S. effort, […], that were perceived as legitimizing the occupation” 
(Ricks, 2007, 215). With a relatively low death toll during the second half of the 
year and throughout the winter of 2003-2004, it was only in spring 2004 when the 
full scale of the insurgency attacks became apparent. By then the U.S. and its 
coalition troops had realized that the real War in Iraq had just begun. Over the 
course of the year 2004, there were 26,496 insurgency attacks (ibid., 414). 
Despite exhaustive fighting against the insurgents, the insurgency intensified 
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resulting in a total of 34,131 insurgent attacks in 2005 (ibid.). The growing 
insurgency of 2005 is also reasoned by the election and appointment of the Iraqi 
government, which was strongly opposed by the insurgents. Many of the 
insurgents had been affiliated to the ousted government of Saddam Hussein, 
having been members of the Ba’ath Party or the Republican Guard. They had, 
thus, suffered the worst losses from the overthrow of the tyrannical regime of 
Saddam Hussein (Hook & Spanier, 2007, 352). By the time of the Iraqi election, in 
January 2005, 1,200 U.S. soldiers had died (ibid., 354). More than one year later, 
in March 2006, the U.S. death toll ranged at 2,300 U.S. soldiers (ibid.). In 2006, 
“the deterioration of the situation not only continued but accelerated” and “attacks 
recorded by U.S. military intelligence increased by 22 percent” (Ricks, 2007, 440).  
 
In early 2007, as a result of the prevalent chaos and bloodshed in Iraq and 
of the “mounting political and popular pressure within the United States” (Nye, 
2009, 195), the Bush administration decided to change its Iraq strategy. Against 
the counsel of the “Iraq Study Group”, a commission headed by former US 
Secretary of State James Baker and former U.S. Democratic Representative Lee 
Hamilton, which had recommended to continuously withdraw all forces from Iraq 
by 2008, the Bush Administration decided to increase U.S. troop levels in Iraq. 
The 2007 ‘surge’, a “steady increase in [U.S.] combat power” (Hodge, 2007, 7), 
began in January and culminated in June 2007. The additional 30,000 soldiers 
that were deployed eventually “led to some military improvement in countering the 
insurgency in 2008” (Nye, 2009, 195). However, the surge was “expected to be 
followed by some reduction in forces”, which worried some officers “about 
whether the decrease in violence could be sustained beyond the surge” (Hodge, 
2007, 7).  
 
An article in Foreign Affairs by Biddle & O’Hanlon & Pollack (2008) shows 
that the so-called “Surge Strategy” (Nye, 2009, 195) proved successful. In the 
second half of 2008, the overall violence in Iraq decreased by 80% from the level 
of violence before the surge. Moreover, the monthly death toll was diminished 
from 70 U.S. soldiers in 2007 to 25 in 2008 (Biddle et al., 2008). Nevertheless, 
there are additional factors leading to the improvement of Iraq’s security situation 
other than the surge. Apart from the increase of U.S. troop levels, Biddle et al. 
  88 
(2008) also name the errors of al Qaeda in Iraq, referring to the destruction of the 
Shiite Askariya shrine in Samarra, the alienation of al Qaeda’s Sunni allies, the 
rising capacities of the Iraqi Security Forces, as well as the consequences of the 
sum of developments for the Shiite militias. As a result of the improved security 
situation in Iraq, U.S. military presence was reduced during the last months of 
George W. Bush’s second term. It was the reduction in forces in Iraq that 
eventually enabled the U.S. to increase its forces in Afghanistan, pursuing “what 
Bush described as a ‘quiet surge’” (Hodge, 2008, 7). 
The Crumbling Coalition 
In addition to a generally deteriorating situation in post-War Iraq, nations 
kept continuously withdrawing their troops from the Multi-National Force – Iraq, 
which was responsible for Operation Iraqi Freedom. As early as in 2004, one year 
after the invasion, several countries pulled out of Iraq. Among the most prominent 
ones was Spain deciding to withdraw its 1,300 troops, but also Hungary, New 
Zealand and Iceland as well as two South-Asian and three Central American 
countries quit their involvement in Iraq. In 2005, the Netherlands, having more 
than 1,300 troops deployed, and Portugal retreated from the Multi-National Force 
– Iraq. These withdrawals were followed by decisions of the Italian, Norwegian 
and Japanese governments to pull out their troops in 2006. The Italian withdrawal, 
in particular, hit the coalition hard. Having had 3,200 troops deployed in the 
summer of 2005, Italy continuously pulled out some of its troops until the last 
soldiers left in autumn 2006. In 2007, Denmark and Slovakia quit their 
engagements in Iraq before, one year later the bulk of the coalition countries 
withdrew their troops. Among the most significant of the 2008 withdrawals were 
Poland, whose original contingent accounted for 2,500 troops, and Ukraine, which 
initially had 1,650 troops deployed. In 2009, the remaining five nations, Romania, 
Estonia, El Salvador, Australia and the United Kingdom, retreated from the 
multinational force. Australia and the UK were the last countries to withdraw, 
pulling out their troops in July 2009 (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009, [online]; Coalition 
of the Willing, 2009, [online]). As the withdrawals left the U.S. the last nation being 
deployed in the Multi-National Force – Iraq, it was reorganized into United States 
Forces – Iraq in January 2010. 
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2.4. Reaching Out to Europe 
Even though there were already some meetings between the heads of 
government of Germany, France and the United States during Bush’s first term, 
the majority of such meetings took place during international conferences, like at 
the UN General Assembly or the G8 Summit. Thus, despite some minor post-War 
reconciliation undertaken in 2003 and 2004, the repair of the damage done to the 
U.S.-German and U.S.-French relations was only actively pursued in Bush’s 
second term. The rapprochement between the transatlantic allies was initiated by 
George W. Bush’s symbolic visit to the institutions of the European Union on 
February 21-22, 2005. The President did not hesitate to emphasize at various 
press availabilities that his first trip abroad in his second term was to Europe and 
that he went for it already in his second month in office after his inauguration. 
When he met with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Mainz on February 
24, 2005, for example, he said, “an obvious decision was to come here [Europe] 
on my first trip since my inauguration” (President Bush and Chancellor Schröder 
Discuss Partnership, 2005).  
 
Bush’s visit to the institutions of the European Union was symbolic for two 
reasons. First, his trip to Europe did not take place within the framework of a 
bilateral meeting, as had been the case on his trip to Europe in 2001, when he 
had travelled to Poland, Spain, the UK, and Italy. Yet, on his trip in February 2005 
Bush visited the European Union and the headquarters of NATO. He saw French 
President Chirac on his first day in Brussels, but this meeting took place in the 
course of his visit to the EU. He also met German Chancellor Schröder in Mainz, 
Germany, but this meeting occurred only after his EU visit. Second, George Bush 
became the first American President to visit the institutions of the European 
Union. There were at least three reasons for this outreach to the European Union 
by the United States. First, the Bush administration in particular reached out to the 
European Union because it had been accused of pursuing a policy of 
disaggregation in its first term and thus not supporting the European integration 
but working against it (Donfried, personal interview, September 2, 2009). Second, 
as former Director of Research at the “Center on the United States and Europe” at 
the Brookings Institution, Jeremy Shapiro, analyzed, “[…] part of the American 
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strategy was to outreach to the EU in order not to have to deal with the French 
and the Germans directly” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009). Third, 
the Bush administration saw a chance that the EU would be able to deliver more 
than in the past once the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (also 
referred to as Constitutional Treaty) was passed. However, when the treaty was 
rejected in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005, U.S. hopes of an 
empowerment of the EU vanished. Thus, “[a]t the end it was not – the EU part 
was not at all a success” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009).  
 
2.4.1. German-American Rapprochement 
The Beginning of the Repair: Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
After President Bush’s visit to the EU institutions in Brussels on February 
21-22, 2005, he headed on to see German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Mainz 
on February 24, 2005. This bilateral meeting between the two leaders is seen as 
the start of the rapprochement of the relations between Germany and the U.S. In 
a joint press conference after their talks, U.S. President Bush accentuated that 
“[a]fter all, Europe is America’s closest ally” and that “in order for us to have good 
relations with Europe, we must have good relations with Germany” (President 
Bush and Chancellor Schröder Discuss Partnership, 2005). Furthermore, he 
claimed to “understand the limitations of German contribution” (ibid.) in Iraq but 
declared them to be vital and important. The limitations concerning Germany’s 
training of Iraqi police and military on the territory of the United Arab Emirates had 
been raised by Schröder in his remarks before. Thus, the German Chancellor 
adhered to his statement pronounced in 2004 that no German soldier would put a 
foot on Iraqi soil. Schröder also emphasized that now that the U.S. had accepted 
what Germany was not going to do in Iraq, it was ready to assist the rebuilding of 
the country with civilian assistance. Both leaders underscored that they would 
leave past differences behind and by putting a stop to emphasizing their 
disagreements they would focus on where they did agree. However, when asked 
how he viewed Germany’s leadership role and its role as a partner for the U.S., 
the U.S. President answered only reluctantly, “I would call Germany a partner in 
peace and a partner in freedom and a partner of doing our duty” (President Bush 
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and Chancellor Schröder Discuss Partnership, 2005). He avoided calling 
Germany a partner in leadership. When Bush and Schröder exchanged toasts on 
the same day, Schröder, probably referring to Bush’s answer, claimed that he and 
the U.S. President stood there “as equal partners, equal friends and real allies” 
(President and German Chancellor Schröder Exchange Toasts, 2005). Four 
months later, in June of the same year, Bush invited the German Chancellor to 
the White House. This was the last encounter of the two leaders before the 
German national elections in September 2005 made Angela Merkel the new 
Chancellor of Germany. 
The Establishment of Good Personal Relations: Chancellor Angela Merkel 
 Even though the personal relationship between Schröder and Bush could 
not be healed, the formal repair of the relations between Germany and the U.S. 
had already begun before Angela Merkel came into office as new German 
Chancellor. The repair then accelerated once Merkel had become head of the 
German government. As Executive Vice President of the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, Karen Donfried, analyzed, “[…] Merkel wins the election and 
is engaging Bush, is opening to Bush, is saying positive things to the U.S.” 
(Donfried, personal interview, September 2, 2009). At their first meeting President 
Bush, in his remarks, confidently mentioned the “climate of openness” that existed 
between the two leaders as well as his “incredibly positive” first impressions of 
Chancellor Merkel (President Welcomes German Chancellor Merkel to the White 
House, 2006). Bush appreciated Merkel’s frankness and her straightforward 
judgments and had the impression of Merkel being a smart and clear thinker 
(ibid.; President Bush Welcomes German Chancellor to the White House, 2006). 
 
 Merkel, for her part, was “sort of unemotional about this relationship” 
(Donfried, personal interview, September 2, 2009). What mattered for her was 
that the United States was important for Germany and therefore she was going to 
build up a stronger relationship with the U.S. than Schröder used to have. She 
has held a very strong pro-American position in international politics and 
according to her opinion, Germany’s place was at the side of the United States. In 
2003, in an article in the Washington Post, Merkel had criticized Schröder and his 
coalition for parting ways with the United States over Iraq. The article with the 
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provocative title “Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans” as well as her visit to 
the United States, during which she met with most of the political elite in 
Washington except for the President himself, ruffled domestic feathers not only in 
Germany but also rocked the boat in other European countries. However, Merkel 
was also criticized by Americans for her in some ways ill-considered pro-American 
position, especially in regards to the U.S. Iraq policy. In an interview in the 
Berliner Zeitung, on January 18, 2007, Richard Holbrooke, who had been U.S. 
Ambassador to Germany under Clinton, criticized Merkel for not confronting Bush 
with European criticism about his Iraq policy (“Bush hinterlässt ein furchtbares 
Erbe”, 2007, January 18). Merkel’s soft tone on Bush’s controversial policies was 
also acknowledged by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an interview 
she gave the news magazine Der Spiegel during her trip to Germany in January 
2007. When she was asked whether she was “confronted with any skepticism or 
criticism over the new American strategy in Iraq”, she replied “I found the German 
government quite understanding of what we are trying to do” (Aust et al., 2007, 
January 22, [online]). 
 
However, Merkel’s soft tone on Bush’s War policy did not only have to do 
with the sort of unemotional intention to strengthen U.S.-German relations. Due to 
her past, Chancellor Merkel could better relate to President Bush’s intention to 
establish a free and democratic Iraq. Grown up in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), Merkel became politically active at a period of time when people 
began to talk about freedom and democracy and the communist regime in the 
GDR eventually collapsed (Rippert, 2007, [online]). Talks about freedom and 
democracy in connection with Iraq, but also with Merkel’s past experiences in the 
GDR, were often mentioned in the remarks of the two leaders, in particular during 
their first two meetings in the first half of 2006. At their first meeting President 
Bush mentioned that he had been “touched by hearing about her early life in 
communist Germany” (President Welcomes German Chancellor Merkel to the 
White House, January13, 2006) and at their second meeting he claimed how 
important it is for him to talk to “a very sophisticated leader who knows what it’s 
like to live in a world that isn’t free” (President Bush Welcomes German 
Chancellor to the White House, May 3, 2006). Moreover, at the end of his remarks 
after their first meeting, President Bush, after paying compliments on Merkel’s 
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smartness and spirit, pointed out that “[s]he [Merkel] loves freedom” (President 
Welcomes German Chancellor Merkel to the White House, January 13, 2006).  
 
Still in January 2006, at their first meeting, Bush confidentially claimed that 
“we’re [Bush and Merkel] going to have a very good relationship” (President 
Welcomes German Chancellor Merkel to the White House, January 13, 2006). 
Between this meeting and their second, thus, from January 13, 2006, to May 3, 
2006, there were less than four months during which Merkel and Bush were on 
the phone six times, which was quite a lot (President Bush Welcomes German 
Chancellor to the White House, May 3, 2006). Hence, as a senior official at a 
press briefing observed, Bush and Merkel “are two people who are very 
comfortable with one another” (Press Briefing by National Security Advisor 
Hadley, 2007). This was especially important since not only was everything 
personal with Bush, but the personal relationships that he had with other 
politicians also influenced the bilateral political agenda with the respective 
country.  
 
As a sign of their good understanding the political leaders invited each 
other to their private places. In July 2006, President Bush went to see Chancellor 
Merkel in the city of Stralsund, which is part of the constituency by which Merkel 
was first elected to the Bundestag. This visit to Merkel’s “home turf”, as Bush 
called it at a Roundtable Interview of the President by Foreign Print Media on July 
10, 2006, some days before he headed to Germany, occurred only half a year 
after his first encounter with Merkel. In November 2007, President Bush invited 
Chancellor Merkel and her husband to stay with him and his wife at his ranch in 
Crawford, Texas, for some days.  
 
2.4.2. French-American Rapprochement 
The Beginning of the Repair: President Jacques Chirac 
 U.S. President George Bush met with French President Jacques Chirac on 
the evening of his first day of his two-day visit to the institutions of the European 
Union on February 21-22, 2005. It’s quite remarkable that Bush’s first bilateral 
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meeting with a European leader since his re-election was with the French 
President Chirac. Bush also explicitly emphasized this fact in his remarks in front 
of the press, “This is my first dinner since I’ve been re-elected on European soil, 
and it’s with Jacques Chirac – and that ought to say something” (President and 
French President Chirac Discuss Common Values, Vision, February 21, 2005). As 
can be deducted from the headline for the meeting attributed by the Department 
of State, the encounter of the two Presidents was seriously focused on 
emphasizing common values and visions in order to divert the public’s attention 
from their differences over the Iraq invasion. Besides, President Chirac claimed 
that the Iraq crisis had in no way affected “the bedrock of our relations, namely, 
our common values and our common vision” (ibid.). 
 
 When Bush changed his administration team in the first months after his re-
election and neoconservative ideologues were partly replaced by realists, the 
relations between Bush and Chirac began to normalize. President Chirac did not 
believe in the neoconservative imperative of the spread of democracy throughout 
the world. He was convinced that anti-Western sentiments were too deeply rooted 
in the non-democratic countries of the developing world, making it impossible for 
those countries to accept the American model of democracy. Thus, when the 
administration gained a more realist outlook, Chirac again regarded the U.S. as a 
serious partner in international affairs.  
 
 Interestingly, the rapprochement between France and the U.S. took place 
in the same foreign policy field where the split had taken place in 2003: the Middle 
East. French President Jacques Chirac was determined not to leave this foreign 
policy field to the United States. Thus, defending Lebanon’s sovereignty against 
Syria’s interference became one of Chirac’s prior foreign policy goals. France and 
the United States cooperated closely in order to enact UN Security Council 
Resolution 1559, which put pressure on Syria to withdraw its troops from 
Lebanon’s territory. Apart form the UN Resolution, Lequesne (2007, 10) named 
two other incidents that had been supportive of a French-American 
rapprochement in the foreign policy field of the Middle East. In February 2005, the 
Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, who had been a good friend of Chirac’s, 
was assassinated. As a consequence, the French President broke off the dialog 
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with the Syrian regime, which he thought had pulled the strings behind the 
assassination. One year later, in the summer of 2006, the Lebanese Hisbollah 
attacked Israel with missiles and the Israeli military intervened in the south of 
Lebanon. Chirac initially defended the Israeli intervention against the Shiite 
militias. Both of Chirac’s reactions not only pleased President Bush but also 
supported the U.S. position in these matters (Lequesne, 2007, 10). 
 
 Summing up, the relationship between the U.S. and France had been “fully 
repaired” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009) still under Jacques Chirac 
before Nicolas Sarkozy became President of France. Nevertheless, the personal 
relationship between Chirac and Bush was never really good. When Bush was 
asked if he would invite Chirac to his ranch in Texas, he answered evasively, “I’m 
looking for a good cowboy” (President and French President Chirac Discuss 
Common Values, Vision, February 21, 2005). However, during their more than six 
years being in office simultaneously, Bush never invited President Chirac to come 
to the White House either. Even though Sarkozy and Bush were simultaneously in 
office for only some one and a half years, their personal relationship was far 
better than that between Chirac and Bush.  
Embracing the New French President Nicolas Sarkozy  
 Still as Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy had already travelled to 
New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11-12, 2006, on time for the fifth 
anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. During his stay he met with U.S. 
President George W. Bush and had pictures taken of him posing next to the 
American President, which circulated around the French press and media. This 
PR campaign for presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy indicated a clear 
message: He was going to improve the relations with the United States once he 
was elected President of France. Yet, as Gordon (2007, 4) analyzed, Sarkozy 
took great risks “by paying a personal visit to President George W. Bush and 
praising the unpopular United States” during his campaign. The fact that he won 
the elections nonetheless might suggest “that French anti-Americanism is both 
overstated and more limited to Parisian elite circles than commonly believed” 
(ibid.). During his trip he also emphasized that his positions and politics were 
different from those of his predecessor when he criticized Jacques Chirac’s 
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reaction to the Iraq War. Sarkozy claimed that Chirac’s position on the invasion of 
Iraq had shown evidence of France’s arrogance and had humiliated the U.S. as a 
superpower (Schmid, 2007, [online]).  
 
 In August 2007, as soon as three months after his election as President of 
France, Nicolas Sarkozy met with President Bush in the United States. However, 
the encounter took place on the French President’s initiative as Sarkozy had 
spent his summer holidays in the U.S. In his remarks in front of the press Bush 
appreciated Sarkozy’s frankness, “you know where he stands, he’ll tell you exactly 
what he thinks” (President Bush Welcomes French President Sarkozy, August 11, 
2007). President Sarkozy for his part expressed his admiration for the United 
States.  
 
In November of the same year, when Bush invited Sarkozy to the White 
House in Washington, D.C., the first official meeting took place between the two 
Presidents. When they were exchanging toasts, Sarkozy not only made a 
sarcastic remark against former President Chirac by saying, “one can be a friend 
of America, and yet win elections in France” (President Bush and President 
Sarkozy of France Exchange Toasts, November 6, 2007), but also sent a very 
strong message in regards to his relationship with the U.S., 
“You know, I’ve come to Washington to bear a very simple, 
straightforward message, and I bear it on behalf of all French men and 
women: I wish to reconquer the heart of America, and I wish to 
reconquer the heart of America in a lasting fashion. I’ve come to say 
one simple thing: France and the United States are allies, have been 
allies and will continue to be allies, and have been so forever. […] And 
I say the following words from the bottom of my heart: Long live 
Franco-American friendship.” 
(President Bush and President Sarkozy of France Exchange Toasts, 
November 6, 2007; as translated from French into English) 
 
At a joint press availability the next day, President Bush thanked Sarkozy for 
sending his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner on a trip to Iraq. Kouchner had 
“announced that France was ready to play a role in international efforts to stabilize 
Iraq” (Gordon, 2007, 5). Whereas Kouchner’s visit did not produce any major 
results, “that gesture helped turn the page on a relationship that had deeply 
soured but now is on the road to repair” (ibid.). The visit thus carried a lot of 
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political symbolism in it. Furthermore, President Sarkozy announced on 
Afghanistan that he would not withdraw the French troops “because what is at 
stake here is the solidity of our alliance” (President Bush Participates in a Joint 
Press Availability, November 7, 2007). President Bush closed the press briefing 
by referring to President Sarkozy as “somebody who has clear vision, basic 
values, who is willing to take tough positions to achieve peace” (ibid.) and as 
somebody he is comfortable with. 
 
During his trip to Europe in the summer of 2008, President Bush also 
stopped in Paris for a meeting with President Sarkozy. The issue of Iran, its 
nuclear program and the sanctions against Iran’s regime played a central role in 
their talks. In their remarks in front of the press both presidents emphasized that, 
even though the relations between the U.S. and France had improved since 2003, 
it did not mean that they agreed on everything. However, they were now able to 
frankly talk about points of divergence and calmly discuss them. Furthermore, 
Sarkozy pointed out that if a relationship is strong, the leaders are able to accept 
differences (President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability, June 14, 
2008).  
 
 Sarkozy’s probably most profound step “toward a more trusting U.S.-
French relationship” (Gordon, 2007, 5) was France’s return to NATO’s integrated 
military command, from which France had withdrawn in 1966. Gordon, however, 
did not so much see a transatlantic but a European motivation behind Sarkozy’s 
step. He maintains that “[t]he new French logic is that America and its Atlanticist 
allies in NATO will never trust or support European Union efforts to develop more 
defense autonomy unless France can show itself to be a loyal NATO ally and that 
EU and NATO defense efforts should both be strengthened” (ibid.). Director of 
Research at the “Center on the United States and Europe” at the Brookings 
Institution, Justin Vaisse, also pointed out that France’s return to NATO’s 
integrated military command included “the precondition of strengthening the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)” and cautioned against 
interpreting Sarkozy’s decision as an Atlanticist move (Vaisse, 2008, 6).  
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Moreover, despite all the publicity Sarkozy gained by taking this step, it 
was actually not such a big accomplishment as had been portrayed in the media. 
Already under President Jacques Chirac, who had also pursued France’s return 
to NATO’s integrated military command in 1995-97 but failed (ibid.), France had 
followed “a sort of creeping reintegration in the 90s and 2000s” (Vaisse, personal 
interview, August 13, 2009). Thus, by the time Sarkozy announced France’s 
reintegration into NATO, the French were already provided with “an extensive 
presence in NATO structures” (Vaisse, 2008, 6). France had actually only been 
absent from the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning 
Committee (ibid.). Thus, Vaisse claimed that France reintegration into NATO 
“amount[ed] to an important political symbol, but a modest reality” (ibid.) and “the 
concrete implications of that are not huge” (Vaisse, personal interview, August 13, 
2009).   
 
 As always, when dealing with French foreign policy, there remains the 
question of how much it was guided by Gaullism. This is in particular the case 
since Sarkozy’s very good (personal) relationship with U.S. President Bush had 
often been attributed to his being an Atlanticist versus President Chirac’s being a 
Gaullist. Vaisse, taking a critical stance on this allegation, agreed that while 
“Sarkozy’s personal style is definitively not Gaullist”, “[m]any of his beliefs, 
however, can be described as Gaullist” (ibid., 5). Thus, in contrast to de Gaulle’s 
discretion and modesty, Sarkozy constantly exposes himself as well as his private 
life to the media. Additionally, his strong admiration of the Americans, his belief 
that success should be honored rather than resented, and the fact that he “has no 
qualms about ‘helping the rich’” (Gordon, 2007, 3) stand in stark contrast to a 
Gaullist lifestyle. Nevertheless, like de Gaulle, Sarkozy is a pragmatist and, by 
seeing “the EU as ‘reincarnation’ for France” (Vaisse, 2008, 6), he seeks to 
expand France’s influence on world politics. Thus, according to Vaisse, “Sarkozy 
has by no means moved French foreign policy in a more Atlanticist direction” 
(ibid.), instead there has been much continuity between Chirac and Sarkozy. 
Moreover, Vaisse also pointed out that now, under Sarkozy, there are even some 
issues on which Chirac agreed with Bush and Sarkozy does not as is the case 
with Turkey’s entry into the EU. Yet, the perception that Sarkozy has been 
aligning himself more with Bush than Chirac did is widespread. One of the 
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reasons Vaisse indicated for this perception is that Jacques Chirac’s foreign 
policy had been overshadowed by the 2003 Iraq crisis “while his wide-ranging 
2004-07 rapprochement with America has been underestimated or ignored” (ibid., 
7). Another reason was President Bush’s strong embracement of the new French 
leader. It is questionable, if this can solely be attributed to “a Bush administration 
desperate for friends”, as Vaisse (2008, 8) alleged. Sarkozy’s lifestyle and his 
strong admiration for the U.S. have certainly also played a role. Lastly, it remains 
to be pointed out, as also Vaisse indicated as well, that, like Bush’s relationship 
with Merkel, the media had blown up the issue.  
 
  100 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In this chapter the findings of the preceding analysis of the transatlantic 
relations of the years between 2001 and 2008 are summarized and interpreted. 
Research questions and theses set up in the introduction are addressed with the 
results of the research carried out. Moreover, this chapter presents for a short 
resume of the study. 
 
Short-Term Effects, but No Long-Term Effects 
 As has been shown on the preceding pages, in particular in the analysis of 
the Bush administration’s first term, the crisis between Germany and France and 
the U.S. over the Iraq invasion had deeply affected the relations between these 
allies. France was punished in several ways for its acting at the United Nations 
when the U.S. attempted to achieve a UN resolution for the Iraq invasion. The 
French were excluded from participation in major U.S. military exercises and were 
not included in U.S.-hosted air force conferences; U.S. military officials were not 
allowed to participate in one of the most famous parades of the French military, 
the Paris Air Show; and French products were boycotted and renamed in 
Congressional cafeterias and on board of Air Force One. However, these 
punishments were run by the Department of Defense for the most part while the 
State Department lobbied against such measures. Moreover, these punishments 
did not spoil the relations between the political leaders of the U.S. and France as 
still in June 2003, three months after the outbreak of the Iraq invasion, Chirac and 
Bush enjoyed private talks. In addition, the French President was the first 
European leader that Bush visited during his trip to Europe in February 2005. 
 
However, the relations between the American and the French Presidents 
had never been really close, which is largely due to the historical narrative of 
French-American relations in the second half of the 20th century. Since the end of 
the Second World War French Presidents have sought to assert French positions 
against the U.S. dominance in military and foreign affairs and to temper American 
power. This king of acting was coined as Gaullism by President Charles de 
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Gaulles, who withdrew the French military from NATO in 1966 due to the 
American dominance of the alliance. French-American relations under President 
Jacques Chirac, who has been characterized as “arch-Gaullist” by Vaisse (2008, 
6), largely followed Gaullist principles. When France did not cooperate with the 
U.S. on Iraq at the UN, the Americans were caught by surprise. However, since 
France held the image of a European rebel and relations between Chirac and 
Bush had not deepened a lot, it did not affect their relationship much. As Shapiro 
noted the repair of the U.S.-European relationship “was very easy with the 
French” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009).  
 
 While the U.S. maxim concerning the treatment of Germany after the 2003 
Iraq crisis, which was to ignore Germany, was somewhat “softer”, German-
American relations were affected more by the crisis than were French-American 
relations. While Bush held talks with Chirac that same year of the outbreak of the 
Iraq War, he had not talked to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for one year, 
since the German national elections in September 2002. Moreover, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was ordered not to contact his German 
counterpart at a NATO defense ministers’ meeting in September 2002 and U.S. 
officials in general were not allowed to respond to German signs of reconciliation. 
When Bush and Schröder officially talked again to each other in September 2003, 
the talks took place in the course of a session of the UN General Assembly and 
lasted for only forty minutes. In addition, it took almost two years before Bush 
again welcomed Schröder to the White House in February 2004. This diplomatic 
encounter is regarded to have formally ended the crisis in the German-American 
relations but the personal relationship between Bush and Schröder was never 
again repaired. 
 
 Since Bush tended to personalize his relationships with other heads of 
government, the breach between him and Schröder, which had already happened 
well before the outbreak of the Iraq War, had a considerable impact on German-
American relations. Bush felt betrayed by Schröder and “hated Schröder, did not 
trust him at all” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009). Yet, apart from the 
relationship between the heads of government, there was also a kind of a breach 
with the historical narrative of Germany’s role in the U.S.-European transatlantic 
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relations and of its position vis-à-vis the U.S. This had greatly affected the 
German-American relations during the first term of the Bush Administration. Since 
the end of the Second World War Germany has obtained a middle stance 
between the American and French positions. On the one hand Germany upholds 
a very distinct transatlantic orientation and pursues very strong relations with the 
United States. This posture has its origin in the immediate post-World War II 
period when the Americans supported the recreation of the state of Germany, 
pursued re-education of its people and protected it from the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, together with France, it has been the driving motor for the European 
integration. Unlike the UK, which has an almost exclusive transatlantic orientation 
in foreign and security policy, Germany also has a distinct European orientation. 
As a consequence of this setting, Germany has always seen itself as a sort of 
mediator between France, representing European interests, and the United 
States, representing American interests. However, in 2003, when the Germans 
aligned with the French against the United States, some scholars worried that 
Germany “now subordinated the Atlantic to the European circle [of policy making]” 
(Szabo, 2004, 49). Hence, it seemed as if Germany would break with its 
traditional role that it had played in international politics for decades. In addition, 
since 1945 no German Chancellor had dared to put the German-American 
relations at stake in the way that Schröder did. Thus, Germany’s alignment with 
France and Russia in opposition to the U.S. caught by surprise many in the Bush 
administration, who still expected “historical modesty” (Pond, 2004, 61) from 
Germany.  
 
Notwithstanding the seemingly deeper rupture in German-American 
relations compared to the French-American relations, it still “was a pretty easy 
relationship to repair” (Shapiro, personal interview, August 4, 2009). As Shapiro 
analyzed, “The thing is that the German-U.S. relationship is so interwoven that it 
is actually hard for its leaders – I’m not sure about the extent to which Schröder 
tried or tried not that hard, but he had tried – it is very hard to sort of disentangle 
it” (ibid.). This has been proven by the various examples of German assistance in 
the Iraq War, ranging from based security to intelligence support that happened in 
spite of Schröder’s pronounced opposition to the war. Hence, even though the 
2003 Iraq crisis resulted in some non-negligible short-term effects on the 
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transatlantic relationship between the U.S. and Germany and France, the analysis 
of the transatlantic relations in the years between 2004 and 2008 clearly indicates 
that by latest 2005 a rapprochement, initiated by the U.S., was pursued. Hence, 
making the case against the thesis of an estrangement in the transatlantic 
relationship due to the 2003 Iraq crisis, the crisis did not have any long-term 
effects on the transatlantic relations between the U.S. and Germany and France. 
 
Thus, it was the complexity of the German-American and French-American 
relations that saved the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the U.S. 
from suffering any long-term effects. In particular the intelligence cooperation 
between Germany, France and the U.S. was much too vital to be put at risk by 
some uneasiness of the political leaders. The CIA was one of the most active 
agencies in the Bush administration that lobbied against any deeper rupture with 
the Europeans and wanted to repair the bruised relations. Less so for the French-
American but more so for the German-American relations, it was also the military 
integration that avoided any long-term effects in the transatlantic relationship. In 
addition, the economic relations between Europe and the U.S., which have been 
excluded from the thesis, were even more important than the intelligence or 
military cooperation. Due to their high importance, the economic relations 
remained almost completely untouched by the Iraq crisis. Furthermore, there was 
also the American public opinion, which did not like to see the image of the United 
States deteriorating due to the dispute over the Iraq crisis and the way the 
Administration handled the transatlantic relationship. Hence, there were all those 
different groups, ranging from intelligence and military corporations to business 
elites and the American public that had an interest in avoiding a split in the 
transatlantic relations. 
Influencing Factors behind the Rapprochement 
 The analysis of the transatlantic relations during the years from 2001 to 
2008 indicates several factors which were responsible for the rapprochement in 
the relations between the U.S. and Germany and France. These factors can be 
split into external factors, in particular the deteriorating situation in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and domestic factors on both the U.S. and the European 
sides of the transatlantic relations. In Afghanistan, the security situation escalated 
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during the summer of 2003 as remnants of the Taliban together with foreign 
combatants of neighboring countries reorganized and pursued a vast insurgency. 
By the end of the year the Taliban had regained control in four Afghan provinces, 
located at the border to Pakistan. After achieving some stability with the help of 
the international community during the years of 2004 and 2005, death tolls of the 
coalition forces skyrocketed in 2006 and further increased in 2007 and 2008.  
 
 The situation was not any different in Iraq, where the insurgency began to 
erupt in the summer of 2003. In the following years insurgents’ attacks and death 
tolls of primarily the U.S. troops but to some degree also of the coalition forces 
increased. Not only did the deterioration of the situation in Iraq continue, it also 
greatly accelerated by 2006. What was believed to be possible during in the first 
term, fighting two wars at the same time, resulted in an overextension of the U.S. 
military. Neither for Afghanistan nor for Iraq, sufficient U.S. military resources 
were available in order to keep the situation under control. Realizing the limits of 
American power and the need for cooperation with allies, the Bush administration 
started to reach out to Europe. This became evident in the diplomatic exchanges 
the U.S. had with European leaders. Bush was the first U.S. President to visit the 
institutions of the European Union. In addition, he undertook more trips abroad 
and invited his European counterparts more often to the White House, which 
became readily apparent in the diplomatic exchanges with German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. However, the Bush administration’s effort to reach out to its 
European allies also became evident in the military cooperation in Afghanistan. It 
was only after the Iraq invasion that the U.S. agreed to expand ISAF’s mission in 
Afghanistan and to allow for closer cooperation between OEF and ISAF.  
 
 However, there were additional factors on the U.S. side influencing the 
rapprochement in the transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. This 
has been shown in the analysis of the thesis and summarized very pointedly by 
Gordon (2006, [online]), “global realities and resource constraints […] force[d] the 
administration toward pragmatism, modesty and cooperation with allies”. As a 
consequence of these realities and the rising pressure from elite and public 
opinion, the Bush administration again pursued close cooperation with Europe 
and altered its approach to foreign policy. As pursuing neoconservative principles 
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had not worked very well, the administration switched to a more realist approach 
in foreign policy. This included a change in the personnel and policies of the 
second Bush administration. Concerning the changes in personnel, people very 
closely associated with the neoconservative ideology, such as Paul Wolfowitz and 
I. Lewis Libby, left Bush’s team, which decreased the neoconservative influence 
on the administration. In turn pragmatists, such as Robert Zoellick, Nicolas Burns 
or Christopher Hill, were taken into the administration. In particular the 
replacement of Secretary of State Colin Powell by Condoleezza Rice was a 
decisive factor for the repair of the relations between the U.S. and Europe. Rice 
undertook more travels abroad, which indicated a greater effort to reach out to 
allies, and she was one of the driving forces of the “counterrevolution” against the 
neoconservative revolution of the first-term government. Moreover, when the 
realist Robert Gates replaced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a person 
closely associated with the disaster of the Iraq War left the administration. 
Concerning the changes in policies, the Bush administration reviewed its 
standpoints towards Iran and North Korea. While during his first term the two 
countries were regarded as members of the “axis of evil”, which had to be fought 
by the use of force, during his second term Bush backed multilateral negotiations 
and allowed U.S. diplomats to engage with these countries. In addition, the 
administration also changed its foreign policy style. In particular President Bush 
and Secretary of State Rice toned down their wartime rhetoric. The new tone and 
style that characterized the foreign policy of Bush’s second term was apparent in 
Rice’s confirmation hearing as newly appointed Secretary of State, when she 
stated that “the time for diplomacy is now” (Gordon, 2005, [online]).  
 
 Lastly, there were factors on the European side of the transatlantic 
relationship, especially in Germany and France that were influencing the 
rapprochement. Like on the U.S. side, there had also been changes in personnel 
and policies on the European side. In Germany, the national elections in 2005 
were crucial for the rapprochement with the U.S. A change in leadership occurred 
as newly elected German Chancellor Angela Merkel replaced Gerhard Schröder. 
While the reconciliation had already started with Schröder, the rapprochement 
accelerated with Angela Merkel. Moreover, the German government changed 
from an SPD/Green coalition to a so-called “Grand Coalition” of the SPD and 
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CDU/CSU, which the U.S. found easier to embrace than the left-wing coalition of 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In general, the change in personnel proved more 
crucial for German-American relations than for French-American relations. One 
reason for this was the fact that there had not been a breach in the personal 
relationship between Chirac and Bush as there had been between Schröder and 
Bush. Another reason was that Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as French President 
only at the end of Bush’s presidency.  
 
 Concerning the changes in policies, a contrasting picture to the one of the 
changes in personnel presents itself. Since Germany did not pursue any major 
changes in her policies, it did only play a negligible factor for the rapprochement 
with the U.S. However, French President Jacques Chirac’s Middle East policy, 
which he pursued after 2003, contributed considerably to the rapprochement. 
Regardless of Merkel’s election, there was a continuation of Germany’s 
Afghanistan and Iraq policies. Germany remained committed in Afghanistan and 
steadily increased its deployment of troops. Moreover, although Merkel appeared 
herself very appreciative of Bush’s Iraq policy, she did not increase Germany’s 
involvement in Iraq. The training of the Iraqi police force by Germany continued to 
be conducted in the United Arab Emirates and still no German soldier entered 
Iraq. Merkel probably could not alter Germany’s Iraq policy because her hands 
were tied since she was in a coalition with the SPD, who has strictly refused any 
German involvement in Iraq.  
 
President Chirac saw no need to change his policies neither for 
Afghanistan, where France remained ranked sixth at troop deployments, nor for 
Iraq, where France continued to be uninvolved. It was only under President 
Sarkozy that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner was sent to Iraq and 
troop levels in Afghanistan were considerably increased. Chirac’s Middle East 
policy, which he pursued in the years after 2003, met with approval in the United 
States, though. Breaking off the dialogue with Syria as well as defending an 
Israeli intervention against Shiite militias was in line with the Bush administration’s 
policy. Regarding Syria, the U.S. and France even cooperated closely in order to 
push through a UNSC Resolution putting pressure on Syria to withdraw its troops 
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from Lebanon. Yet, it needs to be mentioned that Chirac’s Middle East policy was 
not motivated by a rapprochement with the U.S.  
The Change of Leadership in Europe 
The personalities in office as heads of government in the years from 2001 
to 2005 (Germany), 2007 (France) and 2008 (U.S.) played a significant role in the 
dispute over the Iraq invasion. This in particular was the case because the 
relationships between these political leaders were not based on a realistic (IR 
theory) approach, where the interests of countries matter, but on good personal 
relations. In the case of the German-American relationship, Szabo (2004, 135) 
analyzed, “Both Schröder and Bush were responsible for the personalization of 
the problem”. However, due to “the greater weight of the United States and the 
responsibilities that go with leadership of a great alliance” and because of Bush’s 
“general tendency to overpersonalize his approach to foreign policy” (ibid.) he 
attributed more of the responsibility to the American President. Instead of viewing 
the Iraq crisis as a difference of the interests of countries, Bush took Germany’s 
defiance and Schröder’s anti-war rhetoric personal. He felt betrayed by Schröder 
and did not trust him anymore. Even though the personal relations between Bush 
and Schröder were never repaired, a rapprochement in German-American 
relations started in a limited way while Schröder was still in office as German 
Chancellor.  
 
 Hence, the change in leadership in Germany considerably affected the 
German-American relationship because Bush did not have to deal with Schröder 
anymore. In addition, Angela Merkel’s particular personality had a significant 
impact on the rapprochement in the relations. Merkel regarded the U.S. as a 
strategic and important player in international politics and concluded that 
consequently Germany needed to have good relations with the U.S. no matter if 
the German people liked the American President or not. However, her past was 
more important for the good relationship that she enjoyed with George W. Bush 
than her sort of unemotional, realist approach to foreign policy. Grown up under a 
communist regime in the GDR, Merkel could relate to Bush’s fervor for the 
establishment of democracy and freedom in other countries. Moreover, already in 
2003 Merkel publicly militated against Schröder’s Iraq policy in the German 
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parliament as well as during her trip to the United States. This was motivated by 
both her realist consideration that good relations with the U.S. were essential as 
well as her admiration for the U.S., which might have evolved as a counter 
reaction to her negative experiences under the communist regime in the GDR. 
Thus, under German Chancellor Merkel, the rapprochement in the German-
American relations not only accelerated but her personal relationship with 
President Bush was even as good that he invited her to his ranch in Texas.  
 
 In the case of the French-American relationship, the personalities in office 
as heads of government also played a considerable role. In the pursuit of a 
Gaullist foreign policy Chirac was substantially responsible for the split in the 
transatlantic relations over the Iraq invasion. However, there was no real breach 
in the personal relationship between President Bush and President Chirac, which 
found its reason in the fact that there had not been a close relationship between 
the two. While meetings between Chirac and Bush occurred in roughly the same 
frequency before and after the Iraq War, the occurrence of meetings between 
Bush and Schröder decreased already in the run-up to the Iraq War in the 
summer of 2002. Moreover, the fact that Bush held talks with Chirac at the G8 
Summit only three months after the Iraq invasion while he avoided talking to 
Schröder, provides another evidence that there had not been any deep rupture in 
the personal relationship between the French and the American Presidents.  
 
 As a consequence, the change from Chirac to Sarkozy did not have such a 
big impact on the relations between France and the U.S., which had in large part 
been restored even under Chirac. With the rapprochement in French-American 
relations under way, the relationship was better at the end of Chirac’s presidency 
than it had been at the end of Clinton’s presidency. Besides, Bush and Sarkozy 
only spent roughly one and a half years together in office. Nevertheless, the 
particular personality of Nicolas Sarkozy played a considerable role in the 
transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. during Bush’s final eighteen 
months in office. Sarkozy pursued a strong Atlanticist orientation in French foreign 
policy, which was largely due to his personality. His admiration of the United 
States, his belief in the financial reward of success and effort, and the constant 
exposure of his private life to media contradict a Gaullist lifestyle and show more 
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parallels with the American way of life. Like German Chancellor Merkel, Sarkozy 
was opening up to the United States and contributed to improving the negative 
image of the U.S. in Europe. In addition, President Bush was eager to embrace 
Sarkozy.  
The Transatlantic Military Cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan 
 The analysis of coalition efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq of 
chapter IV has shown that the 2003 Iraq crisis had a substantial impact on the 
military cooperation between Europe and the U.S. in the Iraq War. As a result of 
the disputes, two of the EU-3 countries, Germany and France, and some smaller 
European countries did not participate in the combat operations in Iraq. 
Furthermore, France was largely responsible for preventing a UN Security Council 
Resolution legitimizing the Iraq invasion of the U.S. and British forces. No 
traditional military alliance, such as NATO, was involved in the Iraq War either. 
This was partly due to the U.S. preference of ad-hoc coalitions, but also to France 
and Germany preventing such participation. Hence, the U.S. was fighting together 
with European as well as other countries in a sort of a loose ad-hoc coalition. In 
the years from 2004 to 2008 more and more participating nations withdrew their 
troops from Iraq, which was easier to do as part of a loose ad-hoc coalition than 
would have been the case when fighting in a traditionally set up military alliance. 
By the end of Bush’s second term the U.S. and the UK together with four other 
nations remained the only ones involved in Iraq. Thus, during Bush’s second term 
the dynamics of the Iraq War resulted in a sort of crumbling coalition. Iraq 
remained a taboo topic for the rapprochement in the German-American and 
French-American relations and, while contributing to civilian assistance neither 
the Germans nor the French deployed any troops in Iraq. Moreover, also NATO’s 
contribution to assistance in the Iraq War remained limited to training, which was 
largely due to French and German interventions. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the 2003 Iraq crisis had negative effects on the military cooperation in Iraq. 
 
 Meanwhile in Afghanistan, realizing the limits of an overstretched U.S. 
military by two wars, the U.S. reached out to its European allies on the 
battleground. It agreed to the extension of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan, thus to 
an enhanced involvement of Europe in this war, and, in accordance with the U.S., 
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NATO took command of ISAF in 2003. This signaled a change in the Bush 
administration’s approach to coalition building, shifting from ad-hoc coalitions to 
more traditional coalitions and to a renewed significance that the U.S. was 
attributing to NATO. With the extension of ISAF’s mandate in the course of four 
phases in the years from 2004 to 2006, it took over several PRTs from the U.S.-
led coalition OEF. When the UK took command of ISAF from May 2006 to 
February 2007, the British pushed ISAF to work even more closely together with 
OEF. In the following months ISAF’s upper command structure was revised and 
new command arrangements between ISAF and U.S. Combined Forces 
Command-Afghanistan were agreed. The purpose of the fusion of certain ISAF 
and OEF structures was to further support the cooperation between the U.S. and 
European/ISAF troops. After the UK the United States, which had not been 
involved in ISAF so far, took command of the international security force. 
Furthermore, a composite headquarters with a balanced proportion of U.S. and 
European representatives in leadership positions was established.  
 
 Thus, it can be said that the 2003 Iraq crisis affected the military 
cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies in Afghanistan in a positive 
way. While the U.S. sought to strictly separate OEF’s combat operations and 
ISAF’s civilian mission and was not interested in any cooperation during Bush’s 
first term, the U.S. actively sought to cooperate with the European nations within 
the framework of ISAF during Bush’s second term. Hence, the rapprochement in 
the transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. was also pursued on the 
battleground in Afghanistan. The rapprochement in the diplomatic relations 
between Europe and the U.S., as well as global realities and resources were 
responsible for the rapprochement in the military relationship.  
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VI. P ROSPECTS 
 
 The purpose of the final chapter is to give some prospects for the 
transatlantic partnership under the presidency of U.S. President Barack Obama. 
Furthermore, the crisis in the transatlantic relationship in 2003 and its subsequent 
period of rapprochement in the years from 2004 to 2008 are put into the larger 
context of the transatlantic relations as they had evolved in the second half of the 
20th century. On the basis of this framework some prospects of the transatlantic 
relations in the following years are anticipated.  
 
Prospects for the Transatlantic Relations during the Obama Presidency 
The general acknowledgment laid out in the interviews about the 
significance of the transatlantic relations was that they are very important for U.S. 
President Barack Obama. The esteem that Obama attributes to Europe became 
evident already during his campaign when he went to London, Paris and Berlin in 
the summer of 2003. This was quite extraordinary and had not been done by any 
U.S. President before as campaign trips were normally limited to travels within the 
U.S. However, Obama’s trips to Europe were “part of Obama’s campaign promise 
to the American electorate to restore America’s standing in the world” (Shapiro, 
p.i., August 4, 2009). Even though Obama emphasized the U.S. standing in the 
world, he undertook only trips to European countries, which was reasoned by the 
fact that America’s image in the world primarily depends on the European public 
opinion. The popularity and legitimacy of the U.S. is not evaluated by reactions in 
Beijing or Moscow but by reactions in London, Paris or Berlin. In that sense “world 
opinion” has always referred to “European opinion” (ibid.). Hence, pursuing good 
transatlantic relations with the Europeans is part of Obama’s pledge to the 
American people and therefore also part of his domestic policy. As Shapiro 
analyzed, “So, he [Obama] has a huge stake in that the Europeans like him, that 
atmospherics of the transatlantic relationship is good, which translates directly 
into his domestic political porch” (ibid.). Obama’s interest in good transatlantic 
relations became also evident from the three trips to Europe that he undertook in 
his first six months in office as well as from his attendance of the EU-USA Summit 
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in Prague on April 5, 2009, and of the NATO Summit in France and Germany on 
April 3-4, 2009.  
 
However, while Vaisse agrees with the argument that it is important for 
Obama to reestablish good transatlantic relations, he remains cautious about the 
significance that Europe has for the U.S. President, “It depends how you define 
important; important as an ally or important as an issue or subject” (Vaisse, p.i., 
August 10, 2009). Europe is still the most important ally for the U.S. because 
“that’s where naturally he [Obama] can find help” (ibid.), but as an issue in U.S. 
foreign policy Europe is not important anymore. Other countries, such as 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq or Russia and subjects such as nuclear weapons treaties, 
terrorism or climate change are more important to the Obama administration than 
Europe. Thus, as with regards foreign policy issues U.S.-Russian, relations are 
more important than are U.S.-European relations.  
 
Like with the new leaders in France and Germany, the question remains as 
to how much of the change in the transatlantic relationship can be attributed to 
Barack Obama as the newly elected U.S. President. In this regard Karen Donfried 
mentioned the debate among political scientists, which is about whether the 
change in the transatlantic relationship is a cyclical change having to do with a 
particular U.S. President or whether it is a structural change having to do with 
fundamental differences in the world (Donfried, p.i., September 2, 2009). Donfried 
believes that both argumentations are important and explanatory for the change in 
the transatlantic relations over the last eight to ten years. She thus analyzed, “I 
think what you are seeing with Obama is you have an American President whose 
person is very popular in Europe but we are realizing that there are also these 
deeper structural issues. Sort of in a sense that cyclical change masked a deeper 
structural change” (ibid.). 
 
Apart from the question of how Barack Obama has affected the 
transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. in general, there is also the 
question of how much he has influenced the German-American and French-
American relations in particular. Since his election as U.S. President the media 
have frequently been addressing the relationship between Merkel and Obama. 
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The general perception has been that Merkel seemed to have enjoyed a better 
personal relationship with President George W. Bush than with his successor. 
The same applies to the personal relationship between Sarkozy and Obama. 
However, the academic opinion is, as laid out in the interviews, that this view 
taken in the media is not true. There is some truth in that Bush was enjoying very 
good personal relations with Merkel and Sarkozy as they were opening up to him 
and he was eager to embrace them as well as to be embraced by them. With 
Obama that personal level of relations with Germany and France fell apart 
because he pursues a pragmatist and realist foreign policy in which the sole 
interest of the state counts. Thus, they might not seem as cordial as with Bush. 
Moreover, while Merkel and Sarkozy could “shine” in their relationships with Bush, 
they have been “sort of eclipsed by Obama” who arrives as that big star in 
January 2009 (Vaisse, p.i., August 10, 2009). However, this does not indicate that 
the relations between Obama and Merkel or Sarkozy are worse than they used to 
be with Bush.  
 
While the change in U.S. leadership from Bush to Obama “has improved 
the atmospherics of the U.S.-European relations well in the substance” (Shapiro, 
p.i., August 4, 2009), the issues have remained the same. There is still the 
problem of Afghanistan, which made the U.S. turn to the Europeans for help. 
During the Bush administration it was easy for the Europeans to bloc requests for 
an increase in troop levels as they could count on the unpopularity of President 
Bush and his policies. With Obama the case is different because he is more 
popular with the European people than are their own politicians. Thus, the 
Europeans find themselves in a difficult situation since they want to cooperate 
with Obama but do not want to pursue his unpopular policies like, for example, 
increasing troop levels in the war in Afghanistan. So far Obama has not received 
a lot from his European allies concerning the Afghanistan issue and from the 
efforts he has put into the transatlantic relationship. As the Europeans failed to 
deliver, Obama decided to do it on his own and has pursued a huge increase in 
U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. 
 
In contrast to the Bush administration’s highly unpopular, unilateral 
approach to foreign policy, the Obama administration has been pursuing a more 
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multilateral and globalist approach. Rather than defining the international system 
by the number of poles, as have U.S. administrations done throughout the 20th 
century and at the beginning of the 21st century, the Obama administration follows 
the idea of a multipartner world. In this multipartner international system the 
transatlantic relations, though important, might only account for one strand of 
Barack Obama’s globalist foreign policy. If Europe fails to deliver on issues of 
cooperation with the United States, the Obama administration might turn to 
cooperating with other partners who are willing and able to deliver. Thus, if 
Europe wants to remain relevant for the U.S., it will also have to reward Obama 
for his engagement with his European allies.  
Prospect for the Wider Context of the Transatlantic Relations 
In order to give some prospects on how the relations between Europe and 
the U.S. might evolve under U.S. President Barack Obama in the coming years, a 
sketchy overview of the history of the transatlantic relations highlighting the role of 
identity is given. Eichler (2006, 253ff) identifies four phases of the history of 
transatlantic relations.  
1. In the late 1940s and 1950s, an Atlantic identity, also referred to as the 
West, was constructed in opposition to the Soviet threat “through the 
overemphasis on commonalities between Europe and the U.S.” (ibid., 
254). However, from the very beginning there were tensions inherent in 
the relationship, which were suppressed by Europe’s dependence on 
American economic assistance and military protection.  
2. A “weakening of [the] Atlantic identity” (ibid., 255) was the consequence 
of the rise of Western Europe’s economic position in the world and of 
the decline of U.S. hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s.  
3. The 1980s brought about a “further divergence of transatlantic 
identities” (ibid., 256), when the European integration became closer 
and “most importantly, the economic basis for a shared identity had 
disappeared” (ibid., 257).  
4. In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, “a period of self-reflection” 
(ibid., 258) and the search for an identity for both the U.S. and Europe 
set in. An overemphasis of the differences between Europe and the 
U.S. seemed to be an adequate response to the question of identity. 
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While such differences in the U.S.-European relations had always been 
present, they were over-exaggerated in a way that reached its climax in 
the dispute over the Iraq invasion in 2003 marking the end of the fourth 
phase. 
 
Today Eichler would have to add a fifth phase in the transatlantic relations, 
which started after the Iraq War in 2004 and was marked by a cautious 
reconciliation between the major parties of the conflict, Germany, France and the 
U.S. While some scholars maintain that the repair of the damage was already 
accomplished during Bush’s second term, others make clear that it started only 
with Barack Obama’s election as U.S. President. In any case the second half of 
the first decade of the 21st century has been characterized by a period of 
rapprochement between Europe and the U.S. However, the assumed Cold War 
harmony in transatlantic relations has never again been established. Instead, the 
prospects for this fifth phase in the transatlantic relations, beginning from the mid- 
to late-2000s to the 2010s, might indicate a period of normalization in the 
transatlantic relations with the rapprochement only being part of it. While the U.S.-
European relations would still figure very prominently in U.S. foreign policy, 
relations to other countries might become equally important as alternative 
channels of cooperation. There might also occur a specialization on certain issues 
in the various relationships the U.S. pursues with its allies around the world. This, 
however, would assume that no unexpected event occurred that fundamentally 
altered the international system.  
 
It will be interesting to see how the transatlantic relations between Europe 
and the U.S. are going to evolve in the 21st century. A multitude of questions 
arises when giving some prospects about the future of the transatlantic 
relationship. What will develop out of the rapprochement between Europe and the 
U.S.; which influence will the Obama administration have on this relationship; how 
will Europe contribute to and influence the relations; in what way will a success or 
failure of the coalition efforts in the war in Afghanistan affect the partnership; and 
how will the cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies develop in 
other important policy fields that have not been addressed in the thesis, such as 
climate change, nuclear proliferation, the worldwide economic recession, or the 
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establishment of social equation between the developing and the developed 
world? Questions such as these need to be subject to further observation and 
study of the transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. 
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VIII. APPENDIX 
A. Interviews 
Transcript of the Interview with Jeremy Shapiro, M.A., conducted on 
August 4th, 2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: So, how do you see the transatlantic relationship from 2005 
onwards? Do you think that there has been a rapprochement? If so, how did this 
play out during the second Bush presidency? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, I think there was a rapprochement; I probably would not have 
used that word. 
Ms. Psihoda: Which other word would you then have used to describe it? 
Mr. Shapiro: I would simply say that they moved to repair the damage that they 
did. I think that there was a very simple reason for it on both sides. Things got bad 
in the world, essentially, for both parties and they naturally looked to each other. 
There was the sort of incident... You know the European foreign policy 
establishment was very uncomfortable with what has happened in the year 2003 
because in their world view the United States was very critical for their security 
and they felt some of their leaders, particularly Chirac and Schröder, had quite 
fasten loose with the important relationship or an issue which was important, but 
actually not as important. This sort of European pattern in situations like that had 
always been like: Well, if you do not agree with what the United States is doing, 
you do not have to go along, but you should not obstruct. And Chirac especially 
actually broke that pattern in 2003 a lot. Even people in the French foreign 
ministry, the French sort of foreign policy establishment, were very upset about 
that. Because they were worried about the damage that he had done to the US 
relationship. So there was an obvious loader back, let’s say on the European side. 
Chirac and Schröder went to, after the Iraq incident, they went to Moscow and 
Beijing to sort of talk about or talk with them about, you know, what a new 
multipolar world would be like or something like that. I think like ten minutes in 
these conversations they realized that they did not want to do it. They hated Bush 
and they did not like a lot of what the United States had become but once you 
actually start talking to Russians and Chinese you realize that sort of the 
narcissism with small differences – to quote an Austrian. And you know, I guess, 
the phrase I use is that it may be true that the Americans are from Mars and 
Europeans are from Venus but if that’s the case then the Chinese are from Alpha 
Centory. It’s a totally different world and the Russians and Chinese were not 
interested in the French or the Germans, they weren’t, they did not have the same 
sort of frame of reference in terms of world order and legalism and, you know, 
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support of the UN. They couldn’t have had that sort of a discussion. Whereas with 
the United States, even if they did not like the outcome of the discussion, but they 
could had had it. So it was absurd and it did not take them very long to figure that 
out.  
On the US side it is a little bit more complicated in the sense that in terms of the 
initial event there was a lot less, at least on the part of the government, a lot less 
trouble. They were not very troubled about what had happened because it was 
their world view that the Europeans did not really matter. They did not like that it 
happened but it was not deeply troubling like it was on the European side. But 
then by the middle of 2004, so for the first year it was not much of an issue, but by 
the middle of 2004 or end of 2004 an important thing started to happen, which 
was we started to lose the war in Iraq and things started to look rather desperate 
on that front as well as others and they started to look very desperate for help of 
all sorts, in Iraq but also elsewhere because Iraq was draining the resources to do 
anything. So, they went back to the Europeans essentially, they sensed that 
opening with the Europeans and you know, again they had... in a similar way... 
the Bush administration did not like the French, hated the Germans, hated 
Schröder, did not trust him at all. But, again, in a similar matter as the Europeans, 
had not other possibility. So there was a big effort at rapprochement. As I said the 
conditions were best on the European side as the Americans rapidly started it, 
because they [Europeans] did not want to ask them [USA] to do so. And it was 
[inaudible] to the end to the year of 2004. But because of the dynamics of the US 
election, I would say it did not really get, it did get beyond the sort of internal, you 
know, lower levels, internal stages between the governments until 2005. I mean 
the most symbolic aspect of this was the Bush visit to Brussels in February of 
2005. You know, it is interesting; it is only a month into his or less than a month 
into his new term. It was part of the American strategy... was to outreach to the 
EU in order not to have to deal with the French and the Germans directly. It was 
the idea, okay what the EU was trying to say is that, you know, “Look come to us 
and you won’t have to have…”. You know, it had been... the dividing 
counter/conquer strategy within Europe had been a sort of resort of American 
presidents for a long time. Not because they did not like European integration, but 
because it was always easier for any given issue and, of course, the Bush people 
had used it a lot in 2003, and it had not exactly worked. It had not worked as well 
as it usually did and they did get... it is important to remember this if you are 
writing this paper... They did get 14 EU countries to go along with them to Iraq out 
of 25. So, in that sense it worked and these countries were, you know, four of the 
big six ones. I guess Austria was not one of them. But in any case, so in that 
sense it worked, but because the French and the Germans had refused to stand 
aside, they did not do what they were usually able to do, which was sort of a 
newer criticism as well as dividing. So it had not worked as well as it usually did. 
And the EU people were saying to them, you know, that was the best strategy if 
you come to us, we can, we can make help you to make deals with the 
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Europeans in general. We won’t stop for shopping, it will be a negotiation with us, 
but we are a lot more reasonable than the French. This was roughly the 
necessary airing and they thought they’d give it a try, I guess. At the end it was 
not... The EU part of it was not at all a success. In large because the EU, as 
usual, cannot deliver, could not deliver its member states. And if you recall this 
period it was, part of the reason they were able to make this case was because 
they were about to get the Lisbon treaty. And the Lisbon treaty would empower 
them but in May the French and the Dutch voted against the Lisbon treaty and it 
fell apart and it entered into periodic Euro-pessimism. So that’s why it fell apart 
but they just went the normal bilateral route. And frankly because it was 
something both side wanted to do, it was actually pretty easy on all accounts. The 
only country that it was... So they got on bilaterally basically. It was very easy with 
the French and, in fact, after Sarkozy’s election but even before they had fully 
repaired that. By the end of the Bush administration US-French relations were 
better than they were at the end of the Clinton administration. So they had literally 
recovered by 2008. It was not terribly hard because the relationships are very, 
very deep. There are the business communities, their inter-connections, it’s pretty 
easy to repair those things if the conditions are right. The exception, I think, was 
mostly Spain, which, I think, has to do more with the particularities of the Spanish 
government. Because Spain was not one of the those that they had a problem 
with in 2003, but they had a huge problem in 2004 and they never repaired that 
problem.  
Ms. Psihoda: And Germany? 
Mr. Shapiro: Germany, yes, they never repaired the relationship between Bush 
and Schröder, but this was not really that important. So, in that sense there was a 
distance between. But, you know, when was Merkel elected? In 2005 in October, 
so that ended that problem and Merkel and Bush got on very well. And, but, you 
know, the repair had begun, this was under the table even before that, in fact, 
oddly although the breach of policy was very big, the breach between the 
governments was never that big. This is one of the big scandals, of course, of 
German politics, is that the government apparatus never ceased to cooperate with 
the United States. And you’ve seen bunches of scandals about it with targeting 
information in Bagdad. Actually, the most significant thing is that the Germans 
filled in for based security. The Germans are allowed based movement out of the 
US bases into Iraq, which arguably is the single biggest European country 
mission to the Iraq war. Now because it is huge, if they had not done that, how 
would we have done the war. But the Germans could have stopped the war with 
that one seat. Now stopped the war, I do not know if that is true. But that would 
have been a dramatic step, that would have seriously affected the US capacity to 
fight that war. They never considered it. Not only that they never considered that, 
but they actually filled in for based security when the Americans deployed, so they 
were guarding those bases for the Americans, which was also a huge contribution 
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to the Iraq war. They did targeting, they did intelligence, some of these scandals 
have come out, I think that there is actually a lot more that they did and has not 
come out. The thing is that the German-US relationship is so intervolven that it is 
actually hard for its leaders – I’m not sure about the extent to which Schröder tried 
or tried not that hard, but he had tried – it is very hard to sort of disentangle it. But 
that certainly did not happen. US and France is not totally dissimilar but because 
of the lack of a military integration it’s not quite the same level. So, the French did 
not really have to participate as much in the Iraq war although they probably did. 
So, yeah, it was a pretty easy relationship to repair, especially after Schröder left.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, do you think that there was a big role of the leaders for the 
repair or was it more like the circumstances? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, I think it was more of the circumstances. The circumstances 
and, let’s say, the sort of government apparatuses, which, you know, continue to 
cooperate even despite what the leaders said. The leaders were not against or for 
it, certainly Chirac, Schröder and Bush, and obviously, Blair was for it. But as I 
said Schröder and Chirac went to Moscow and Beijing. Bush, you know, in the 
first year after the Iraq war just thought, okay let them go, but circumstances drew 
them together again, which is some sort of classic story of transatlantic 
relationship. And I mean, they could have, you know, just sort of set their face in 
front of them and say, you know, I do not care, I do not care how stupid this is but 
I am not going to do it. Now they did not do that. Not even Bush did do that. I 
guess, actually, it was easy for Bush because he was very angry with Schröder, 
he did not really care that much. So, they did not really oppose it but I would say 
that it was not their first choice. 
Ms. Psihoda: And with the new European leaders in France and Great Britain 
and Germany was it even easier to do it or did it actually not matter? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, it did not matter too much. In the case of France and Germany it 
made it marginally easier. But, as I said, it started before they left. What the new 
leaders did, especially in Germany, was allow it, you know just get out of the way, 
the personal animosity that meant that it was no longer hard to go to the White 
House and chat. But, frankly, all of these guys are professional politicians. They 
stab people in the back one day and kiss on the other day. They have done that 
their whole career. It’s not much of a big deal for them. Bush is a fairly personal 
politician but even for him, if he thinks it’s important he can do it. And I would say, 
by the time that most of those leaders left, certainly by the time Chirac left, and 
definitely by the time Blair left, it was already done. And it was well begun by the 
time Schröder left.  
Ms. Psihoda: And now talking about the change to the Obama presidency: Is 
there any different perception of the relationship to the EU or has the agenda 
changed?  
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Mr. Shapiro: Oh, a little. Not so much in the ways that we’ve been talking about. 
The main important change has been the change vis-à-vis Russia, now that has 
affected US-European relations. We saw the letter from the CEE, so the Central 
European countries, which Austria used to be in, but now I think it’s in Western 
Europe. So, the Obama administration definitely takes a different view of Russia 
than the Bush administration did, a different approach to dealing with Russia’s 
relationship. And that has a big effect on how it relates to Europe simply because 
Russia is an issue which deeply divides Europe, particularly divides the European 
Union. Sort of East/West, but not just East/West because the UK is very West. In 
any case it divides them and interestingly on this issue the United States, if you 
were sort of charting a view of how people view Russia and Europe and then you 
put the United States on it, you could actually find the United States more in the 
middle. And so what happened is that it moved slightly from one camp to another 
but not dramatic, but it is a good way of understanding that problem. This has had 
two effects in Europe. We’ve seen the effect on the Eastern Europeans, they were 
very nervous that the United States is selling them out to Russia. On the Western 
European side, even though the United States has moved closer to the Western 
European view of French and Germans and Italians, they are also very worried 
that the United States is decided to essentially conduct Russia policy over their 
head. And this whole sort of notion, which is very appealing to the Russians, 
which is why the Americans sort of present it that way. It’s odd to have arms 
control talks as we used to, and go to Geneva and there will be a lot of press 
coverage. And, you know, we are the two superpowers and the other countries 
are just going to be not so important. And Russia and the US is just going to hang 
out in this club of two. This is what the Russians really wanted... There was 
something from the United States perspective, which was kind of easy to give. But 
from the European perspective it’s a little bit troubling because they want to be an 
important player and this is just as true of the Germans as it is of the Poles who 
want to be an important player. They think they have a special conduct and they 
fear that they get screwed up by the way the US is handling Russia. So they are 
not quite happy with that aspect, but this is all quite early days, but in any case I 
think it is one of the basic messages. It is the change in Russia policy that has 
upset some of the transatlantic dynamics. From the Bush administration [to now] 
there is not any direct change in the way that the US approaches NATO or even 
Afghanistan or any of the particular bilateral relationships. Yeah, the missile 
defense thing is important, but I would put in the overall context of the change of 
policy toward Russia. Even though it is the US line that has to do with it. 
Ms. Psihoda: And apart from Russia are there any other issues that have 
changed or that Obama has a different stand on? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, climate change. That is obviously an important and 
substantial change. I do not think it is kind of fundamentally alter the dynamics of 
transatlantic relations, really. It makes things easier for the Europeans in the way 
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that Obama has generally made things easier for the Europeans. Even though 
US-European relations were broadly repaired by 2008, Bush was still slightly less 
popular in Europe... something like 7% popularity rate, it is incredible. He was not 
very popular here... but it is still more popular than that. And it made it difficult for 
the Europeans to cooperate with the United States. I would say that climate 
change more than any other issue was the symbol of that. Iraq too, but... And so, 
Obama in general just by being who he is and being not Bush had lessen that 
problem and the climate change stance is an important element of that. You 
know, obviously, it is going to be difficult for the Americans to deliver, frankly, it's 
difficult for the Europeans as well. But it has improved the atmospherics of the 
US-European relations well in the substance.  
And, in fact, now the Europeans somewhat of the opposite problem, which they 
used to have, which, you know, you see in the German elections that Obama is 
the most popular politician in Germany. So, now it puts the German politicians in 
this weird place where they need to be seen as close to Obama. But, in fact, 
Obama's policies since they are not very different from Bush's on the issues that 
matter for Europeans, with the exception for climate change, but the policies are 
not any more popular than they ever were. You know, the Iraq war, the 
Afghanistan war, these things are not popular in Germany. And so it puts the 
German politicians in this weird place, where they need to be close to Obama but 
they can't be close to his policies. And you can see that in their careful way the 
Germans treat Obama. You know, during the Merkel visits… When she comes 
[she] has all sort of good... But she is still willing to sort of stand up in the press 
conference for some specific policies. And they are all just very, very worried 
about, you know, whether Obama will smile or not go over and touch Steinmeier's 
shoulder. I mean it's really on that level of [inaudible]. But this is with German 
politics particularly because of the elections coming up. Well, exclusively because 
of the elections coming up, for that you hear a lot about the atmospherics of 
Obama. He is, I would not say that he has played on that... not all that much, 
maybe a little. But he is wise, I think, not to try to leverage that too much because 
that would get him into trouble and so he is sort of, you know, he tries to have a 
steady neutrality, which is interesting because in German politics it's assumed 
that he prefers Steinmeier and that is actually false. He prefers Merkel, the 
American government prefers Merkel but that's a matter sure of how successful 
he has been and trying to be neutral in that, which is, you know, I mean it's hard 
because as I have said there matters every glance and blink.  
Ms. Psihoda: And do you think that the transatlantic relationship or the 
relationship to the European Union is more important for Obama than for Bush. Or 
is it just…? 
Mr. Shapiro: I think they have broadly the same view. I mean, as I said, in the 
early Bush days there was what you might call ideological opposition to the 
European Union, but that disappeared before the end of the first term. And the 
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entire second term was characterized by the sort of [inaudible] with the European 
Union. I say in a way that... there is a famous quote. Someone said to Ghandi, 
“What do you think of Western civilization?” and he said, “It would be nice”. And 
this is the way they felt about the European Union “it would be nice”. There is 
broad agreement in the American political establishment democratic and 
republican at this point. But they would like a more powerful European Union that 
was capable of forging a coherent foreign policy and capable of being part of the 
United States on a variety of global problems. This was not a consensus in the 
1990s. So this is a change from ten years ago, but it is not an Obama/Bush 
change. The reason for the change is because in 1990s it was possible to think 
that the European Union was the greatest threat to America and Germany. And in 
2009 that is an absurdity. There is about ten more pressing threats to America 
and Germany. And frankly, the European Union has been so slow and so that the 
idea that it would ever gather enough power is so for off in the future. Even if you 
believe that there is push in that direction it is just so distant that no one is really 
nervous about it. Frankly, even in the 1990s, I think, it took an amazing feed of 
imagination to be nervous by the Americans but some achieved it. Americans 
weren’t kind of long-term thinkers with this kind of thing. So, yeah, there is a broad 
consensus that it would be great, broad consensus in the second Bush term, 
broad consensus in the Obama term, but, you know, it's not there. It's not, I do not 
think, it's the American view that they have a lot of capacity to bring that about. 
So, you are not seeing a broad effort, again by either Bush or Obama, to create 
European integration. For the American perspective it's a European problem, they 
are broadly supportive but not actively supportive on the details. So, yeah, you 
see on Lisbon treaty, you know, Americans would like the Lisbon treaty to pass 
but they are not willing to devote any political vocabulary to weigh into that. The 
exception of this is, of course, is Turkey: Turkey enlargement, which has more to 
do with the specific American problem with Turkey than the European Union. And 
again because, I would say broadly that Americans do not expect the European 
Union to ever be a geopolitical actor, they do not worry about screwing it up by 
admitting Turkey because there is nothing to screw up.  
Ms. Psihoda: Why does the US want Turkey to be part of the European Union? 
Why do they care so much? 
Mr. Shapiro: Because they are very, very worried about the internal dynamics of 
Turkey. And Turkey is a very critical country for US interest in a bunch of places: 
in Israel, in Iran, in Iraq, in the Caucasus, and everywhere. On a certain level 
Turkey sort of the crossroads to every geopolitical problem, in fact. And, you 
know, it's the American experience from Eastern Europe that, and of course the 
experience of the European Union, that the European Union is the most effective 
democratization strategy in the world. It's also a very expensive democratization 
strategy... expensive in every sense of the word, it's expensive monetarily, it's 
expensive culturally, it's expensive institutionally, it's expensive politically, but 
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almost all of those expenses were born by Europe and not by the Unites States. 
So, actually, it's sort of a no-brainer, you know, unfair but frankly that the 
European Union taking in everybody because it's easy for me, easy for the 
American side. But we understand that frankly that it's a lot more of a difficult 
issue but really from the American perspective that is a no-brainer. Just the 
European Union accession process has been very, very good for the internal 
development of Turkey, for its democratization, for its stability, for its economy, 
which is something that Turks understand very well. And the sort of Western 
orientation of Turkey is definitely at risk to a large degree because that European 
Union accession process is so radically uncertain. And the Turks are beginning to, 
not more than just beginning, to disbelief that they are ever going to be admitted. 
There is a joke that they tell: The Romanians, the Bulgarians, and the Turks go to 
the European Union accession committee and first they interview the Romanians 
and say, “Okay, what year did World War One start?” and the Romanians say 
“1914” and the European Union says, “That's great, you're in”. Then they bring up 
the Bulgarians and they say, “What year did World War One end?” and the 
Bulgarians say “in 1918” – “That's great, you're in”. And then they bring up the 
Turks, who think, “That's easy, we are not going to have any problem at all” and 
they say to the Turks, “Please list the names and addresses of everyone who died 
in World War One”. That's the Turkish view of the European Union accession, that 
it's weighted against them that they'll never... that they are going through the 
emotions but they never intend to get them in. And that there is a double 
standard, that the Croatians, and the Macedonians, and the Bosnians will pass 
them. And, you know, there is still in Turkey a government, which recognizes that 
economic advantages of the process is in conflict with its own military, which 
means that its needs the European Union for that conflict. But it's not at all clear 
that this consensus is going to hold much longer, it's very, very gravely weakened. 
You know, twenty years ago, this was absolutely what everybody in Turkey 
wanted and now it's a much more [inaudible] thing. And the US-Turkish 
relationship has deteriorated a lot as well for different reasons. It was very, very 
strained by the Iraq war, much more deeply and permanently strained that the 
US-European. It has improved a little bit in the last two years because of 
improved cooperation with the PKK, which was the main issue but frankly the 
United States is very, very unpopular in Turkey. The United States does not have 
a lot of economic leverage with Turkey. They do not have much of an economic 
relationship with them, that's the European Union. So, we need the European 
Union as it needs the European Union to root Turkey in the West and that's a very 
important geostrategic interest.  
Ms. Psihoda: How important is the transatlantic relationship now? I mean, is Asia 
or Africa more important to the Obama administration?  
Mr. Shapiro: Ahm, well, not Africa. It's [the transatlantic relationship] important... 
arguably it's more important than it should be and the reason is, I think, in part 
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because of the sort of history, density of ties, and in part because of the fact of 
who these countries are and the fact that they are democracies roughly think 
alike. So, they are clearly the best partners that the United States is ever going to 
get anywhere. That has been demonstrated time and time again, but we are not 
ideal partners even in terms of their power or in terms of their outlook. But they 
are far better than anybody else. Also, interestingly there is a sort of important 
cultural dimension to all of this. When the candidates were out on the, the US 
presidential candidates, Obama, McCain and the others, were out on the 
campaign trail, they heard from the population what I think was a surprising 
message to them, which is that it mattered very greatly to the US population that 
they were becoming hated in the world. This is not something, frankly, that had 
had much political resonance in the United States prior to this election. But, and 
the polls showed this too, but maybe even more importantly they heard this 
directly from voters, “We don't like that people hate us, we don't like being 
ashamed of being Americans when we go abroad”. And this was not actually, in 
its phrasing it was not a reference to Europe but if you dug deeper into how they 
understood that they were liked or hated, they were judging that by reactions in 
London and Paris. They were not judging it by reactions in Beijing and Moscow, in 
fact, did not care. I mean, they always said “world opinion” but they always meant 
“European opinion”. And that's just a result of how the United States understands 
“world opinion”. I mean… I think, it's totally sort of historical Westigio culture but 
they actually do not look... understand themselves in the eyes of others... they 
don't look to Africa, they don't look to Asia, they look to Europe. And the 
presidential candidates understood it. And this is what helps you to understand 
why Obama did this extraordinary thing during campaign when he went to 
London, and Paris, and Berlin. I mean, why did he do that? First of all, you know, 
why did he go abroad at all? That has never been done before really, not like that. 
But secondly, why would he go to these places? That should actually be an even 
more difficult question. And I think this is the reason. And that plays out in the 
policy. It is part of Obama's campaign promise to the American electorate to 
restore America's standing in the world. And that's the way they usually put, to 
restore America's popularity and legitimacy in the world after the damage that the 
Bush administration did. That is principally going to be evaluated to European 
eyes. So, he has a huge stake in that the Europeans like him, that atmospherics 
of the transatlantic relationship is good, which translates directly into his domestic 
political porch. Now, you know, of course, it's not making too much out of this. He 
has a lot of other factors, you know, health care is going to be a lot more 
important than that. But the presidents get elected because they worry about all of 
these different aspects and that is one. So, that makes Europe important. And, 
you know, on the more prosaic level, as I said, they are the best partners. So, 
they are the place where you look to first for all these global problems. Most of 
transatlantic relations now is not about, you know, the Lisbon treaty or even EU 
enlargement. It's mostly about how the US and Europe can work together to set 
some problem outside of Europe: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, global climate change, 
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international financial regulation. These are global problems or at least extra-
regional problems for generally not more than the US and Europe. But Europe is 
the place where the US looks first, first partners, first of agreement. There is a sort 
of informal US-Europe caucus on most of these problems in the sense that they 
tie and coordinate the positions first. Climate change is maybe a challenge to that, 
we'll see. So, in that sense, it's quite important and a lot, none of that can be 
captured by looking at GDP shifts, or population shifts, or the rise of China, or 
even like that.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, Hillary's first trip abroad to Asia is not a sign that Asia is more 
important than Europe? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, I mean, Obama grew up in Asia and yet went to Europe three 
times before he went to Asia. He went to Europe three times in his first six 
months. I think in that sense the Hillary trip was compensatory. You know, all of 
these areas are important and this sort of... You know, in every administration 
since I have been alive there is always this sort of European prediction of “Okay, 
now the US is going to start to look to the Pacific, wants to become more a pacific 
power”. This has been going on as long as I can remember and it has never been 
quite right. I mean, it has always been partially right. I mean, first, clearly it's sort 
of a shift of power but it underestimates, I think, systematically this stickiness of 
institutions, this stickiness of relationships. And so, you have seen, you know, 
obviously some shift and move in the intention of the US but dramatically less 
than is justified by the changes in the world. And frankly, to the extent that there is 
a shift, it's not what the US wants, it's actually what Europe dictates by refusing to 
become involved in some of these areas in the world. At this point, you know, the 
United States would love to have sort of European help in dealing with the 
geopolitical challenge of China but Europeans are not interested in dealing with 
the geopolitical challenge of China. They are not interested in being a geopolitical 
player in the Pacific. They trade obviously, so they have that interest, but they 
don't want to be involved in that part of the world. So, actually, the more classic 
understanding, at least from my perspective, is the US trying to draw Europe out 
into the world. Not because it loves Europe but because it needs the help, and not 
being terribly successful, being a little bit successful in places like Afghanistan 
and the Middle East, but not at all in the Pacific.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that the EU is more taking a look more beyond its 
borders and trying to think more globally or are they still preoccupied...  
Mr. Shapiro: The EU or Europe? 
Ms. Psihoda: It depends on how you define the transatlantic relationship, which 
is another question: Is it for Obama more a US-EU relationship or a US-Europe 
relationship? 
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Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, definitely US-European. The EU is an important part of that 
but probably not the most important part. And as I said that is not a US choice, it's 
the way it is. But from the US perspective there is just absolutely no way deal with 
the EU as a primary actor. You have to deal with France, Germany, UK, and 
Spain, Poland. There is absolutely no alternative. And, you know, on trade issues, 
the EU is quite primary but on these sort of geopolitical issues that I have been 
talking about mostly it does not relate to the EU. The primary interlock of this part 
is frankly the big 3 but on specific issues other countries beyond that but almost 
never the EU.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, do you think that the Europeans are more looking beyond their 
borders and are trying to think globally?  
Mr. Shapiro: Some of them but by large they are not. Certainly the EU is not, you 
know, various thinkers within the EU would like to but in terms of actually acting 
the EU is really not. You see, they want to think of Afghanistan, what actually 
happens in Afghanistan in terms of the EU, it's pitiful. And most of the European 
countries really have actually no interest in thinking this way. Certainly the 
Austrians, they think that beyond their borders there is Spain, really. It's basically 
their neighbor countries, they are just not interested in anything, which is not 
attached to them. And that is actually quite typically for the small European 
countries. Sorry, but it's true. I think, you know, the British and the French have a 
global vocation or at least an extra-regional vocation, which they attempt to satisfy 
themselves, they attempt to get the EU to work on but they don't succeed very 
much occasionally. I would say that none of the other countries really did. I mean, 
there is a spectrum but, you know, some live in even more isolation but others, 
but say broadly beyond those two, they other are not really interested in that 
much. The Germany are particularly striking in this regard. Because as the largest 
country and potentially the most powerful country, you would think that would be 
the first interested and actually they are very uninterested. They are almost a 
small country in this regard. I would say that they are less interested in these 
things than the Dutch are, which is extraordinary. And this has to do with the 
particularities of German history, the particularities of the German constitution, 
and the parliamentary... and frankly this weird cultural pacifism and idealism, 
which dominates German politics. In my view, the German political culture is in 
Neverland, I mean, they live in a world, which sounds lovely. I would love to visit it 
but it's just not remotely like the world that I actually have to live in. And, I think, 
the Germans are particularly extreme to have a look like this but this is not 
uncommon on the ponds of Europe. You know, the Easterners are more sort of... 
are less able to dream because the Russians keep waking them up in the middle 
of the night. And the French and the British have another experience of the world 
and interest in the world.  
Ms. Psihoda: And from your perspective... 
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Mr. Shapiro: In my view the EU can't because the EU certainly needs British, 
French and German agreements to do anything geopolitically. 
Ms. Psihoda: And what do you think that the EU has to do in order to become a 
more global and a more important actor in the world? 
Mr. Shapiro: Well, the first thing that they will have to do is want to. Right, I mean, 
that's the principal impediment but as long as it does not want to... 
Ms. Psihoda: So, that's more of an ideological reason, not of processes? 
Mr. Shapiro: There's a lot of processes and problems that you could point to but 
as a certain point you've got to ask, “G, people did point out a lot these process 
flaws and these implementation flaws for decades. So, why did it not get fixed?” 
And so you come down to because they don't want to fix them. So, the first issue 
is political will, which frankly I don't see changing, not soon. I think that in general 
European politicians are aware of what's at stake but for a variety of reasons, 
many of them, enough of them, it took a long progress to walk change, which is it 
might not be progress. And they had decided that this is the way they want to go. 
And even if they did, in a year, frankly, the principal impediment is, and this is a 
very different analysis than you usually hear, is the Germans. Because the 
Germans don't want Europe, they don't want to be a global power, they don't want 
Europe to be a global power. Even if the Germans were to go through a machine 
that made them French tomorrow, which would be good for their cuisine but for 
usually nothing else, there would still be a lot of impediments. But then we... 
Ms. Psihoda: And why do the Germans not want Europe to be a global power? I 
mean, obviously, they must see that alone they cannot do a lot. And – at least I 
have the perception from the standpoint of Austria – Austria can never do 
anything. So its better to support the European Union and the European project. 
So, I assumed that it must be the same for the Germans. 
Mr. Shapiro: It is and, of course, in a lot of areas they do support the European 
Union specifically for that reason. But what we are talking about now is sort of 
being a global power, they don't, you know, speaking as the German political 
system, not necessarily any given individual, they don't think that being a global 
power is necessary for security and things that they want. They think that it 
creates all sorts of wars and problems in their politics that they just don't want. I 
mean, they see 130.000 American troops in Iraq and they think this could be us. 
They don't want that. You know, this is strange, when we think of countries having 
a will to power and, of course, the Germans have a long history of that, but they 
have an extraordinary history of putting that will of power to... and of speaking of 
the world of power is something very damaging to the world society. They are 
almost unique in the world of doing this. It's something, which is very, very hard to 
understand and at a certain level I admire it tremendously and, you know, the 
world in which the Germans acquire power is not the bad world at all, I can say, 
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given, you know, where we came from. But still, I think it's strange, it's unusual 
and it's a problem for the European Union and it therefore it's a problem for the 
transatlantic relations. There is another aspect to it, which is some of less 
[inaudible], which they will never express but it's largely that there is a sort of free-
riding problem, which extends beyond the Germans but it's particularly true in 
case of the Germany, which is that they don't want to do these things because 
they [these things] are hard and they have all these negative influence. They also 
do these things off because the Americans will do it if they don't. And that is their 
history of the last sixty years.  
For the French and to a certain degree for the British, they don't want the 
Americans to do it. Everybody else is broadly comfortable with the Americans to 
do it, you know, “sauf” the Americans. And, you know, so why I have said that 
apple card and so my prediction would be that the only way to get Europe to step 
up is for America to step down. But that's a very dangerous game, which we don't 
really feel to do it that way, I would not even recommend it. But it may happen for 
reasons of the American domestic politics. You know, you could argue that it is 
happening but I don't really think so. But certainly at the moment the Europeans 
have a pretty good deal. I think, you know, what it is to be European, you spend 
less than 2% or 1.5% of your GDP on defense, the United States spend 5%. You 
are the richest countries in the world, broadly speaking, very, very high quality of 
life. You are surrounded by neighbors who live in misery and they don't attack 
you. I mean that's strange, right? How is it that a country like Austria can even 
exist? The history of the world would tell you that there could no country like 
Austria because one of its neighbors look at it and they go, “G, there is a 
defenseless rich country, let's go attack it.” And they will attack it and it ceases to 
be rich and probably ceases to be defenseless, eventually. You know, that's how 
history has generally worked. The last fifty years it has not worked that way, which 
is great for the Europe. I mean, you know, it's the sort of Switzerland option. And, 
you know, in Switzerland the streets are clean, chocolate flows to the streets. So, 
I think, broadly, people are satisfied with that, I would be, it's just... The question is 
really, can it continue? How much responsibility can they push off? So that's the 
game and that has actually been the game for the last twenty years. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that it will continue? Because actually the Europeans 
were expecting Obama to ask more from European countries, more troops for 
Afghanistan, help in Iraq. But so far, I have not seen anything. 
Mr. Shapiro: Well, he has asked but, you know, quietly. Yeah, I think that it will 
continue. I don't think that they... The dynamic in the second Bush terms was… 
Americans were always asking for Europeans to get involved and Europeans said 
“no”; giving a little but trying to get involved as little as possible in all of these 
problems. I think that the essential dynamic will continue but the terms of the deal, 
how much exactly they give, that may change because Obama may be better at 
this than Bush. But the essential push-pull is the same. 
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Ms. Psihoda: And then, on issues like the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, how important 
is the transatlantic partnership? If it is important at all? 
Mr. Shapiro: It's important. I mean it varies from issue to issue but what's 
consistent is that the US would like it to be even more important. You know, on 
Iran, for the last several years it has been very important but it seems to 
becoming less important. On Iraq it's really not very important at all because the 
Europeans have really not been... You know, because of its particular symbolic 
importance in European politics, which to my mind has been a huge problem to 
transatlantic relations. You know, basically the US, during the second Bush 
administration, the US and Europe agreed to sort of disagree on Iraq because 
they took it off the table. The US agreed not to ask the Europeans to do anything 
and the Europeans agreed not to do anything. Worked for both sides but it was 
odd because, of course, for the transatlantic alliance – and it's an alliance – to be 
really functionally important to both sides, it needs to be relevant to the most 
important issues for both sides. And Iraq was clearly, maybe not quite anymore, 
but even arguably it's still the most important issue for the United States because 
we are now having a 130.000 troops there and a lot of them were dying. And for 
Europe not to be playing in that, I think, is deeply damaging to the transatlantic 
relations. People have not commented on it much because there was, for all the 
reasons I'm talking about, there was an agreement on both sides not to really deal 
with it. And that kept it out of the headlines but what it meant is that the 
transatlantic alliance is utterly irrelevant to what the United States was doing in 
Iraq. And it need not have been that way and it meant that, it meant that... Well, it 
created two lessons. One, of course, since... At least as it is now, they seem to 
have won the Iraq war and they would actually show to Europe that it is not that 
essential in all of this. I think that's a sort of ironical way to look at it, but it's the 
lesson. And you could see that... and you could see that in a lot of Afghanistan. 
One of the bits that have received wisdom about the doing of the Afghanistan and 
Iraq war is that NATO is in Afghanistan for legitimacy reasons and it gained some 
legitimacy but you lose a lot on the political restrictions, on the coalition warfare. 
They did not have that in Iraq, they did not have legitimacy and they did not have 
the restrictions. Turns out that it was a pretty good trade, they weren't enabled to 
do that trade in Afghanistan because at the moment restrictions are very binding 
and legitimacy does not seem to make any difference. In Iraq the legitimacy did 
make any difference and they did not have any restrictions and that did make a 
difference. That's the deal with that. That's a somewhat... way of looking at it, but 
it's definitely part of the American received wisdom on this issue. And particularly, 
I think, if you see Afghanistan continue to go south, this becomes very 
problematic for NATO and for the transatlantic relations. And on the comparison 
of Iraq and Afghanistan and the role that NATO played in the two, which is why, I 
think... And the basic lesson of this is if you're in an alliance if you want to be a 
tight alliance, you need to go down together and you need to go up together. And 
they didn't do that in Iraq. And so that creates a certain distance. 
  145 
Ms. Psihoda: What about Iran? 
Mr. Shapiro: Iran was a certainly better story. The transatlantic relationship has 
certainly functioned very well in the case of Iran, in a sense that they have been 
able to come up with a common position. And they have been able to use their 
combined leverage to serve that common position. The only problem is that is has 
not helped the problem. So it's a sort of triumph for the transatlantic relations but it 
has not really improved the Iran issue at all. So the transatlantic people are happy 
about that, the Iran people are less happy. And, you know, that would be fine for 
transatlantic relations if we did not have these other examples where they weren't 
working together and things have gone even better. I personally think that it's very 
good that they work together in Iran and it has made a difference, even though it 
has not brought the problems where they wanted them to be. And you know it 
could have been worse and the fact that they worked together means that they 
are sort of set up as they move forward for a more of policy of outcome than they 
would have been otherwise. But it's hard to make that case. 
Ms. Psihoda: And how about Israel and Palestine? 
Mr. Shapiro: Israel and Palestine is a worst side example, especially to Iraq is on 
its border and then with Iran they are having problems. I mean, it's such a disaster 
on so many levels but I think we've gotten ourselves in the situation where the US 
is seen as the supporter of Israel and the Europeans are seen as the supporter of 
the Palestinians. And this is simply not good for transatlantic relations, even 
worse for the Israeli-Palestinian problem. 
Ms. Psihoda: But hasn't there been a move by Obama to get closer to the 
European position? 
Mr. Shapiro: No. You know, Israel was very particularly sure American politics 
and the Europeans actually don't really interact, they don't really play that much. 
So, it's for all of you see American politics toward Israel or toward Israel/Palestine. 
And in part this is because Europeans talk a lot about these problems, they are 
not delivering these problems. They are symbolically involved in a certain way 
when you talk about Lebanon, which I guess is important. But they are really not 
involved in the core Israel/Palestine issue. They don't want to be. And their 
involvement basically consists of throwing money to the Palestinians and 
watching them steal it. So, the Europeans are, you know, and this is a hierarchical 
problem, in these place probably 50 years. And the Americans have often not 
been, usually not been, let's say effective at dealing with it. So, the Europeans 
have not been responsible, they have not even been trying to deal with it. Again, 
they are just sort of leaving it to the Americans, which is particularly odd in this 
case because their view is that the Americans get the problem on [inaudible] and 
it's very important to Europe. They say all these things, these things are broadly 
true, but they don't do anything about it. They pretend to do things about it, but 
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they certainly don't really. And you don't really see, especially for the last ten 
years, any kind of concern in European effort to really get involved. The US would 
have mixed feelings about that, frankly, but in the end they will accept it if the 
Europeans were really serious because they... Well, because they don't have 
great ideas with these problems, because they need help, because... There is a 
lot of people in the US who are pretty happy that the Europeans aren't involved 
into this and it would be complicated if they were. But in my view it could be done 
but the Europeans aren't really interested in it. So, it's a sort of fake transatlantic 
issue, it's a rhetorical issue. But there isn't an actual conflict because the 
Europeans aren't doing anything.  
Ms. Psihoda: And on the issue of international terrorism: Is there more 
cooperation or less? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, there is a huge matter of cooperation on that issue. And this 
is a big practical success in transatlantic relations in the last ten years. They work 
together very effectively, they disagree on all of the theoretical elements, but we 
see a lot of surface disagreement. You know, whether it's a war or any other crap. 
None of that really matters, I mean, has some political resonance but it does not 
matter to the actual cooperation, which is very, very tight and has been 
consistently tight throughout the period that we've talking about and since 9/11 
essentially. And, you know, in fact, with the French and the Germans during the 
Iraq crisis and throughout it has been always tighten. That's been another source 
of the scandals where the Germans would stand up and say, “You know, we don't 
agree with the war there” but then they would be cooperating with the United 
States at things that they were publicly condemning. So, I would say on a certain 
level the transatlantic relations and terror have been too covered. They had 
exceeded the political foundations because and the reason for this is because 
these are so sort of secret worlds. And you can hide them, but then it usually 
comes out and you can hope to hide it. And because the interaction occurs at the 
level of professionals who have roughly the same worldview. So, yeah, you can 
have German public opinion thinks this and American public opinion thinks that, 
but in fact the American and German intelligence agencies think exactly the same 
thing. And so they work together very, very effectively. And if you look closely at, 
well if you remember a couple of plots tow or three years ago in Germany, if look 
closely at those you see that print of American intelligence and you see, well 
sometimes you see more than that because the Germans occasionally leak but 
this is how they got the information with that. Basically though they use American 
signals and the intelligence standards that were brought from Pakistan and the 
British and the Germans have gotten a lot out of this. It has been a very strict 
cooperation with the French. So, with the smaller countries it does not work as 
well with because they are just not as terribly interested in the problem but – and 
the Germans have been very interested in that problems – but in general it works 
quite well at the operational level. And all of the countries value that. On the 
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rhetorical level you can see the source of analyst dispute during the Bush years, 
which has been completely faded after the Obama years even though the policy 
has very changed. So, the best example is having improved atmospherics that 
kind of allow them to do what are already doing.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that this could be a new purpose for the transatlantic 
alliance? I mean, the purpose, obviously the Soviet Union has disappeared. So, 
they are still searching for a new purpose. Do you think that they find some or that 
it is just going to be like in the last ten or fifteen years that they are still in search 
of a purpose and that the alliance somehow exists but it will not be as important 
as it was when the Soviet Union was still of a global scale? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, I don't think that it is ever going to be rediscovered a purpose 
like the Soviet Union unless it actually [inaudible] Russia. Certainly terrorism is not 
going to do that. And this whole search for a purpose is a little bit absurd. You 
know, NATO, I guess which is the sort of embodiment of the search of purpose is 
a sort of paradox when you think about it. So for forty years it had a very obvious 
purpose and it never did anything, right. For the last twenty years it has been 
searching for a purpose and it has been very, very busy. So, you have to... So, it 
seems that the NATO governments know less what NATO is for but they need it 
more. They all use that. It's because NATO is actually, even without a purpose 
pretty useful. And NATO is being called on for any number of things. And we think 
about Afghanistan and Kosovo but actually it has been called on for a huge 
number of things. So, the time when it's [inaudible] people sitting out in Brussels 
and saying, “NATO – what is it for?”. They don't bother look at the fact that NATO 
is busier than it has ever been, that it has been called upon by its member 
governments all the time. And the problem is not that NATO is in danger of 
wasting away, the problem is that NATO is in danger of so exceeding its 
capabilities that it fails, which frankly is not much of an institutional threat. I mean, 
it's a threat to the missions. And then NATO, it is undercapable [inaudible] what it 
is asked to do. But that's a very different type of problem and assumedly if it 
failed, people would not say, “G, NATO failed, we should get rid of it” because 
they don't know what to replace it with. They say, “G, we need to make NATO 
better”. And so, the fact, I just find that to be, personally incredibly state of debate, 
the fact that it's very difficult to define what NATO does, well, you know, that's the 
state of existence for most alliances, you know, most of history in the world. 
Almost anomalous was the Cold War and I think the best way to judge whether 
NATO is relevant is not sort of sit around and think about its purpose but to look at 
what it actually does. And by that measure it is essentially much more relevant.  
Ms. Psihoda: And for the future of the transatlantic relationship what would be… I 
mean do you think it's going to get more important as NATO gets even busier? Do 
you think it is getting less important? 
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Mr. Shapiro: Well, I mean, I think the key is the sort of European position, 
although “position” is sort of the wrong word about whether it wants to be a global 
power and that's the real struggle in terms where the coalition is right now. And, 
you know, I would say that does not look very good at the moment, from my 
perspective. Maybe from the Austrian perspective it looks great. And that will 
define the transatlantic relationship. It's that sort of European identity question, 
which is, I think, deeply unresolved. There is a lot of division with it within Europe 
and it's a political problem, it's not a technocratic problem. They are not going to 
solve it through the Lisbon treaty and external action services. The fundamental 
question is will Europe a) decide to be a political entity and b) as a political entity 
decide to take an active interest in China, in Israel/Palestine, in Afghanistan. For 
the moment it is not doing that. I talked a little bit about the reasons. I don't think 
that the tenor of the US-European relations is really going to be the main factor 
driving that. As I said this dependency thing has a big effect on it. But I don't think 
that this is a Bush vs. Obama issue because the dependency issue has not really 
changed. And I don't know where that's going, I really don't. I think it has to get 
worse before it can get better. But I'm not sure that even if they got worse, they 
will get better.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, what you are sayin is that it actually depends on Europe, the 
future of the transatlantic alliance depends on Europe. 
Mr. Shapiro: That's right. I think that's not the normal view. Especially in Europe 
people like to say, “Well, it's the United States not looking to us, it's the United 
States looking to the Pacific”. The way you asked these questions. I don't think 
that that's the central issue frankly. The United States is looking to Europe 
because there is no other place to look. And there is not going to be any other 
place to look, it is just not going to happen. The real question is, “Will Europe 
respond?”. 
Ms. Psihoda: Ok, alright, thank you very much for your time and this extensive 
interview. 
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Transcript of the Follow-Up Interview with Jeremy Shapiro, M.A., 
conducted on September 4th, 2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: Could you go into more detail about how the repair of the US-
German and US-Frexnch relations was carried out? 
Mr. Shapiro: Some of my work that you can find on the website talks about what 
the US and French were doing together in counterterrorism. You are just 
interested in German and French relations? 
Ms. Psihoda: Yeah, German and French, because you said that the government 
apparatuses never ceased to work together. I mean how can I find out about that? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, right. I mean you will find a fair amount of sort of published 
papers asserting that. You won't find to much detail and that Deanna Priest article 
talks about how the US and France organized that base in Paris to do kind of 
counterterrorism. On the German thing that I referred to that was a plot... was that 
2007 or 2006... 2007 I think. That was to attack US military bases in Germany and 
there were about 7 or 8 people arrested. And if you look carefully at that you'll find 
that there was discussions of the technique (inaudible) there was a plot that 
emanated out of Pakistan. And there is discussions of how the plot was 
uncovered because the people were communicating from Pakistan via this 
technique known as... I think it was yahoo email, one of those email services, and 
the way that they were trying to avoid detection by the American singles 
intelligence was to use the draft emails folder. You know how that works? 
Ms. Psihoda: No. 
Mr. Shapiro: You can write an email and save it as a draft. It does not get sent. 
So it does not enter into the whole email system, it is just stored on the yahoo of 
computers. And then someone else who has your email password can log on and 
read the email in the draft folder. So it's... What happens when you actually send 
an email, it goes through all this servers and things. This email never gets sent. 
So it actually just stored on the yahoo server. And so it's a lot more... from the 
perspective of the people sending emails... it's a lot more secure. Of course, the 
person has to have your password. So they set up special accounts for this. And it 
was a popular technique for communicating internationally for terrorist trying to 
avoid surveillance. And there is discussion in the press about how this technique 
was compromised by... and it's... I don't think the press does not know this quite 
clear that the fact is that the Americans only could have done that. So you should 
be able to find that. It's abundantly clear that the Americans would have the 
capability to do that.  
Ms. Psihoda: Why? I mean it's an easy thing, right?  
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Mr. Shapiro: No, it's not. Because you have to be able to identify the accounts. 
And it's not within the German capacity. 
Ms. Psihoda: But they did it? 
Mr. Shapiro: The Americans did it and gave it to the Germans. And that's as 
much as said in the press reports. So that's just an example, one of the few 
examples that emerged in the press about how they cooperate. And you could 
see there what I think is a sort of classic cooperation, which is that the Germans, 
that the Europeans, in general have the problem, they have the people on the 
ground and the Americans have the secret intelligence and then cooperate on 
that. Because it was an attacked aimed at Americans but in Germany. So they 
have an interest in cooperation but they have that problem.  
Ms. Psihoda: And what about the thing that you mentioned about the based 
security in Iraq? You said that there was based security, right. So the Germans 
did based security during the Iraq war. So is it correct the way that I understood it: 
The Germans were guarding those bases in Europe or outside Europe? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, in Germany. 
Ms. Psihoda: Okay, so to free soldiers to go to Iraq.  
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, they took over a lot of the bases but, of course, the German 
bases, you know, the American bases in Germany were quite critical for the Iraq 
war because they have the sort of the logistics no elsewhere. And most of the 
troops that deployed at Iraq actually came from Germany. So, they also enabled 
the... They guarded the bases. They also enabled the transport out of these 
bases and through the German ports above all the equipment for the troops, 
which is something that they have agreements to do and done before and never 
really contemplated not doing this. This is not a secret in any sense. But, you 
know, I mean the thing is that if you were actually going to oppose the war, they 
have the power, they have the sovereign right to say, “No, you cannot deploy from 
the bases”. There was an example from the 1980s where the French and Spanish 
would not allow an attack on Libya from their soil. But that's always something, 
which is on [inaudible] that any use of these bases can be vetoed essentially. The 
Germans never considered doing that. There is another famous scandal with the 
Germans where it was revealed that German intelligence agents in Bagdad were 
providing targeting information for the Americans, which is in the press a lot.  
Ms. Psihoda: Can you explain a bit the plot about the “targeting information”? 
Mr. Shapiro: I don't recall the precise detail but it is basically that the Germans 
had people in Bagdad during the war because their embassy was still there. And 
they the... As part of their embassy they had intelligence officers. And those 
intelligence officers passed information about where things where to the 
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Americans, which was a problem for the Americans because they did not have an 
embassy there for twenty years. 
Ms Psihoda: Is it actually true that the Germans found out where Saddam 
Hussein was hiding? 
Mr. Shapiro: Well, it is certainly not correct because, of course, the [inaudible] 
attack the very first day of the war, it's actually two days before the war started, 
there was an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein because they thought, they knew 
where he was. And it was a deep bunker so they sent in a huge amount of 
[inaudible] but he was not there. I don't recall if that information came from the 
Germans or the Americans. I am not precisely sure about what the information 
was.  
Ms. Psihoda: Ok. 
Mr. Shapiro: You know, there was another German scandal. Well, there has 
been a lot of German scandals about the question of rendition and the degree of 
German complicity on their rendition program. There was a very famous case of a 
guy going to... the guy has a fight with his wife and he... in Germany... and he 
leaves and goes to Albania or Macedonia. And he is arrested crossing border in 
Macedonia because his name is on a terrorism list. And he has been handled to 
the Americans and sent to Guantanamo... no, sent to Bagram, sent to 
Afghanistan [reference to Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan]. And has a 
rather unpleasant time there. And eventually after about eight or nine months the 
Americans figure out... after actually intervention by Merkel and by Secretary of 
State... figure out that he is in fact the wrong guy and they never should have 
arrested him. And they bring him back. So he has basically lost nine months of his 
life sitting in a stinking cell in Bagram. So it's a terrific scandal. 
Ms. Psihoda: He was a German man? 
Mr. Shapiro: He was a German resident. I don't think that he was a German 
national. So, there have been some questions raised about German complicity. I 
would ask simply this question: This is a man who is leaving Germany and he 
stopped at the Macedonian border and found to be on a terrorist list. I don't know 
if you have ever been at the Macedonian border but it is not what I would call 
center of information technology fusion. Okay? And they pull this guy right out. 
So, how did they know that this guy was coming? They knew that he was coming, 
clearly they knew he was coming. How did they know that he was coming? That... 
an example of that, you can't know for certain... but it leaks of German-American 
cooperation. It leaks of the Germans saying to the Americans, “This guy you had 
asked us to watch because his name is on the list but we won't arrest because he 
is in Germany. He is leaving Germany, we find you might want to know”. And then 
the Americans tell the Macedonians to arrest him when he comes. I guess the 
Americans could have been watching him in Germany themselves but it's actually 
  152 
very unlikely that they would have been doing that but they know that he was 
leaving. So, I mean, you never know that kind of thing but it's typically of the way 
that these things work. So, you know... In Italy there was the sort of famous case 
where they kidnapped a guy of the streets in Milan. And they did it with the... it 
turned out with the cooperation with the Italian intelligence services. The 
government said to not know about it. But, you know, they basically, they pulled 
the CIA's mobile phone records and the people they were calling was Italian 
intelligence. Whether the government knew about it or not is a bit confusing. But 
that's not the point. I mean the intelligence agencies sometimes cooperate even if 
the governments don't want them to. The Germans clearly were not willing to do 
that, they were not willing to kidnap this guy of the streets of Berlin but they 
probably were willing to tell them [Americans] that he was leaving Germany. This 
is something the Germans have done with the French too, by the way. They 
actually rerouted a plane to get Christian Ganczarski. So I guess there is 
examples like that. 
Ms. Psihoda: Is there any example of French and American intelligence 
cooperation? 
Mr. Shapiro: Well, not that kind of thing because the French would be proud of 
having to arrest anybody themselves. They are much different. Yeah, I mean you 
will see in that Dana Priest article a lot of examples of US-French cooperation. 
You know, they have a huge base together in Djibouti, which is focused on 
counterterrorism operations. There is tremendous sort of respect among the US. 
In fact, I would say the US and the French among the Western countries, are the 
countries that are most focused on counterterrorism. They cooperate, all over 
Europe they cooperate probably most effectively. They cooperate with the British 
now. It took a while to get the British cooperation going as operations for 
counterterrorism. Yeah, so it's pretty effective the relationship [US-French 
relationship], has been actually for quite some time.  
Ms. Psihoda: And on the level of political leaders… I mean, in my perspective, 
because there was a meeting in 2003 in New York and then Schröder went to the 
White House in February 2004… And for me the question raises if there is a 
breach then why do these political leaders still meet? I mean was the breach or 
the crisis really that deep or was it just over-exaggerated because those leaders 
met actually still in 2003? 
Mr. Shapiro: Ah, yeah. Yes, let's put the breach into perspective. I mean these 
are allies, treaty allies, they are sworn to protect each other. The breach, the crisis 
was a crisis of friendship and that's even the way it's was characterized. So, it was 
never that they were not going to talk to each other. They always met throughout 
this period. I mean, there was, you know, Bush could be somewhat [inaudible] 
and some say that there was breakdown in the communication between the 
leaders, I mean they had very few phone calls. But there was never any sort of 
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“we are not going to talk to” and no one ever said that. And certainly the 
governments always talked to each other. I mean a meeting between them is 
neither an indication for crisis nor a repair because they have meetings all the 
time for various reasons.  
Ms. Psihoda: So this is just a routine that they follow? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, I mean there is all sorts of summit meetings that are set up 
and they follow those. Even on itself a meeting does not mean too much, either 
way. You know, certain specific meetings might mean something. I mean, for 
example Bush's trip to Brussels in 2005. It's an important service involved 
because no other President had done it before. And it was an indication that he 
was a) trying to repair the [inaudible] and b) trying to reach out to the European 
Union. There was an important meeting, I think in February 2004 between Bush 
and Schroeder. When Schroeder went to the White House and Bush puts his 
hand on his shoulder. So this is the sort of beginning of the repair. But that's sort 
of more what happened in the meeting than the fact that they had it.  
Ms. Psihoda: How about the relationship between the Department of State and 
the Department of Defense? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, no that's true and it will always be true. Right, I mean the 
State Department's job is to have good relations with other countries. So the State 
Department always does not favor breaks with relations from Iraq to the United 
Kingdom. That is the institutional bias. So it's somewhat always true. In this case, 
it wasn't... You said the Pentagon, which is fair but it's sort of important to 
distinguish that it wasn't really the military. It was really the Pentagon civilians, 
who were very angry about this... Rumsfeld and those guys were very angry 
about the refusal and they also didn't think that these countries mattered by a 
multilateral military perspective. So there was no harm in punishment and they 
advocated a lot of punishment measures. Condolezza Rice was famous for 
saying, “We are going to punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia”. 
This is sort of an indication of how important they thought they were. What's 
interesting is in the event... and I don't think you find this documented anywhere... 
When they were having interagency meetings figure out what to do about this... 
As I said the Pentagon was for it, the State Department was against it, what was 
probably decisive was the intelligence agencies who sort of raised their hands 
and were arguing, “Well, we know they don't fight in Iraq but we need these 
people for counterterrorism”. And so, in fact, most of these measures weren't 
taken and they really were not taken at all on the governmental level. The 
Pentagon did some things about not meeting French officials and not going to the 
Paris air show but it was incredibly minor. And beyond the Pentagon not anything 
was done. It to a [inaudible] degree the [inaudible] army's were bad in 2003, might 
have been if the intelligence agencies haven't stepped up and said, “It's this 
counterterrorism cooperation”, which, of course, in the 2003 year was very 
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important ... “That's very, very valuable to us and we don't want to risk it by doing 
this”. 
Ms. Psihoda: And the intelligence agencies, they are in the Pentagon or where 
are they located? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, they are separate. The CIA especially, which is the one I am 
referring to mostly, but probably also the NSA. They are separate but they would 
take part in the interagency deliberations on what to do with the government or 
not. 
Ms. Psihoda: But they are not included in the government apparatus? They are 
separate from the government apparatus? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, they are in the government apparatus. They are just not in the 
Pentagon. CIA is a sort of... Technically it's in the executive office of the President 
but it's basically an independent agency. It's sort of part of the government but it's 
independent at the Department. It's not part of the State [Department]. However, 
very confusing the organization of the US government, they never understand 
that. But stressed saying the intelligence agencies represented yet again a 
different perspective than either State [Department] or Defense [Department]. And 
in this case they were quite decisive. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you have maybe some minutes for one or two other questions? 
Mr. Shapiro: Sure. 
Ms. Psihoda: What do you think about the outcome of the elections in Germany? 
Well, we probably know that Merkel is going to make it but I mean will this have 
an effect on the Obama administration? Will Obama go to Merkel after the 
election and ask for more troops or not? Or if Steinmeier should make it, would 
there be a change in the relations to Obama? 
Mr. Shapiro: I don't see any major changes there. I mean I think that the German 
government has been saying for about a year or certainly since Obama came in 
that “We can't really do anything interesting until the election is over”. So that will 
sort of free an obstacle and we might see more movement but I don't think that... 
Both of the candidates are, of course, pretty forward, they want to have a good 
relationship with Obama. The Social Democrats think that they have sort of a 
special relationship with the Democratic Party because they are both from the left, 
I guess. I think the Social Democrats don't understand American politics at all. 
That's an idiotic statement but they believe it actually. In fact, the Americans are 
probably more comfortable with the Christian Democrats. They like Merkel. 
Obama, in particular, likes Merkel because she does not bubble in an image, she 
just says, you know, well, I can't do. I can't go to Afghanistan because of these 
domestic constraints and, of course, Obama understands that even if he does not 
like it. But he understands and he thinks that she is a straight shooter and that 
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she is basically trying to do things that he wants her to do within the constraints. 
Whereas Steinmeier is a little bit more of a double viewer. So, yeah, but I mean 
this is frankly minor stuff. Frankly, he [Obama] can work with either party. You 
know, foreign governance almost always prefers continuity. So I think they have a 
slight preference for Merkel but it seems they could make it with either. 
Ms. Psihoda: How do you see the change from Blair to Brown in Great Britain? 
Has this affected the special relationship in the transatlantic relationship 
somehow? 
Mr. Shapiro: Hmm, it's affected it, not dramatically. You know, if you look at that... 
Have you ever seen that movie “Love actually”? It's an important movie to 
understand the special relationship and it's also very romantic with Hugh Grant. 
And Hugh Grant plays the British prime minister, probably randy British prime 
minister and at one point the American President comes to visit and basically 
sexually harasses and essentially insults one member of his staff. And they had 
been involved in this session of negotiations where the British basically thought 
the Americans were stupid but they were going to do it, they said, anyway. 
Because that's what they do but he was so insulted by this attack on his staff 
member that he, in the press conferences, basically dressed down the American 
President, told him that he won't approve him anymore and that, you know, you 
just have to do the right thing. So very stoic speech, got a big applause in the 
room. And it's a British fancy about how you are going to deal with the American 
President. And it reflects to some degree how a lot of British prime ministers have 
felt and what none of them has ever done. Because it does not really matter what 
they think or how they feel, I should say. There is just a sort of strategic [inaudible] 
about not doing that. It's pretty strong and I think in your first day in the prime 
minister's office as you are assured of reading what the American alliance means 
to you, you recognize that you are not ever going to make this press conference 
that Hugh Grant has done. Probably you have the sort of wishful feeling about 
having the conversation that you are never going to do that. But then you quickly 
are able to rationalize in the way the content can nationalize things in the war of 
Iraq. Because you internalize the constraints and so it means that what kind of a 
lot of British prime ministers that had different feelings towards the United States 
and actually they all end up with the same policy. So you know Brown did more or 
less the same way. They tend to enter with the sort of image that they are going 
to stand up to the United States and then they tend to not. I have not seen it that 
much different with Brown. The one distinction is that Blair was a very effective 
politician on the American scene. He was so articulate that he represented to the 
American public the sort of outside voice of approval for American diplomacy, 
which was important in some of the Iraq days and afterwards, which Brown would 
never be able to do because he is not as charismatic even if he wanted to be 
able. So that capacity of Blair to be a factor in American politics is a loss for 
British and American relationship.  
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Ms. Psihoda: But also Brown is now very weak because of this government 
scandals, right? 
Mr. Shapiro: Right. 
Ms. Psihoda: And therefore I guess the US cannot rely so much on the British 
anymore, right? 
Mr. Shapiro: No, well, they have the difficulty relying on him to deliver to his 
country but they there is less likelihood that he will defect from them [US]. You 
know, the stronger the prime minister, the more he feels the capacity to defy the 
Americans but the weaker he is, the less able he is to deliver the country. So it's 
always a trade-off and right now, you know, Brown is quite weak, probably weaker 
than the Americans would like. But he does not really threaten the alliance. You 
know, they are having problems with the mission in Afghanistan but Brown is 
actually double [inaudible]. It's interesting to object the... The mission in 
Afghanistan is basically opposed by about two thirds of the British public, that it's 
probably 60 to 65%. None of three major parties communicate that. A couple of 
them talk about how it is going to commonly done but that's not opposition. That's 
an attack on the government without putting a threat to the American alliance. It is 
not on the panel of policy to withdraw from Afghanistan. So we would not expect a 
change in the American alliance especially to the extent that Cameron [David 
Cameron is the leader of the Conservative Party in the UK] is anti-European, 
which he is, is going to mean to reassure in his party and the public that they are 
still main rooted in the international system on making sure that there is good 
relationship with the Americans. You can't pick fights with Europe and the 
Americans. So the relationship remains special because of history and because of 
even more importantly the placement.  
Ms. Psihoda: And in Afghanistan, about ISAF… There are more and more 
American troops taking the lead in Afghanistan and outnumber the European 
troops. Is it a feasible argument that there is again some sort of unilateralism? 
Mr. Shapiro: I don't want to have an argument about that but is it unilateralism if 
you come to people and say, “Hey, we should do this together and they say no, 
you go ahead”. You know, the mission in Afghanistan has UN Security backing, it 
has NATO backing, it has participation by 42 states including every single 
member of NATO. So it's the least unilateral mission that you could see in history. 
I mean 42 countries is 25% of the world. Okay, so there is nothing even remotely 
unilateral about the structure of the mission. Everybody has committed to do this, 
right. As things have gotten worse and as there has been a determination that 
more resources are required, the resources have primarily been forthcoming only 
from the United States, and that means that the person who commits the 
resources and that's not the US choice fundamentally because it's just the fact 
that no one else would contribute to a mission we need to get done. As the 
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mission becomes more... as resources are contributed more by the Unites States, 
naturally the Unites States is making more of the decisions. It could never be 
otherwise. The sort of internal decisions, they are not making the general 
decisions about... The sort of highest level decisions are made by the mission 
itself that was named years by UN Security Council and by NATO. So, you know, 
obviously America had a big influence in that. So, you know, I mean I don't know if 
this is unilateral... I mean does it mean if your allies don't... if you have an 
important mission but your allies aren't interested in contributing, you should just 
abandon the mission, is that the way to avoid unilateralism. I mean I am familiar 
with the views you are talking about but it just frustrates me beyond means.  
Ms. Psihoda: Alright, then my final question would be that one: Do you think that 
these structural gaps and those cultural differences between Europe and the US 
are kind of over-exaggerated? Or do they still exist but now is the time when we 
are not going to talk about them? However, when we have some other political 
leaders in the future, could it be that those gaps and differences will come up 
again and we'll have again a crisis? 
Mr. Shapiro: Yeah, I think that they both exist and that they are exaggerated in 
their effect because the relationship has never been based on love or 
fundamental common values. It's been always been based on the fact that we 
need each other. And so in my view the relationship... The better explanation of 
the relationship's ups and downs, even though all of these gaps are real, is a 
neutral perception of need. In 2003 the United States fundamentally believed that 
they did not need Europe and actually to a certain extent Europe was convinced 
that they did not need the United States and so it was a lot easier to have dispute. 
In the period since 2003 both sides have both sides have very much reached the 
conclusion that they need each other. So that's why they repaired the rift. From 
the US perspective it was that there was a lot of problems in the world and they 
needed partners to solve them and they were not likely to find any partners better 
than the Europeans. And that's pretty solid consensus in the United States right 
now. And in Europe there is a sort of similar consensus. And I think it's right, by 
the way, we do need each other. As long as they need each other and they 
believe that they need each other, the alliance will persist and that's I think the 
fundamental glue. The values thing is certainly not irrelevant; it's one of the 
reasons why they believe that they are good partners. And the gaps are not 
irrelevant, they are real, they create some of the frictions. But all of those are 
overcomeable... can be overcome... I don't want to harm your English... if the 
need is there.  
Ms. Psihoda: Alright, thank you very much for this follow-up interview.  
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Transcript of the Interview with Justin Vaisse, Ph.D., conducted on 
August 13th, 2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: So, my first question would be if you could elaborate a bit the 
rapprochement between the French and the United States that has been taken 
place. 
Mr. Vaisse: Well, that's very easy because you have already mentioned the most 
important facts and the most important fact is that it took place before Obama 
arrived that is it started very soon after the Iraq war. Bush and Chirac were not 
talking on the phone for a long time after the winter of 2003 and even the spring of 
2003 and then there was an effort on both sides, you know, to get back to a 
normal relationship. And it started in 2004 really but it did not really… were visible 
until 2005… would be the visit by first Condoleezza Rice and then Bush and that's 
the major...  But you have two points of inflection or change: The first one is really 
January 12/13, 2003, and the second one early 2005. That is starting in January 
12/13 in 2003 when Chirac realizes that the US are going no matter what, then 
relations get really out of control and get really, really bad. And then the second 
big change...  And so then you have a period of time, which is sort of exceptional 
in transatlantic relations, which is really a crisis situation like you had in Suez 67… 
only a couple of time before. And then in 2005 it changes back to a normal 
working relationship, not entirely good and with… not necessarily with very good 
atmospherics, as you say, but at least working relationship on many issues and a 
patching up of relations et cetera. And so the atmospherics change when Obama 
arrives but the fundamentals are in place. And so the real change is 2005 but you 
mentioned that, so I don't have much to add on that. Then you would have to look, 
well, there is another issue, maybe you had a question on that afterwards. I am 
anticipating on it, which is to what extend does the election of Sarkozy change 
things. Well, yeah, it does change things for...  because it's not Chirac. So you get 
all the psychological, personal thing out of the picture and it's a part of it 
because… yeah, the personality and psychology of leaders is important for 
transatlantic relations. And, also because Sarkozy, you know, he wants so much 
the rupture with Chirac that… You know, Americans at this point were really 
happy to welcome anybody else than Chirac. It's like...  And, you know, after Bush 
many people were so happy to have someone who is not… first not Bush, 
whoever he or she is. Now this said when you look more closely there are many 
issue that have really not changed among which French and Americans. And so I 
am just restricting on the French-American relations here. [I] don't see [change] 
on [them] and this has been my point in various places. Basically, the idea is that 
even though atmospherics and the personal thing between Sarkozy and Bush and 
then Sarkozy and Obama are much better than between Chirac and Bush, the 
substance of different issues and of policies has not changed that much. The 
most important thing is the NATO thing, the full reintegration into NATO military 
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command. But if you look closer, yes, it's important symbolically. There is no 
doubt about that. But then if you look closer, the concrete application of that… the 
concrete implications of that are not huge. You are talking about a couple of 
hundred people rejoining, fully rejoining the military organization. And the French 
are rejoining two committees that they had been away from. But for the rest there 
had been a sort of creeping reintegration in the 90s and 2000s anyway and so it 
does not change fundamentally things. And so, yeah, it's important once again 
symbolically and diplomacy is largely about symbols and also for sending signals 
to other Europeans. But if you look issue by issue like on Syria, for example, on 
terrorism, on Afghanistan, on Iran, there is not much difference in foreign policy 
and there are even new subjects of irritation, I would say, like the financial crisis 
or the role of the Dollar or European defense or where Sarkozy would not be as 
good a partner as Chirac was. So, you see after Chirac disentangled the 
impression that was given “Sarkozy, the Atlanticist” – he is no Tony Blair that's for 
sure, it's different. Even though, of course, his opponents in France have been 
portraying him as Sarkozy, the American bla, bla, bla. You know if you look at...  
Israel/Palestine is another good example, Turkey is another good example. 
Chirac was in favor of Turkey into the EU, Sarkozy, as you know, is not and the 
official American position for a number of years has been Turkey into the EU. So 
that's a very interesting thing that should be seen. And it's also from, you know, a 
sort of political science point of view, pointing to the importance of symbols and 
atmospherics et cetera in relations and also the distortion that meet the media 
image does to the actual relations.  
Ms. Psihoda: I guess, the repair of the relationship between Chirac and Bush, 
you can find online on any newspapers? 
Mr. Vaisse: Yeah, largely, but, of course, you would have the most important 
book is “Allies at War”. But also there are a couple of others which are not as 
good… like Elizabeth Pond wrote a book. There is a good book on Germany by 
Steve Szabo. He is now at the German Marshall Fund. That was really good. I 
think that's pretty much it for serious books where you would find the exact...  And 
since then there have not been many books. But once again, I insist on that: Look 
on the issues beyond the headlines. And the ones who really follow this closely 
know that things have not changed that much. The distance has not been great 
and sometimes it has been a distance in the other direction of disagreement like 
Turkey and other things. And then, you know, when Obama arrived… For 
Sarkozy it was not as comfortable as with Bush because when Bush...  Bush was 
very much eager to have Sarkozy embrace him, anybody was very good to have 
anyone embrace him at the end of his presidency. So, it was easier and also it 
was declining and Sarkozy had the presidency of the European Council and so it 
was sort of a very comfortable position for Sarkozy. He could shine if you liked. 
But then in January arrives a bigger star. Sarkozy is not the President of the 
European Council any longer and he is sort of eclipsed by Obama who is a huge 
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star. So, there is a sort of, not competition, I would say, but, you know, the sort of 
media field or space… It was now filled by Obama largely and also on initiatives 
and et cetera. And so there were couple of issues where things have not been 
really, really smooth but, once again, that's... we're still talking about atmospherics 
and signals and they are important but to a certain extent. But then when you look 
really at details on Syria, on Israel/Palestine, on Iran, on Afghanistan, on 
terrorism, on Africa, you name it… Things don't change that much.  
Ms. Psihoda: And would you say that this rupture between the French/US 
relationship was also on the government side, like government apparatuses? Or 
was it only the leaders? Like that the government establishment still worked 
together but the leader were just not cooperating? 
Mr. Vaisse: It was definitely the Pentagon on the US side and that's very 
important. It was really Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and core of others that is the number 
one, two, three in the Pentagon and others. And one good example of that is the 
fact that one of the more concrete consequences of the fight was the end of the 
common military exercises like “Red Flag” and then “Nevada”, I think. And also 
the absence of any American participants to the air show, the Paris air show of 
2004… was it 3 or 4… I think it was 2004, because the Pentagon had asked 
some high officials not to participate and that downgraded the level of 
participation of US officials. So it would not be Three-Star-Generals and, you 
know, big, the top... It would be at lower levels. I can't remember what, but I think 
you will find that at Allies at War. So, and the State Department was on a very 
different line. And you know it was Condi Rice who famously said, “Forget 
Germany, forgive Russia, and punish France”. The exact formula was “Punish 
France, forgive Russia, forget Germany” or something like that. And that's 
certainly there otherwise it was in a column by Jim Hogland in the Washington 
Post in May 2003. And so there was a meeting at the...  I think it was a Deputies' 
Committee, no it was not a Deputies'… I think it was the real staff. It was the 
National Security Council in May say, “You know, what to do with the allies that 
had not been along”. And, you know, at that time it was the time of triumphalism; 
there had been a victory in Afghanistan two years earlier and now big victory in 
Iraq against all the people [who] were saying… There was no insurrection yet in 
Iraq. It really started in June, July and August. So it was a moment of [inaudible]. 
And so there was a meeting of the NSC on that question where basically the 
State Department say, “patch things up” and, you know, “let's cut the crap”. And 
the Pentagon was pushing for sanctions and [inaudible]. That's my understanding. 
I am not 100% sure and, of course, we will have to wait for the archives 30 years 
from now. But basically that's what transpired from the meeting. 
Ms. Psihoda: And about the French government? Were they also like rejecting 
cooperation?  
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Mr. Vaisse: No, because they... I mean it's an asymmetrical relation in a sense 
that there are not so many things that France can do to “hurt” the US. But, 
basically, no. It was more how to patch things up with the position of some in the 
American government, the State Department in particular. But there was pretty 
much the mindset in the French government… because many thought that things 
had gone too far and Chirac got criticized especially by the elites, by part of the 
elites in France. You know, he was supported by a huge majority of the 
population. But still people were thinking that, pretty much like in Germany, that 
[it] is about Schröder. Basically that “Yes, Chirac had been right but he had gone 
too far and he should have done that differently”. And so, Chirac was eager to 
patch things up but there was no sort of enduring… And then very soon 
afterwards when the election began… Then his position was, at least partly, 
vindicated in a sense that it happened what Schröder and Chirac had said would 
happened, which is it would be extremely difficult to stabilize Iraq and it would 
create all sorts of problems and also the recruiting tool for terrorists et cetera. And 
more importantly [it] would lead to… And that's a bit anachronistic because at that 
time it was not so prominent but would lead to sort of “forget Afghanistan” and did 
divert resources from Afghanistan to Iraq. And that's really what happened and we 
are paying the price now probably to some extent. 
Ms. Psihoda: And apart from Iraq are there any other reasons for this 
cooperation? For this rapprochement? Repair of the damage? 
Mr. Vaisse: No, it's pressure. It's pressure of the elites and business and public 
opinion to some extent. Well, public opinion not so much but I would say business 
leaders and the fear of boycotts. On that I must warn you. You may find a study 
on the effect of the boycott [of] 2003 and it's a really bad study. It does not work. I 
should have written something to sort of set the record straight but I never got to 
it.  
Ms. Psihoda: Is there any difference from Bush II to Obama in the transatlantic 
relationship? I mean are they carried out differently? Does Obama have a 
different perception of the transatlantic relationship? Does he care more about the 
transatlantic relationship? 
Mr. Vaisse: Well, yeah, obviously he is not really a transatlantic guy. There is no 
reason why he should care about the transatlantic relations out of his own history. 
He has just been to Europe once and the main issues for him are number one 
Afghanistan, number two Iraq, number three Iran, number four Russia, number 
five climate change. And you know Europe matters for some of these issues but 
not that much. And so there is no reason why he should pay too much attention to 
that. Europe was for Obama to extent that it was a political...  You have to get 
back to the campaign and basically what Obama was saying during the campaign 
was “I will”...  And that was important because that resonated among American 
voters, “I will restore America's image”. And America's image means America's 
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image in Europe. It's not America's image in Nicaragua or in Zimbabwe. It's 
America's image in Europe because that's the nature of international relations and 
media and all of this. And so, and he did that. And he did that very rapidly by… 
You know, by his Berlin visit when he was just a candidate and by going to 
Europe three times in his first six months. He went to… yeah, to London and then 
to Normandy in early June and then again in Europe in July. And that was really 
important but that was important on a political and symbolic... You know, to be 
able to work with Europe, once again which Bush was doing. But the image of 
2003 was too strong in everybody's mind and there was still the idea that...  And, 
you know, there were also good reasons for Europeans for not wanting to be very 
cheerful and very welcoming or very nice with Bush. And so that's what has 
changed. But then now, you know, beyond this, what did Obama get on 
Afghanistan? Not much. He's getting cooperation on a number of issues but it's 
though and the expectations were set pretty high… so… which was not a case 
during the Bush administration. The second Bush administration… there was no 
expectations of, you know, Europeans delivering enormously et cetera. So, I think 
it was last month or a month before… yeah, in early June when Obama visited 
Buchenwald. That was just before Cairo. But basically the idea is that Europe is 
both central and somewhat sidelined for various reasons.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, would you say that Asia or Africa is more important for Obama 
than Europe? 
Mr. Vaisse: It depends how you define important; important as an ally or 
important as an issue or subject. You know, once again, I get the order of priority 
for Obama, the hierarchy is Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Russia, et cetera. And then 
now how many… You know, who are the allies around? It's still Europe first and 
foremost and that's where naturally he can find help. Now this has not changed. 
But if you take the time that he is spending on foreign policy issues, Europe itself 
does not figure prominently. Partly because it's in peace and there is no big 
problems to solve. So that's good news in a sense. But on the other hand also 
because Europe is not so important to realizing the articles that a more important 
for him and that he needs to realize like once again, you know, Afghanistan, the 
peace process, the energy question around Russia and issues like that.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, actually the transatlantic relationship is there but it's not so 
important? 
Mr. Vaisse: You know, once again, it's central and sidelined. Central because it is 
still the most important but it's sort of on automatic pilot in a sense that there are 
very frequent consultations between, you know, Phil Gordon, for example, and his 
counterparts in France, Germany and UK. And that's were the transatlantic 
relations is. I mean if you want to point a place it's not the US-EU summits, which 
are terribly boring and which nobody cares about. It's not all these institutions that 
were created like 10, 15 years ago like the Transatlantic Business Dialogue or 
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these things that nobody is really interested in. It's really in the dense 
communications that exist on every issue or almost every issue between the 
political directors of the different ministries or the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Europe and Political Director of France, of Germany and UK. That's where I think 
transatlantic relations are. And then at a higher level, it means that when Obama 
is taking an important decision that he would get the views of his allies. So it's still 
central but it's not...  But because there is no disagreement and because... And 
also on some issues because Europe does not deliver so much, it's not very 
present. The noise level is not very high.  
Ms. Psihoda: Okay, would you say for Obama it's more a US-EU relationship or 
US-European relationship? 
Mr. Vaisse: No, you know, for any President it's a US-European relationship. I 
mean Obama made an effort, there was a...  I know there was a debate 
discussion inside the US government to whether Obama should go to Prague, to 
the US-EU summit in early April. And then it was decided that he would go, which 
was a sign sort of to show that EU was important. Because otherwise if he had 
not gone, people would have said, “Oh, look he overlooks the EU bla, bla, bla et 
cetera”. But the truth is, it's still pretty much a relationship with Berlin, Paris and 
London. And that's what counts and that's what delivers. Now it does not mean 
that the EU does not count and certainly among the people that have been named 
by Obama like, you know, Phil Gordon, Ann-Marie Scouter, Hilary Clinton, Jim 
Steinberg, all the top people… It does not mean that they don't consider that the 
EU is important. I think probably taken as a whole they have a much better view 
of what the EU is than the predecessors in the Bush administration. But, you 
know, it has not, still not risen to the importance that it would like to have. 
Ms. Psihoda: What do you think the EU has to do to be more important? I mean 
there is always the discussion about is the EU a strategic partner. Does it have a 
strategic role. Do you think that is going to happen in the future and if so how? 
Because for the moment, I think, it is not the case. 
Mr. Vaisse: No, it's not the case and the question is whether there is some 
europeanization or not. That is if there is a gradual convergence and work 
towards cooperation to complement that. And there is a project we have been 
having with the European Council of Foreign Relations to try to see whether 
things are going in this direction or the other. And if it's going in the right 
directions, which is more harmony, less disparity in positions one and two better 
cooperation, active cooperation, costly cooperation if you would like. That it's, you 
know… I disagree with you, you know, I… the UK disagree with EU Germany on 
major point with Russia, but we gonna adopt a common policy that is minimum. 
That is we are not just going to paper over the differences and say, oh we have a 
common policy but we are actually going to do something together, which would 
cost us in terms of what our original position was. So to try to measure that and 
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see if things are going... you know, if we Europeans are more united than we 
were five years ago, ten years ago, fifteen years ago like on the Balkans, for 
example. In the beginning of the 1990s it was total the catastrophe and then we 
got better on the Balkans as the decade went by. Bosnia was better than the early 
breakup of the Yugoslavia, and then Kosovo was better than Bosnia to some 
extent. So, the bottom line is, I don't but there are some issue... I don't know what 
the answer is if it will ever be... But there are a lot of small indications that things 
are going in the right direction. I mean the ATALNATA mission [EU NAVFOR 
Somalia – Operation Atalanta], the operation of the coast of Somalia, is a 
success. I mean there is one institution over there fighting pirates and it's the EU. 
And, you know, it may seem small et cetera but it is still relevant because it's 
protecting European ships and American ships and Russian ships and, you know, 
ships from everywhere. So, it's providing public good, which is safety of the 
sailings and it's done under a British commander and with Danish-French-
Portuguese help and resources. So, if you take examples like that... or Russia, for 
example, there is huge level of disagreement but we still can come up with 27 
countries agreeing on one position. So, because it is not as forceful as you would 
like it to be but it is still a common position. And so, if the Irish vote in the right 
way on October 2nd and we get Lisbon, this will give a boost to these things. So, 
national capitals London, Berlin, Paris are going to remain central for the 
foreseeable future but it might be complemented more and more, especially on 
some issues, by other areas in which the EU will be in the driver's seat, I think. 
And, you know, you have also to answer with some optimism, I guess.  
Ms. Psihoda: Yeah, sure. I mean, you also see the monitoring mission in Georgia 
and you see what the EU has done in DRC, so if you take all that into account, I 
think probably the EU is having some role but the US… And, of course, they are 
thankful and grateful that we are in Georgia because they cannot be there 
because the Russians voted against them, but it seems to me that this is not 
enough. So, do you think the EU has to do even more to become a strategic 
global player? 
Mr. Vaisse: Well, the first thing is... I mean, it's largely in the hands of London, 
Paris, and Berlin, and, you know, I am not overseeing other smaller countries, but 
it remains that the big players are them. And then Italy, Spain, Poland, 
Netherlands would be close second. There is an activism abroad, I think… their 
network of embassies… They have military forces that are being meaningful et 
cetera. But still the trio remains really the key to much of that issue. That's one 
thing. Well, once again, positions, disparity of positions, we fundamentally 
disagree on a lot of things and it's hard and this is not going to change because 
the reason why German has the attitude it has vis-à-vis Russia, the reason 
France, the reason Rome the attitude it has vis-à-vis Moscow are grounded in 
history, in economic links, in investment, in cultural factors, in networks et cetera. 
And these things you don't change just by fiat or... On energy considerations, 
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even if I think people here in this town are making way too much [out of it], but 
Europe's dependency on Russia, I think, is overblown, but, you know, there is still 
an issue about energy. So this is not going to change rapidly because nation 
states are still the most important thing but, you know, that would be one place to 
work and the other would be in military resources because we need manpower to 
pacify countries. And, you know, I am not an interventionist. I don't think that we 
should go around and try to fix every failed state that exists because it might be a 
danger bla, bla, bla. Unfortunately we won't be able to do that and we will exhaust 
ourselves and getting hated by the rest of the world for doing so. But still it 
remains that we are in Afghanistan, I don't think there was much choice and 
Europeans were very supportive in 2001. It did not turn out the way we wanted 
but now that we are there, I don't think that we have a choice of leaving. I mean, 
leaving would really be bad, so we have to be there and for this we need more 
resources. And, you know, in general, I think, there should be more of an effort 
toward ESPD and military resources. So these would be...  Foreign policy 
positions and military resources and civilian resources to some extent would be 
the two keys to improve the situation.  
Ms. Psihoda: Okay, and what role would EU actors have? I mean, we were 
talking about Berlin, Paris, and London, what about the President of the 
Commission? What about the President of the European Council? Do they have a 
role in the transatlantic relationship? 
Mr. Vaisse: Yeah, and the Higher Representative… Well, it depends and it asks 
the question of what will Lisbon change to all of that, it's very hard to know. It is 
very hard to know because it's largely personality dependent. It will really depend 
on who we pick as a next Higher Representative, who will replace Solana, who 
we pick to replace, well, to be the first President of the EU so to speak. You know, 
will it be a forceful personality like Tony Blair or is it going to be someone more, 
you know, less forceful let's say. And I won't name any names, you know, but 
someone who is remarkable but not the sort of strong will and determined person. 
It's very hard to tell but... because, you know, if there was a permanent President 
of the European Council, could he do what Sarkozy did last year? Sarkozy, I 
think, was really good when he was President of the EU, he really gave a lift to 
this whole European thing but it's also because he was the President of France 
and there is not doubt about that. And it's something that someone with the same 
energy and activity probably could not have done even with the same level [of] 
energy et cetera. It's also because there were specific links, because he was the 
President of the big three. And so that's complicated because then it means that 
the Higher Representative or the President will not have so much leverage, as 
much leverage as Sarkozy had. So the common service diplomatic choir… I can't 
remember what the acronym is… the basically external service action, external 
action service… I can't remember… but basically that will be an improvement and 
that may foster what we call europeanization even though it is debated and I am 
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not sure it exists at all but it will take time. And I see [inaudible] situation 
continuing for long that is both the three Europeans and the EU apparatus. And, 
you know, it's not necessarily a bad thing. I mean, yes, ideally, we would have a 
more united EU policy, you know, CSFP and ESDP could be strong bla, bla, bla. 
Yes, but at the same time, yeah, we need more definitely but we don't need 
something entirely unified probably. I wonder to what extent we are not good with 
a mixed system so that's an important point. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that there is an elite crisis at the European Union? 
Mr. Vaisse: You mean the quality of people making decisions? 
Ms. Psihoda: Yeah, and also that people being in elite positions don't have a 
face. They don't have a name. People don't know them. People know the 
Chancellor of Germany but they don't know the President of the Commission. Is 
this kind of an elite problem? 
Mr. Vaisse: Right, let's say visibility problem, yeah. The permanent President of 
Europe might be a partial remedy to that even though it is just adding to the other 
figures. So I am not sure it's as much a part of the solution as it's part of the 
problem because it's adding one layer. Now, it is a problem? Yeah, because 
people cannot associate. People still believe in sovereignty, history, wars, 
passions, this is the stuff of politics et cetera, regulating the size of paper tissue or 
things like that does not get you to be recognized on TV by night. You know, flying 
to Georgia and, you know, putting yourself in between Putin and Saakashvili that 
is sort of dramatic. So you can get a lot from that. But, you know, tedious 
mediation between Azerbaijan and Armenia or whatever done in the structure of a 
common action decided by 27 countries that does not give you a lot of visibility 
points. So, I think, yes, it is a problem and yes, it will remain certainly. You know 
but then I have to get back to what I was saying about that it's largely personality 
dependent. If you have very a strong and forceful Higher Representative, then he 
might change things and change perceptions. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think we have personalities like this in the European Union 
right now? 
Mr. Vaisse: Yeah, I think we do. Yeah, you could imagine that and also people 
can reveal themselves in the situations. You know, who knows… Like Felipe 
Gonzalez if he was named High Representative or he could... he is a very pro-
European leader and he could certainly turn himself into someone strong. Even 
Tony Blair could actually be because he has talk power. He has the visibility et 
cetera. He could shake things up a bit. I think it's also dependent on luck and, you 
know, the joke would be we need a good war. But it's only partly a joke. What it 
means is that we need some drama of history. And, you know, it's profoundly anti-
European to say that because precisely the whole project of the EU, the whole 
identity of the EU is really inherently devised to be boring and precisely to escape 
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the brutality of history. And it's very good. I mean that's what largely contributed to 
peace, prosperity bla, bla, bla. But then, I think, you need a dose of it. We want 
war but not too much and not in our place. No, you know, I may sound cynical but 
more seriously it's true that the entire EU project was aimed… was at putting in 
place procedures and… You know, all this multilateralism was precisely aimed at 
avoiding the brutality and tragedy of the battle.  
Ms. Psihoda: Talking a little bit about issues, what areas would you identify as 
good cooperation of the transatlantic relationship? 
Mr. Vaisse: You mean the best ones? And I'm US-European relations… I'm 
taking this as meaning not on the EU but also...  Terrorism, especially with France 
and Germany and not so much or not so well with the others. The best issues of 
cooperation... because, you know, there are many issues on which we cooperate 
well but... I mean Georgia was actually a good… It was actually a tandem; 
Sarkozy was consulting with the Americans quite a bit.  
Ms. Psihoda: What about climate change, and Afghanistan, and Iran? 
Mr. Vaisse: Well, obviously no, Afghanistan, it's disappointing for the Americans 
in a sense that they are not getting what they would like to get. Climate change – 
no, because the Europeans are not getting what they would like to get for a 
simple reason which is the American political system and habits and power 
structure system if you would like. Israel/Palestine – the Europeans are not 
getting what they would like to get even though it has become much better. But 
they would like much more involvement and pressure on part of the US on Israel 
even though they don't say it this way. And it's a bit a simplistic way to put but 
basically puts it down to that more pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians.  
Ms. Psihoda: But Obama has changed his policy on this issue? 
Mr. Vaisse: Yeah, and the jury is still out, and there is real pressure. This 
[inaudible] of war and now we are going to see who wins if it's Netanyahu or 
Obama. But Europeans... And so, yeah, I think… You know, right now it's a 
convergence but it's not cooperation. It's just a convergence of existing positions. I 
mean, the Americans... obviously there has been a turn here and so it coincides 
better with the European positions but it does not mean that it was actively built as 
a US-European thing. Contrary to terrorism, for example… You know, there was a 
willingness to share, to put into place the instruments et cetera. Financial 
regulation – so, so, not too bad. 
Ms. Psihoda: How important is the transatlantic relationship for the current 
economic crisis? 
Mr. Vaisse: Well, it would be important if it worked. No, that's a bit too stark. But 
basically that's the idea. That is it would... There are strong disagreements inside 
Europe between Germany, France and the UK to make things simple even 
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though there are other positions. And then there is a difference between the US 
and at least France and Germany on the other hand. And so the cooperation is 
good but it's not as good as it should be or could be. 
Ms. Psihoda: And what about Iran? 
Mr. Vaisse: Iran – here as well there is a disagreement among Europeans even 
though it has been one of the areas of success because of the EU-3 and all that 
what has been done. You know, they have not succeeded but they have not failed 
either. And so there is more, there is a good connection but things...  It's not going 
to last if only because it's now hard to see how sanctions could work. So even if 
there is a US-European agreement on toughened sanctions et cetera. It's hard to 
see where it goes but it has been a good area of cooperation. Yeah, I would 
probably rank it in the good cooperation problem.  
Ms. Psihoda: Alright. Well, thank you for your time and thank you very much for 
this extensive interview. 
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Transcript of the Interview with Karen Donfried, Ph.D., conducted on 
September 2nd, 2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: On part of the research on the transatlantic relationship between 
Europe and the US will also touch the subject of change versus continuity in US 
foreign policy but more importantly to me in the transatlantic relationship. This I 
put in context with the change from Bush to Obama. So this – the change from 
Bush to Obama in the transatlantic relationship – would be sort of my beginning 
question on which I would ask you to elaborate a bit.  
Ms. Donfried: So, you asked a question about change versus continuity in the 
transatlantic relationship with the change from Bush to Obama. And I actually 
think though that there has been a very significant change. I mean first of all if you 
talk about the individuals. Well, I think… I mean there is one question of is there a 
change of definitely speaking and is there a perceived change. And there is no 
question… and if you look at public opinion surveys… Europeans are incredibly 
enthusiastic about Barack Obama in a way that they never were about President 
Bush. And the Pew survey came out recently… GMF is releasing its surveys 
“Transatlantic Trends” next Wednesday. You should definitely go to our website 
on Wednesday and get that data because it is highly relevant for the topic that 
you are writing about. And it is actually quite similar to other surveys in showing a 
very significant Obama bounce. Now, you know, I think in that sense, I mean 
there has been a clear change... His policies on some issues are markedly 
different: The decision to withdraw from Iraq, the decision to close Guantanamo. 
On other issues there is not obvious change: on Afghanistan, in fact, he is 
recommitting to the US to that effort. On Iran the US administration remains 
committed to trying to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capacity. 
And what's interesting is even though Obama as a person is tremendously 
popular in Europe… I mean his approval ratings in Europe are much higher than 
they are in Europe… that even with that you don't see differences in European 
opinion on policy. In other words Europeans are not more enthusiastic about 
engaging in Afghanistan because of Barack Obama. You know, so you have not 
seen that personal popularity translate into greater policy coherence. And this is 
the challenge for the administration: How can you do that? I mean how do you 
use that tremendous personal capital he has for benefit to the US on the policy 
side. And you do not have an answer to that now. He still relatively new in office 
and the economic situation has been a huge factor dominating his presidency 
thus far. And certainly on the domestic scene it's all with that health care reform. 
So, you know, it would be interesting to see how this plays out on the foreign 
policy side but I do think it's an important opportunity… a moment of opportunity 
for the United State because there is this enthusiasm for this new American 
President in Europe. And you know we really need to think it out how to take 
advantage of that to really closer policies. 
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Ms. Psihoda: How do you see the relationship with Merkel? I mean if I follow you 
correctly – and this is also what I have read and heard – Merkel for my mind is in 
a certain trap, let's put it like this. Because she has the elections coming up in 
September and she cannot be for his [Obama's] policies because they are mostly 
not accepted by Europeans. They are unpopular but she cannot be against 
Obama either because Obama is one of the most popular politicians in Germany 
right now. How do you see that tension or that difficult relation? 
Ms. Donfried: You know it's interesting because there has been a lot, particularly 
in the German press about Merkel and Obama not getting along. I tend to be a 
realist and how I view relations between the countries. So I mean I think it's nice if 
political leaders like each other. I don't really know whether Barack Obama and 
Angela Merkel like each other but I don't think that's what's going to drive their 
relationship. It's going to be driven by interest. Angela Merkel has a strong interest 
in maintaining a very good relationship to the United States. And the United 
States looks at Germany as the role member state in the European Union and 
has a strong interest in maintaining a very good relationship with Germany. When 
Merkel was first elected part of her campaign was, “We need to improve the 
relationship with the US” and that was the United States of George Bush. And 
even though George Bush was not popular in Germany, Germans believed what 
she said, “Yeah, actually it would be more benefit for us to have a good 
relationship with Washington”. And, you know, and you saw that and she did work 
on that relationship. Now you have Barack Obama who is very popular in 
Germany so it's all of net plus. But you are right, there is this policy issues. She is 
not going to say, “We will send many more troops to Afghanistan”. But what they 
did was very clever. Right a year ago, more or less, when they extended the 
German participation in the Afghanistan mission, they renewed it for more than a 
year to get pass the election and they renewed it at a slightly larger number. So 
Merkel has actually been able to increase the German troop presence in 
Afghanistan without ruffling any domestic public feathers. So I think she has 
actually played it quite well where she is doing things that would be helpful to 
Obama but not that will get her into domestic political hot water, let's say. I mean 
people have been looking at the NATO summit and the various visits they had, 
“Oh, how are they getting along”. You know Angela Merkel is Angela Merkel. I 
mean she is not going to become Barack Obama. I think she has been very 
steady in her relationships with people and… You know, I think it was a good 
thing for the Germans and the French to get Barack Obama to Europe so early, 
right, April 3-4 for that NATO summit. And, you know, some people say it was too 
early but I would think for European interest the amount of time that Obama has 
spent in Europe is remarkable. And, you know, that also put some pressure on 
Europeans because he is investing a lot in that relationship. And at some point 
presumably he is hoping for a return on that investment. And I think it's 
understood in Washington that in the case of Germany the return on that 
investment is not going to come before September 27 or the day after election. 
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But what happens later this fall… I mean we all assume Angela Merkel will remain 
the German Chancellor. There is a question about whether it's going to be a 
grand coalition or whether the FDP and CDU/CSU together will do well on that for 
a coalition of the center-right. But my sense is that even after the German election 
Angela Merkel is not going to be enthusiastic about sending more troops. Just 
look at any German public opinion survey: 70%, depending on the poll you look 
at, of the country does not want the Afghanistan war and they certainly do want to 
send more troops but there is a support for economic measures. And I think it 
could be very interesting if Germany would lead a civilian surge that they were to 
encourage more development assistance. And in a sense Germany is very well 
positioned to do this, the European Union as a whole is very well positioned to do 
this. I mean if you think about the kind of assistance that the European Union 
gave to the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. A lot of that could 
be relevant in the case of an Afghanistan. You know, how do you really built those 
structures in a country that has not know democracy in any real sense. You know, 
so to me I think we need to think more broadly about this and not measure the 
health of the transatlantic relationship or the German/Merkel relationship on how 
many German troops are in Afghanistan. And to be honest I would argue that it is 
quite remarkable that there are, what, 4,000 German troops in Afghanistan today 
given Germany's history, given the World Wars. And I think it's quite remarkable 
actually that Germany is deployed in the numbers that it is deployed today in 
Afghanistan and I would not be critical of them being deployed in the north. You 
know, if they weren't in the north, someone else would need to be. I mean I would 
be careful about that. But why not look to Germany or European allies for the 
other piece of this smart power equation. And my sense is that the administration 
gets that. When Barack Obama went to the NATO summit in early April, he did 
not ask European allies for more troops. And I think because he was pretty sure 
the answer would be no. What the administration has done is send more 
American troops. You know, we are bumping up American troop numbers in 
significant ways as we are drawing down in Iraq. And in my mind the Americans 
said, “Okay, you know, we have been asking the European allies now for – well, 
they have been going on for eight years – to do more on the military side and it's 
not going to happen. There are other important parts of the Afghanistan project. 
So fine, you know, let's have the Europeans play a larger role on those other 
pieces”. You know, so anyway, we will see. But I do think there are prospects for 
us to work closely together on some of these issues that are very difficult. 
Ms. Psihoda: Did the Obama administration never ask for more military power 
from Europe?  
Ms. Donfried: I am not sure if the Obama administration has publicly asked for 
more troops. Now we don't know what happened in informal conversations. My 
suspicion is that there probably were informal conversations about this and it was 
clear that [it] was not going to be forthcoming. So the decision was “okay,...”. For 
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increases he should present someone. But mostly you have countries drawing 
down. You know because I mean the reality is a lot of these countries did not 
happen to be put into Afghanistan for eight years. Afghanistan is very far away 
from Europe. It is hard to keep up these deployments year after year. Most of our 
European allies do not have expeditionary forces. You know… They had static 
forces that were there for the defense of Europe during the Cold War. You know, 
so I think there are some practical reasons to… It's not just... You know it's also, 
there are just some practical reasons why this is a hard thing to do over time. You 
know for countries like the Netherlands or the Brits or the Canadians, obviously 
not European, who have been deployed in the south, it's also an issue of taking 
hits. They have had casualties and that is hard to sustain over time. But I mean, I 
think in the German case there are other issues that are driving them out. But you 
know, it would be a good thing for you, that would be pretty easy for you to 
research, I think. You know, whether the Obama administration has publicly 
asked Europe for more. But I do remember at the time of the NATO summit I was 
quite struck that that was not the case and that that was not what was on the 
table.  
Ms. Psihoda: And what about the German elections? I mean does the Obama 
administration prefer Merkel? And what would be the likely outcome if Merkel wins 
or Steinmeier does? 
Ms. Donfried: You know, I don't know if they have... if there is preference there. I 
am not sure if it really matters. It seems highly unlikely that the SPD is going to be 
the largest party after the German election. But if they did, it is not obvious to me 
that Steinmeier's foreign policy is markedly different form Merkel's. I mean I think 
on Russia, perhaps we have seen important differences but… You know, 
Steinmeier is not Schroeder, he is not. I mean he is more centrist on foreign 
policy. So, you know, I don't think we don't have a strong... any concerns that... I 
mean I think if there were a possibility of a coalition that would include “Die Linke” 
that might be of concern. But frankly I don't think that's in the realm of the 
possible. I mean I just don't see today a party considering a coalition with “Die 
Linke” at the federal level. So there is a benefit to being post-election because 
you have a government in place that has just gotten a bit of confidence from the 
public that hopefully is empowered to make important decisions across the policy 
spectrum. So I would think that's sort of what people are looking forward to. You 
know having a government in place that can act.  
Ms. Psihoda: And why is it that we have the perception that Merkel got along with 
Bush better than with Obama when actually Bush is so unpopular in Europe? 
Because when we are looking to the press coverage we see those nice pictures 
of Bush and Merkel. And with Obama the press always portrays the two political 
leaders as a couple that does not really fit, that does not really like each other. 
Why is that the case? 
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Ms. Donfried: You know I think it makes for good reading. I think, certainly, the 
objective reasons for it on Bush is, you say, he was deeply unpopular across 
Europe in the way that President Bush was not on speaking terms with Gerhard 
Schroeder or Jacques Chirac. So, you had a very bad German-American 
relationship at that level with leaders. I don't think that was true at every level and 
Joschka Fischer and Colin Powell got along very well. I think there was... You 
know, when Merkel wins the election and is engaging Bush, is opening to Bush, is 
saying positive things to the US that was striking because it was such a contrast. 
The relationship with Germany had already begun to improve. You remember that 
Bush made that trip to Mainz. Wow, that was an uncomfortable visit. You know, 
the entire city had been emptied out. Schroeder was visibly uncomfortable. You 
know, from a public diplomacy standpoint, I mean it was significant that Bush 
went and, you know, it was a sort of “Yes, we are post-Iraq; we are getting over 
this” but there was a chew in the air, you know. And so I think it was the contrast 
that you now have this German leader who, you know, was there sort of 
unemotional about this relationship. America is important; the United States of 
America matters for Germany and I am going to build a stronger relationship with 
that country than what my predecessor had. She was very open about that. So 
that was new, you know. And it was the beginning of a broader change in Europe: 
Chirac leaves the scene, Sarkozy comes in. You know, you have sort of these 
changes in the governments that were most critical of the US on Iraq. Okay, so 
that captures the attention of the press. Then Obama comes in who is just this 
rock star in Europe, and Merkel does not really change her approach. She 
continues to say, “The United States of America is an important partner for 
Germany and I am going to build a strong relationship”. But she does not follow 
the speed, she is... but she is very steady in that. So the press thinks, “Oh, my 
goodness, this is worse than her relationship with Bush”. But objectively speaking 
I am not sure it is. But I think the external reality has changed fundamentally. So 
when she initially engaged Bush, the external reality was such a negative one that 
it stood out. The external reality now is such a positive one for Obama in 
Germany that it also stands out but in a different way. But my sense is that she 
has been quite steady in the way she has been engaged with the US. You know 
and it's interesting because, you know, so the political scientists have this debate 
about is the change that we are seeing in the transatlantic relationship a cyclical 
change having to do with a particular US President or is it a structural change 
having to do with sort of fundamental differences in the world? Right, so the 
cyclical change argument is, “It was all about George Bush”. Right, so George 
Bush leaves, Barack Obama comes in, we are good, you know. It was just like 
that. But as you and I just talked about other issues before, with Barack Obama 
everything is not okay. You know, Afghanistan is still really hard, Guantanamo. I 
mean very hard publicly and Europe is not really that interested in taking 
Guantanamo detainees … and there are differences… So, you know, clearly 
there are some structural differences here that are important. It's not the Cold War 
anymore. Germany is not dependent on the United States for its security in the 
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way it was. You know, so I think it's some combination. Yes, it does matter who is 
the US President, sure. But there are also structural changes that present 
challenges to us. And it seems to me that, you know, Merkel has been very sort of 
(inaudible) about this in seeing that the US is an important partner for us and I am 
not going to be too bugged down whether it is George Bush or Barack Obama 
and whether I like them. But I am going to make sure I am representing and 
looking out for German national interest in these various relationships. So, you 
know, I would get less excited about the hype of, you know, “Oh, she does not get 
along with Obama and she liked Bush more” because I just don't think that's how 
states go after their interest. 
Ms. Psihoda: So you would be more… There would be more arguments for the 
structural change than for the cyclical change? 
Ms. Donfried: I mean I think that what happened in the eight years of George 
Bush. I mean George Bush in many ways is sort of quint essentially American in 
exactly the way Europeans don't like us. And Barack Obama embodies the 
American dream that Europeans so admire the US for. And I think during the eight 
years of Bush the antipathy many Europeans felt toward him, which was sort of 
that who he was… this cowboy from Texas. But then it was exacerbated by the 
policy decisions he made that it was easy to imagine that it was all about him. And 
I think what you are seeing now with Obama is you have an American President 
whose person is very popular in Europe but we are realizing that there are also 
these deeper structural issues. Sort of in a sense that cyclical change [that] 
masked a deeper structural change. When Americans and Europeans look at the 
world, in broad strokes we see things the same way. But the way we perceive 
certain threats is different and that leads us to different policy conclusions. And 
so, you know, I do think that both of these arguments are important and they sort 
of played out in different ways over past eight or nine years.  
Ms. Psihoda: But I mean these perceptions and the structural and cultural 
differences they have always been there... 
Ms. Donfried: Yeah! 
Ms. Psihoda: …and it was not a problem. But on the issue of Iraq it seemed like 
this was a big problem. At least I got the perception that… I mean they have said 
this at each crisis in the transatlantic relationships that has so far occurred, “This 
was the the worst”. But every time the next one is the worst... 
Ms. Donfried: Right! 
Ms. Psihoda: But I mean okay, then you could argue that there was the USSR 
and that was the reason why those structural differences did not play out. But 
then we had the Clinton presidencies and there were those structural differences. 
There was the beginning of a new system. The old bipolar system collapsed and 
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there was still no crisis. So the crisis about Iraq must have also been about the 
political leaders at the head of government at that time. 
Ms. Donfried: Well, but I mean I would argue that Germany during the Cold 
War… Yes, we were bound together by a common threat, the Soviet threat. But 
for the US in many ways our foreign policy was about Europe. I mean the biggest 
problem we probably faced was the Soviet Union and, of course, our closest allies 
in that were the Europeans. The issues beyond Europe were not at the core of 
our relationship. We did not agree on these issues then but it mattered less 
because they were at the periphery. What has happened at the end of the Cold 
War and Clinton administration in many ways was sort of the period of evolution in 
this. I mean we still fought a war in Europe during the Clinton years, which was in 
the Balkans. I mean so we were still very focused on Europe but starting… You 
know… but in a sense, you know… In those years the focus on Europe was 
“Creating a Europe whole, free and in peace”. That was the motto starting with 
Bush one and then taken on by Clinton. In a sense of the end of the Clinton 
period the American perspective was that we had largely achieved that goal. You 
know, you had NATO enlargement, you had EU enlargement. I mean sure there 
are issues in the Balkans. There are issues in wider Europe. But, you know, for an 
American looking at the world Europe looks really good. I mean it's a huge 
success of European and American policy. So, then the United States says, 
“Okay, great, really our focus now shifts”. Right? It's about the Middle East, it's 
about rising powers like India and China… It, you know, global threat terrorism… 
all of those issues beyond Europe that Americans and Europeans had never 
agreed on. But now this is at the center of our relationship and it's hard. We don't 
really have the tools to deal with that. Do you deal with that in NATO? Well, a little 
bit but not really. Do you deal with it in the EU? Well, a little bit but not really. I 
mean, you have Javier Solana but I mean foreign policy still really is in the 
purview of the member states. You know, so to me that's the structural change. 
It's not that we agreed about everything in the Cold War but the things that we 
disagreed about were not at the center of our relationship. So and you know that's 
how I would view that.  
Ms. Psihoda: Okay. 
Ms. Donfried: And I mean you saw cyclical changes then too. Ronald Reagan 
was deeply unpopular in Europe. I was a student in Germany in those years. You 
know, hundreds of thousands of people were demonstrating against the dual track 
decision. So, you know, there is… there was cyclical change within that period as 
well but that structural change I really see is happening with the end of the Cold 
War and with these sort of new threats. 
Ms. Psihoda: Okay, I see what you mean. What about the importance of the 
transatlantic relationship? Is it still as important for Obama as it is for Bush? Is it 
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less important or is it more important for Obama than for Bush? How would you 
see that? 
Ms. Donfried: Ehm, you know, there is obviously a huge debate about this. I 
mean with Obama people are worried because he really hasn't… What is his 
connection to Europe? He has not spent broad [inaudible], which frankly was true 
of Bush as well. Ahm, and Clinton, of course, was a Rhode scholar. George Bush, 
the first George Bush I mean, had lots of connections and lots of government 
experiences. Ahm, you know, in my mind, if you look around the world, the closest 
allies for the Americans remain the Europeans. Ahm, I actually think values are 
important and I actually think the European-US values are quite similar. I mean I 
do think we share... you know, we can have a debate about that... but I do believe 
that that you can make a compelling argument that that remains the case. I also 
think that Europeans can bring assets to bear that help us meet the challenge that 
we face. You might be familiar with Bob Kagan writing on this. 
Ms. Psihoda: Sure, Robert Kagan’s “Power and Weakness”, right? 
Ms. Donfried: Right! You know, so Kagan was making the argument that, you 
know, “Europe is a nice for vacation but really they don't have much in the way of 
hard power and what can they really contribute”. Ahm, well, I mean I actually think 
that Europeans have quite a bit to contribute across the spectrum. And what is 
interesting about Bob Kagan's writing is that he had originally written an article 
and then he turned it into that short book and I don't remember now if it was a 
foreword or afterword but he added a piece to the book, which said something he 
had not fully appreciated or valued when he wrote the article was the fact that the 
Europeans can bring legitimacy to US actions. And this is, of course, one of the 
powerful lessons of Iraq that the US has the power to go to war in Iraq but it did 
not actually had the legitimacy. And, you know, so I thought it was interesting that 
Kagan felt that. You know, so even he then was saying, “Okay, so maybe on soft 
power this is good”. But I would say… I mean there is always this thing… You 
know, the Europeans before the US troop increase in Afghanistan and this is 
changing now, we basically weren't contributing equal amounts of troops to the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. We are going to greatly 
outnumber the European contribution, which… Well, is a separate issue, but… 
You know, I would not belittle 30,000 European troops on the ground in 
Afghanistan. That is a material help to us. Ahm, what the Europeans are doing on 
economic assistance, on development assistance is a material help to us. And 
there really aren't a lot of other countries out there who can be partners with us… 
whether it's on the legitimacy side or making the argument that action is needed. 
But also then really in helping to provide the material resources to achieve a goal. 
So in my mind the transatlantic relationship remains critically important for the US. 
You know, the world is changing. So, yes, there are rising powers like China and 
India. We see the G7, became the G8, it's now the G20. And I think what that 
means for the transatlantic relationship is that US-European agreement on 
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something used to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for international 
action. It may still be necessary but it is no longer sufficient. And this is a 
challenge for us… I mean for us collectively, for Americans and Europeans. So, 
you know, Americans and Europeans can agree on international economic action 
but the reality is we do need to discuss that in the G20 context. We do need these 
other countries to be a part of that, to be effective actors. You see it on climate 
change… I mean you see it across the board on these issues. So, that to me is 
the big change. It's not that the transatlantic relationship is not still vitally important 
for both sides but that it's not enough. And it used to be enough to really bring 
global action. So that's a challenge.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you see a difference between Bush and Obama in the 
perception of the transatlantic relationship and its importance? 
Ms. Donfried: Ahm, you know, certainly the perception was that in his first term 
Bush did not value Europe to the extent he did in the second term. Ahm, I am not 
sure we agree with that. I mean people use the example of Iraq and say, “He had 
built this coalition of the willing”, very disruptive for Europe. Well, he did not… 
That really was not his first choice, right. I mean, the Bush administration was 
trying to unite Europe behind US policy and it failed. So it was left with a 
suboptimal outcome, which was building a coalition of the willing. Okay, if you 
can't get everybody, you take as many as you can. And that was one of the 
interesting lessons of Iraq. It was not just a US-European dustup. I mean that 
worries deeply Europe. Europeans were divided among themselves. You know, 
with governments like the UK, like Poland, like Spain initially, Portugal, you know, 
backing US policy and the Germans, the French and others, you know, being 
critical, not supporting US policy. But, you know, I think Bush would have liked to 
have a united Europe behind that. So, yes, I mean he had to accept a suboptimal 
outcome. And then, of course, relations got very bad. You know, it's a pretty big 
deal if a country decides to go to war and other countries don't support. I mean 
that's sort of the upper end of, you know, policy disagreements. You know, in his 
second term it was pretty clear that the administration actively reached out to 
Europe. Ahm, which is significant, I mean that is acknowledging Europe matters; 
we want to rebuild bridges that were broken because of Iraq. And in particular the 
administration reached out to the European Union because there had been so 
much criticism from the European side that the Bush administration had engaged 
in a policy of disaggregation. You know, after decades of the US trying to support 
a united Europe, you know, you had been working against this. And so I think the 
administration was about to show, “No, no, no, we actually do support the 
European integration”. They talked about the EU. That trip where President Bush 
went to Mainz… He, of course, also went to Brussels and visited each constituting 
part of the EU, the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, gave a speech 
there. Ahm, so, you know, that was I think symbolic of this difference in the 
engagement with Europe. And, you know, talking to European policy makers at 
  178 
that time, they thought it was not just for symbolic but that it was real. That when 
President Bush was there, I think every European talked to him about Iran and the 
need for the US to engage in the EU-3 process and that in fact happened. Ahm, 
the US then also put things on the table like spare aircraft parts and WTO 
membership for Iran. You know, so you also saw policy changes that came from 
those negotiations with the Europeans. And, you know, this is… Some of the 
people who make the continuity argument, “Ah, US policy is not that different 
under Obama than it was under Bush”… Really what they are talking about is 
these changes that you saw on US policy in that second Bush term. Ahm, you 
know, I think that is important too, to sort of think about these eight years of Bush 
and, you know, how the second term was different from the first term. And, you 
know, Bush sort of going back to a more traditional US engagement with Europe 
in that second term than perhaps would have even been possible in the first term 
because of the role that Iraq played in sort of poisoning this relationship. 
Ms. Psihoda: Okay. Talking a little bit about the EU: How is the perception 
towards the EU? I mean I guess it is still a US-European and not a US-EU 
relationship. What is the perception of the EU or how important is the EU for 
American Presidents, for Obama in that case? 
Ms. Donfried: I think the EU is important and I think the fact that when President 
Obama went to Europe in early April for the NATO summit that he also went to 
Prague for a US-EU summit is significant. You know, I think everyone is waiting to 
see what is happening on October 2nd in Ireland. Will we have a Lisbon treaty 
ratified? Because I do actually think that the Lisbon treaty will make a difference 
on the foreign and security policy side. 
Ms. Psihoda: In which ways? 
Ms. Donfried: I think that by having an external action service, by having… by 
essentially combining the Solana position with the Commission position. So that 
you give that… whoever the new Solana is. Also the tools that the Commission 
has that… that makes that a more substantial and important position. You know, 
some of the changes that are in the treaty actually could be important for their 
being a more substantial EU foreign policy. It will depend also on who that person 
is. I think it's interesting to see who is chosen for that. So, you know, we'll see 
what happens with Lisbon. You know, I am… my view of European integration… I 
think it is very good for the United States that the EU has achieved what it has. I 
think that was a key post-World War II goal for the US and I think we have been 
very successful in sort of supporting that process. I am not convinced that we will 
continue to see integration deepening in the way it has over the past four-five 
decades. And I see that because in my mind Germany was a critical engine for 
ever-deeper European integration. Right, so if you think that during the first 
common then European community policy was the common agricultural policy. I 
mean essentially that was the German agreement to subsidize French farmers. I 
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mean in its very basic form. Okay, you know, then think about the Euro, hugely 
significant. You know, if we define, I mean when I took my International Relations 
101 course, the definitions of a state sovereignty was money and troops. For 
countries to agree that money will be controlled not nationally… huge, right? But 
okay. Germany was the key country to agree with that because the ugly little truth 
is there was a European currency and that was called the “Deutschmark” but 
nobody had control over it except the German Central Bank. So it was Germany 
that was giving up sovereignty and, you know, this was Helmut Kohl's – whatever 
your judgment is on Helmut Kohl – this was his brilliance. I mean to say he was 
committed to creating a European Germany and not a German Europe. The Euro 
was a huge part of that. And if there had been a referendum in Germany, it would 
not have gone through. But, you know, you create the Euro, which again in my 
mind was Germany giving up sovereignty, you know, and the new… The area 
that's left, right the other part of that definition of state sovereignty is troops. Okay, 
but on foreign and security policy it is not Germany that has to give up 
sovereignty. It's France and it's the UK. I mean those are the two countries that 
have substantial expeditionary forces, those are the countries that have 
permanent seats on the UN Security Council and, wow, I don't see a lot of 
enthusiasm in France and the UK for giving up that seat in favor of a EU seat. 
And so, you know… And it seems to me that there is a bloc there here on foreign 
and security policy that it is hard to see… I mean at least in the short term. I mean 
I don't know… maybe… I don't know over time this changes. And the reason I 
have sort of gone through all of this is to say, so for the United States the EU is 
tremendously important when we are talking about trade policy. You know, when 
we are talking about areas where the Commission has competence, the EU is 
what we deal with. Okay, but there is this big area, foreign and security policy, 
where the EU, the Commission does not have competence. And, you know, yes 
the Lisbon treaty will make some differences in that but the US is still going to 
need to engage with key member states when we are talking about foreign and 
security policy. And, you know, so when I say the EU is very important for 
American policy I just want to differentiate, you know, what are the issues that we 
deal exclusively with EU on and what are the issues that we still are going to need 
to deal with member states on. And, you know, and I think that is just the reality. 
Ms. Psihoda: But isn’t it also that also Germany does not want to become the EU 
militarily powerful? And that's also a reason why the EU cannot manage to have a 
united foreign and security policy because Germany just does not want to have a 
militarily powerful EU. Isn't that also a reason? 
Ms. Donfried: I don't know of that. I mean my sort of analysis, which, of course, 
you don't have to agree with, of German security policy or German military 
engagement is that Germans always want to be doing that in a multilateral 
context. Right, I mean ideally you have a UN Security Council resolution blessing 
the military action. But you at least… If you don't have that, which was Kosovo, 
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you are part of NATO operation, you are part of an EU operation. And so in my 
mind for Germany the more you can multilateralize German security, the better 
because Germans don't want to be out there on their own. So, you know, that 
would be my sense of that… that the Germans would actually be quite open to the 
EU playing a larger role on that. But, you know, again I certainly respect having a 
different view on that. Because I don't see the EU running off on military 
adventures. You know, Gerhard Schröder had this… When he was running for re-
election, he had this comment about, you know, we are not going to be engaging 
in any military adventures. And what he meant was the US in Iraq. And I think, 
you know, in the German view if something is multilateralized, it is actually harder 
to bring about that action because, you know, you need to get agreement across 
many states. But I just think we are very far from that just because I do think there 
is a British and French sort of [inaudible]. So in a sense the Germans can sit back 
and don't actually have to take a prominent role on that.  
Ms. Psihoda: Okay. And then we were talking about trade and that the EU does 
matter for the US in terms of trade. How do you see the possibilities for 
cooperation in terms of the economic and financial crisis between the EU and the 
US? What can be areas of cooperation? Is there any cooperation? 
Ms. Donfried: You know, I mean, again, I think the press in a way overstates the 
US-European divide on this. I mean sort of the popular view is that the US is all 
about stimulus and Europe is all about regulation except for those Brits. You know 
that Anglo-American brand of capitalism that is so evil. You know, so that's sort of 
the caricatures, so stimulus versus regulation. Ahm, I mean we are much more 
closer than that. I mean the reality is that if you look at a social welfare state like 
Germany, there are these sort of built-in stabilizers that kick in when the economy 
is in recession because of the fabric of a social welfare state. Ahm, and I think it 
was an IMF study, there was a study recently that sort of played this out that if 
you look at all the programs that were triggered by the recession in Germany in 
terms of benefits that got people have employment. The amount of stimulus… I 
mean it's different from the stimulus package that was passed in the US but the 
total numbers are not as different as you would think. And, you know, there is 
obviously a vibrant discussion in this country about regulation that has not ended. 
I mean the European fear is that the US is not going to do any of them 
[regulations], that we are going to come out of this recession and forget the bad 
stuff. We'll see, I mean I don't know the answer to that. But there is certainly a 
vibrant debate in this country about the regulation piece of this as well. You know, 
and I think the Americans and the Europeans have done a pretty good job of 
managing the G20 meetings, of, you know, trying to build a consensus among 
themselves and we have this G20 meeting coming up. So, again, I don't want to 
say there are no differences, of course, there are. I mean we are not a social 
welfare state. So, yes, there was a separate stimulus package. But, you know, the 
European economies also were doing a lot of this sort of stimulus spending, just 
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as sort of what they called built-in stabilizers. And, you should, look at this public 
opinion survey because there were interesting questions about the economy as 
well and there is an embargo on the data until next week. So I don't want to say a 
whole lot about it. But the results were not quite what I had expected in terms of, 
you know, Europeans blaming the Americans for this sort of crisis, which you… 
arguably you could do given the toxic assets. So, anyway, we'll see, we'll see. 
Ms. Psihoda: How important do think EU actors are for the transatlantic 
relationship? I mean obviously the Commission is important when it comes to 
trade but what about the Presidency? I mean we have seen Sarkozy and we had 
the perception at least that it was a well-going relationship. Then you had the 
Czechs where there unfortunately was not so much going on. And, yeah, how 
important are those EU figures and actors for the US compared to the national 
heads of the governments like Brown, Sarkozy, Merkel and others? 
Ms. Donfried: I think it is going to be all of the above. I mean, obviously the 
presidency is changing, you know. If Lisbon is ratified, you will have the rotating 
Presidency but in a very different form. You will have an elected President and I 
think that's different. Again, it's going to matter tremendously who that person is 
but there will be a coherence there… that you do not have with a six month 
rotating presidency. So I think there are important structural changes coming both 
on the Presidency, both on the Solana figures we talked about. You know, that 
will be a more powerful position once you combine the Solana and Ferrero-
Waldner portfolios. And I do think that the President and that foreign… Well, of 
course, they could not call him Foreign Minister… But that Foreign Minister will be 
of interest to the US because they will be more important. They will be more… 
they will carry more legitimacy and have more policy to their disposal, which is not 
to say that the Merkels and Sarkozys and Browns of the world are not important 
anymore. They will be important. So I think you are going to see… You know, this 
whole debate of what number the US is going to call… There is not and cannot be 
one number. You know, and that's the art of diplomacy. And it's going to be very 
interesting to see how these structures are going to play out because in many 
ways that is a question for European countries. Are they going to put powerful 
people in those jobs? And my preference would be to have powerful people put in 
those positions. But, you know, member states may be concerned about doing 
that because they don't want to lose their power. So, you know, it's going to be 
interesting to see how this is going to play out.  
Ms. Psihoda: So there is a huge part of personality actually? 
Ms. Donfried: I think so. I don't think that there is anyway around that.  
Ms. Psihoda: And when we go back to the crisis and to the rapprochement… 
When we are talking about personality, was there a huge change in the terms of 
that the transatlantic relationship got better because of new leaders in Germany 
  182 
and France? Or was there a rapprochement happening already between Bush 
and Schroeder and Bush and Chirac before the new leaders came in? 
Ms. Donfried: I think it was really when Sarkozy and Merkel came and I do think 
that was an extreme [inaudible]. You know, again there is no policy that is closer 
to home than going to war. And, you know, Bush clearly felt… And he felt that he 
had been betrayed by Schroeder and Chirac. So there was no… I mean, sure, 
you could try to patch it up and he made a trip to Mainz but there was really no… 
It was just so deep. And then, you know, with Merkel and Sarkozy it was not just 
new leadership. It was leaders who were open about wanting a stronger 
relationship with Washington. And so they were leaders of the center-right as well. 
I mean there was a commonality there that I think made the rapprochement even 
sort of stronger than it might have been if Schroeder had been replaced by a 
Social Democrat. So, yeah, I mean I think leaders matter but also context matters. 
Ms. Psihoda: Could you explore on the context? 
Ms. Donfried: The context mattered just in that the break had been over an issue 
of one piece, so it was very fundamental. It was so deep. And it was not like that 
they just did not like each other or some minor disagreement. It was really a deep 
disagreement. I can't.., I mean when was there a break like that in past-War 
period of an issue of war where, you know, I mean Germany and France were 
trying to prevent the US and the UK from getting a second resolution in the UN 
Security Council. They succeeded in doing that. They could not stop the US from 
going to war but there was a really deep fracture. And I think everybody came 
away from it saying, “Oh, don't want to repeat that”. That part was not good for 
anybody because it was just so sort of damaging within the relationship, within 
Europe. So, that's what I mean by the context.  
Ms. Psihoda: Alright. Well, thank you very much for your time and for this 
extensive interview.  
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Transcript of the Interview with James Goldgeier, Ph.D., conducted on 
September 8th,2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: So, my first question would be: How important do you think are the 
transatlantic relations for Barack Obama and for his administration? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I think that he does take seriously the importance of 
transatlantic relations but I think he is concerned that he is not getting a lot from 
his interactions with his European counterparts. So I think he is grown frustrated. I 
mean the way that they look at it from the standpoint of the White House is that he 
went to Europe three times in his first six months. That's pretty unusual. You 
know, he has not been to Asia yet and on the issue that's probably going to be of 
greatest importance to him in terms of foreign policy in his first term, the war in 
Afghanistan, he is not getting a lot of help from his European counterparts. So, I 
think there is a lot of frustration. He knows that the transatlantic relations are 
important but I think that he is going to be continuing to get frustrated as to what 
he can get from that relationship. 
Ms. Psihoda: 
Do you think that Asia is more important to him? Or an engagement in Africa? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, well, from my standpoint of view as national interest… You 
know, in the coming period Asia is going to become important, more and more 
important. And so US attention is definitely shifting from the kind of focus that it 
had on Europe previously. And is now more Middle East and Asia. So I think that 
is a pretty inevitable transition. But for the US it's best partners, it's main partners 
are the Europeans. So, it's hard to do things around the world unless there is a 
good transatlantic relationship. 
Ms. Psihoda: Sure. How important do you think were the transatlantic relations 
for George W. Bush? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think he came in not realizing how important they would be and I 
think over time he realized how important they were. So he came in thinking, “It 
does not really matter. I can do whatever I want. The United States is so powerful. 
If they want to be with me, that's great. If they don't, I don't really care”. And that's 
how he spent his first term and it was a disaster. So, I think by the second term he 
realized it was important to have a better relationship with the Europeans. So that 
took him a lot to learn. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think the European Union, in particular, was more important 
for Bush than for Obama? Because actually he went to Brussels and started to 
rebuild the relationship through the European Union whereas Obama… Yes, he 
was at the EU-US summit, but you don't have the perception that the European 
Union is very important to him. 
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Mr. Goldgeier: I don't know if I would say that. I mean he did go to Prague in April 
because they were holding the EU presidency and he went to the meeting in 
Prague. Ahm, it's true… I mean it will be interesting to see… I hope that if… that if 
he goes to Brussels that he would go to the EU like Bush did early in his second 
term. I think we still have a problem in the United States… that the level of 
understanding of what the EU is and what the EU does is still do low. I don't think 
there is just much recognition of the role the EU plays.  
Ms. Psihoda: Would you say that it is still a US-European relationship? Or are 
there also some parts or some areas when you would talk about a US-EU 
relationship? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think the main relationship the US has in Europe still are the 
bilateral country-to-country. You know, Britain and France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, more than the US and EU. 
Ms. Psihoda: And what could be reasons for why Bush did this kind of 
rapprochement, as I would call it, with Europe? I mean was it only that things got 
worse... 
Mr. Goldgeier: Yes!! 
Ms. Psihoda: ...in the world around... 
Mr. Goldgeier: Yes! Yes!! 
Ms. Psihoda: ...or were there also some other reasons, domestic reasons, public 
opinion reasons?  
Mr. Goldgeier: No, I think he realized… I think things… I mean at that point 
things were going badly in Iraq and I think he realized, “Wait a minute, we can't 
just do whatever we want and be successful. We do need help”. And that he 
should not have treated the Europeans the way he did in the first term. So I think 
he realized that he needed to reach out in the second term. 
Ms. Psihoda: And talking a little bit about the transatlantic agenda: Do you think 
that there has been a change from Bush's second term to Obama on the 
transatlantic agenda? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, I don't think probably not as… You know, the main thing that 
has changed is the style and the atmosphere. I mean, you know, in a sense… 
You know, Bush was such a hard person for the Europeans to like and Obama, 
you know, is so popular in Europe. But the problem is the issues are still the same 
and it's not clear what they are willing to maneuver. So, for example, on two 
issues that were important to the Europeans, closing Guantanamo and climate 
change… And Obama announced his intention to close Guantanamo and then 
realized that he was going to have problem and in fact it's… still figuring that 
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whole process out is very difficult. On climate change I think because of the 
nature… the debt of the economic crisis and the other issues he has got… I don't 
know that he is really going to be able to do that much on climate change. Not 
enough that would really get the Europeans to notice that the US is radically 
different. And on the issues that are important to the United States like Iran and 
Afghanistan… on Iran we'll see. I mean the administration is counting on if it tries 
to reach out to Iran and Iran rejects it that the Europeans will then support stiffer 
sanctions. So but that, you know, we'll see. And on Afghanistan, you know, they 
would like more help and they are not going to get it. 
Ms. Psihoda: And on Iran, do you think that the Europeans are not going to go 
with the sanctions? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I don't know. I wonder. I think it is going to be very hard for the US 
to get tougher sanctions.  
Ms. Psihoda: Because of economic advantages that Europeans have. 
Mr. Goldgeier: Mhhm, yes. 
Ms. Psihoda: And on climate change: So we should not actually expect too much 
from the Copenhagen climate change meeting in December. 
Mr. Goldgeier: No, I would not. I think politically it is very difficult for the 
President… both Congress, the economy, the stance that India and China are 
taking. And economics is very difficult for the US to do something bold, which is 
what we need. I mean we need bold things. 
Ms. Psihoda: 
Yeah, but we see the climate bill that has passed the House. At least I thought 
that this is a step in the right direction but, of course, it still needs to pass the 
Senate. How is your view on that? 
Mr. Goldgeier: No, I think he certainly got… I mean this is an administration that 
is greatly different from the last administration on climate change because there 
are… First of all, they believe in science and they have people in place who take it 
seriously. I mean it is a very different group than the previous group. So that's 
good. But it's just the politics that is just going to be very difficult, especially with 
the economy. It's going to be easy for people who oppose this kind of legislation 
to say it's going to cause more job loss. 
Ms. Psihoda: But then there are others arguing that it would actually create a lot 
of jobs. 
Mr. Goldgeier: Right, I know. Right, I mean that's… You know, people who read 
Tom Friedman tell you that green jobs are the paths to… You know, the most 
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competitive economies are going to… you know, have green jobs. But that's going 
to be a tough argument. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that there was a crisis of confidence during the 
second Bush presidency? And I have also read that Katrina had an impact on 
Bush’s reaching out to the Europeans. Were these probably some underlying 
reasons as well? So, is not there another explanation for Bush's reaching out 
other than just the “things were going bad around the wold” argument? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I mean, you know, the population typically wants to see the 
United States working with others and, you know, there is always the sense that 
there is a lot of opposition to the United Nations, for example, to multilateralism 
and it's just not true. If you look at public opinion, the public's argument usually is 
they don't want the United States dealing with problems by itself. They think it's 
too much of a burden; it's too costly for the United States; the United States 
should ideally be working with other partners. So I think there is an expectation 
that the US is going to actually work with other countries. 
Ms. Psihoda: How much does the Congress play a role in the transatlantic 
relations? I mean in the sense that the domestic politics is keeping the 
administration from further reaching out or from doing compromises on certain 
issues? 
Mr. Goldgeier: In general the Congress does not play much of a role in foreign 
policy but there are specific… I mean trade is the area where it has the most 
impact. And I think that that is going to be an issue for this administration because 
even if they have in mind sort of more free trade Doha round or free trade 
agreement, North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement or something like that, I think it 
will be very hard. The politics in Congress are very anti-trade right now. So I think 
the administration is just going to try to keep things from being really bad. So like 
when we had things like a provision that the President tries to keep the Congress 
from putting too much of [inaudible] in the legislation. But I don't think it's going to 
be actively free trade. So I think that's going to frustrate people who want to see 
more movement on the trade agenda. But usually other than trade the Congress 
really… You know, in the place of all of these specific countries… But in general if 
there is something the President really wants on foreign policy, he should be able 
to get it.  
Ms. Psihoda: I was thinking about the climate change bill and I think you also 
have to pass a bill for putting sanctions on Iran. So I thought that Congress could 
block these bills and then Obama would not be able to move forward with his 
policies. 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, climate change I think more than sanctions. I think he wants 
to do sanctions, he'll do sanctions but climate change… the politics of climate 
change will be difficult.  
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Ms. Psihoda: Is there a difference in the perception that Republicans and 
Democrats have of Europe, the EU and the transatlantic relations? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, I think that… I think in general the Democrats are supportive 
of good relations with Europeans and the EU. Typically what you have had is 
when the Republicans said two different things: One, because Republicans 
typically are anti-government and anti-bureaucracy, they tend to look at the EU as 
this big bureaucracy and so they don't like it. Because it's just… to them it's just 
another bureaucracy and they don't like bureaucracy. The other thing about the 
Republicans is the strong support among… in the Republican party for the East 
European Countries. So that tends to color their attitude toward Europe. So when 
Don Rumsfeld talked about old Europe and new Europe, that's a pretty standard 
Republican approach to think about Europe. 
Ms. Psihoda: Is this still a common sentence of reference? I mean is this still 
present this new and old Europe distinction?  
Mr. Goldgeier: I think for a lot of Republicans, yes. 
Ms. Psihoda: And I guess Eastern European countries are important because 
they are normally pro-American. 
Mr. Goldgeier: Right. 
Ms. Psihoda: Whereas old Europeans are a bit careful, I would say. 
Mr. Goldgeier: Right. And usually also the East Europeans have a lot of 
sympathy because the Republicans tend to be more anti-Russians than the 
Democrats. And so there is more the concern that the Eastern Europeans need to 
be protected.  
Ms. Psihoda: And how about the Democrats? Are there also issues that influence 
the relationship with Europe? 
Mr. Goldgeier: You know, with the Democrats in general, you know, trade is a big 
issue and, you know, there have been issues with respect to the Europeans. But 
most of the issues are really more about cheap imports from other parts of the 
world. So it's not… I think for the Democrats in general good relations… I think 
Democrats are generally pretty supportive of it. And they don't… I mean they don't 
have these hang ups about old Europe or about bureaucracy and so on. 
Ms. Psihoda: What about Afghanistan, do you think that there is going to change 
something? I mean we saw that there are more American troops but on the same 
time Germany has slightly increased its troop contingent in Afghanistan and so is 
France willing to do. Do you think that there is going to be a change of the 
situation there? 
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Mr. Goldgeier: No, I mean the real question is: How many more American troops 
are going to go in? How about Iraq? And I think unless things change where 
people can see there is a difference being made. I think… I mean it's a very 
difficult moment right now for Obama because the American population is losing 
faith in the mission. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do they still have faith in the Iraq mission? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think people have really moved on from Iraq and sort of a sense 
it's not time for the Iraqis to take over and we are going to remove our troops. I 
don't think people are thinking much better about Iraq today. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that the takeover by Iraqis is going to be successful? 
Or could it be that now the Americans are pulling out of Iraq and are going into 
Afghanistan and then after some months they are again pulling out of Afghanistan 
and are going back into Iraq again? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think if the situation gets worse in Iraq again, I think the 
American public is going to say, “We gave them a chance”. It's their fault, too bad. 
I don't think that people are going to support going back into Iraq. 
Ms. Psihoda: Is there a possibility that Europeans are going to take over more 
responsibility in Iraq and are going to free American troops for Afghanistan? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I think there's more of a role for the Europeans to play on 
training, training Iraqis, training Afghanis. I don't think that that's a role Europe can 
play but I don't Europeans are going to do much on the security part.  
Ms. Psihoda: And how about economic relations and the current economic 
crisis? Is there going to be a cooperation between the US and Europe in order to 
get the things right again? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I think, you know, the issue has been that there have been 
very different approaches, you know, across the Atlantic on the best way to deal 
with the crisis. And I think there are still huge debates between US and Europe on 
what the best way is to deal with the crisis. You know, the G20 meeting coming 
up in Pittsburgh… I think we'll get some sense of how well we are working 
together.  
Ms. Psihoda: What about the last G8 and G20 meeting? Did you have the 
perception that we were working together well or not? 
Mr. Goldgeier: No, I don't think that they went very well at all because I think 
there was a real… I mean especially the G20 about the US which wants the 
Europeans to do more stimulus and the Europeans said, “We are already doing 
plenty, we are not doing more”. So I mean there is a real tension.  
Ms. Psihoda: And the G8? 
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Mr. Goldgeier: Well, the problem is the G8 is sort of losing its justification for 
existence because we now have the G20. In fact, I think this administration 
probably would like to get rid of the G8 because the G20 is more representative. 
The problem with the G8 is that it leaves too many countries out that matter. It's 
just not… I mean it's heavily weighted towards the Europeans and it does not 
have China and India. And so it does not really make much sense anymore.  
Ms. Psihoda: How about the Middle East and the Israel/Palestine conflict? Does 
there exist some sort of cooperation between the US and Europe? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I mean, I think the sort of the usual. I mean the big issue on 
Israel/Palestine is… for the US can find a way to move the parties forward. I think 
it's really a US/Israel/Palestine question. Europeans… You know, through the 
quartet in that Tony Blair has worked they play a little bit of a role but not a huge 
amount. I don't think the US is looking for the Europeans unless they can find 
some… I mean if there really was a deal than the US would want the Europeans 
to help financially. The US wants to be able to drive this process without a lot of 
other people meddling.  
Ms. Psihoda: How about Russians? Do you see that Russia is going to influence 
the transatlantic relationship? Because Obama now has a different Russia policy 
than Bush had and the Eastern European countries are getting worried... 
Mr. Goldgeier: They are getting worried. I don't think they should. I don't think 
that he cares about Eastern Europe. I think he does want a better relationship 
with Russia. So… But I think there is such uncertainty in the West about how best 
to deal with Russia. I mean there is not really one unified position on how the US 
and Europe would deal with Russia. So I think that's a problem. 
Ms. Psihoda: What is the interest right now for Obama in his relations to Russia 
compared to the European interest with Russia? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Well, so I mean he's got two issues on which he really cares a lot 
about that Europe is not involved. I mean that's not directly relevant to Europe. So 
one is the arms control. I think really he does want to get an arms control 
agreement and another one after that. And secondly, the issue of transit of 
American personal and material into Afghanistan. He is relying more on Russia. 
He is going to rely more on central Asia, which means he's got to have Russian 
cooperation. So that ability to move material and people into Afghanistan for 
resupply he really needs a strong relationship with Russia.  
Ms. Psihoda: Whereas for Europeans the main concern is about energy, right? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Right. 
Ms. Psihoda: What about the NATO enlargement? How does the US perceive 
that? Is this something good? I mean Georgia and the Ukraine still want to get 
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into NATO. And how does this conflict with building a strong relationship with 
Russia? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Yeah, so right now with NATO enlargement the process is on hold 
basically. I don't think it's going to be relevant even if Obama wins two terms and 
is President until January of 2017. I don't think enlargement to Ukraine and 
Georgia will have taken place before then. So I don't think it's really that relevant 
to his presidency. I mean the NATO is going to continue to have relations with 
Ukraine and Georgia to try to help move them along but enlargement is not going 
to happen any time soon.  
Ms. Psihoda: And the recent enlargements did they conflict with the pursuit of 
good relations with Russia by the US? 
Mr. Goldgeier: You mean Albania and Croatia? No. No, I mean the big issue is 
Ukraine and George but I don't think this is going to happen anytime soon. I mean 
the other… the other big issue for the fall is going to be missile defense… within 
the next couple of month figuring out if the Obama administration takes a position 
on missile defense, what position they take. 
Ms. Psihoda: What do you think is going to be their position? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I don't really know. I really don't know. But I mean there is talk… 
You know, I think they have to figure out sort of what it is they are defending 
against and what they want to defend and what the right way to do that is. And 
that may mean they go forward with the Polish and Czech deployment but they 
might not. And I think it's really more… I think for Obama it will rather be a 
technical question. Politically tough, of course, it's going to be difficult if he wants 
to do something different because people are going to see this as a problem for 
Poland and the Czech Republic if he decides something different.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that the EU enlargement has an impact on the Obama 
administration? Does he get anyhow involved in that or is he more of the opinion 
that this is something the EU has to figure out for itself? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Yeah, I think it's a European question. I don't think he has got 
strong views on that. I mean I don't know but I would not think he has strong 
views on that. 
Ms. Psihoda: How important do think are actors for the transatlantic relationship? 
I mean is it more that circumstances are responsible for the development of good 
or bad transatlantic relationships? Or is it also a question of actors like, for 
example, Schroeder, Chirac? 
Mr. Goldgeier: You know, I think the actors can make a difference on the origins. 
The problem is that… I mean you yourself noted at the very beginning that there 
seems to be a lot of continuity and normally there is a lot of continuity. I mean 
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policies just don't change that much. But the actors can play an important role. I 
mean Obama is a very different role than Bush and that gives, you know, we talk 
about soft power. The US has a lot of soft power right now because of Obama. 
For France, having a President in Sarkozy… He is very different than Chirac was. 
He is much more pro-American, he is much more interested in working with the 
United States. So that makes a difference. I mean there is still the politics involved 
in all these places but I do think, you know, the actors… Within the constraints 
actors will make a difference. And I think we have seen that with both Sarkozy 
and Obama. But, you know, and I also… I mean normally Presidents develop 
good or bad relations with their counterparts and that has some impact. We don't 
know enough yet. You know, does Obama have a good relationship with 
Chancellor Merkel? We don't really know. I mean it does not seem like but we 
don't really know.  
Ms. Psihoda: Are good relations with other head of governments important? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think at the margins it can be important. For resolving problems I 
think that it can be important for… You know, when tough problems exist… if 
leaders have a good working relationship… I think that they can resolve them 
more easily if they have a good relationship.  
Ms. Psihoda: Why do you think do we have the perception that Merkel had a 
better relationship with Bush than with Obama? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, well, I mean, Bush did seem to have a good relationship 
with Merkel. And then Obama comes in and he does not seem to have a 
relationship with her at all. And it may just be that there has not been enough time 
yet. I don't know. But it's also the fact that when he went to Europe in April he had 
two issues on his mind, Afghanistan and the financial crisis, and he did not really 
get anything from Merkel. So I would not expect him yet to have much more 
relationship with her. But Obama, you know, he is a very different person than 
Bush. I mean Bush, those kind of personal relationship were very important to 
him. Obama does not seem to really care a lot about personal relationships.  
Ms. Psihoda: Is this just a question of personality or was it because Bush was so 
unpopular among the European public that he wanted to have good relationships 
with the head of governments? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think it's just dependent on the type of person. Like Clinton, 
these things were also very important to Clinton. Obama just seems like, you 
know, personal relations just don't interest him. 
Ms. Psihoda: How important do you think are European Union actors for the 
transatlantic relationship? 
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Mr. Goldgeier: Well, I think they will be a lot more important when the Lisbon 
treaty goes into effect than they are right now. I mean right now, they are not that 
important at all but that's why Lisbon is important.  
Ms. Psihoda: From your point of view, will it change a lot in the relations? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I do. I think it will make… I think the six months rotating 
presidency is a disaster for the EU, it really is. I mean it's just crazy. Because you 
go from France holding the presidency and there is really stuff happening and 
then the Czechs come in and it all falls apart. It's just… It's really awful.  
Ms. Psihoda: And if we have then a so-called Foreign Minister. Do you think that 
there is more US-European Union cooperation in crisis areas? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I hope so, yeah. And I hope there will be more NATO-EU 
cooperation.  
Ms. Psihoda: Right. What does the NATO-EU cooperation look from your 
perspective right now? Is there enough cooperation? 
Mr. Goldgeier: No, there is not enough.  
Ms. Psihoda: How about the new NATO Secretary General. Are there any 
change in the way he carries out the NATO policies or the way he goes to 
countries and asks for support for NATO missions? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think he is still pretty new. So I don't know. It's hard to say that 
he has got some new... I think the previous guy, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was 
excellent. So I hope that Rasmussen is as good. 
Ms. Psihoda: And lastly, about the cultural differences and the strategic gaps that 
we all read about: Are they really so deep and important to the US-European 
relationship? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Yes, I think so. I think mainly because what the US would want 
from Europe now is a partner for dealing with problems that are rising outside of 
Europe. I think Europe is still focused on Europe and so I think there is a real 
difference in the way they think about the world.  
Ms. Psihoda: Is this going to influence the relationship? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I think it will to the extent if the United States fail to convince the 
Europeans that they need to spend more time thinking about stuff outside of 
Europe. I think the US will grow less interested in Europe over time.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you see that this is going to happen? That Europeans will look 
beyond their borders in the foreseeable future? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I don't know. I mean we have not seen it yet.  
  193 
Ms. Psihoda: So if I just wrap up the Bush-Obama change argument a bit: You 
would say that changes are Guantanamo and climate change mainly. Are there 
any other changes from Bush to Obama? 
Mr. Goldgeier: I was just saying that… I mean I was just saying that in fact that 
on the areas where the Europeans were hoping for big changes, you can see how 
hard it is for Obama to make a difference. I mean he wants to close Guantanamo 
but it's hard. And I think he wants to do something on climate change but it's hard. 
So, even on issues that the Europeans might have expected big changes, I think 
it's going to be very hard to see big changes. 
Ms. Psihoda: Are there any other changes in his policies apart from Guantanamo 
and climate change? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, well, we don't know. I mean we really don't know what his 
trade positions are. So that's an open question. And, of course, we have also 
seen a big change with the way he is approaching Israel because he is trying to 
get the Israelis to stop to build settlements but that's hard too. So, you just see 
whatever he wants to do, it's very difficult. And so I think Europeans might be 
surprised that how little changes. And they are maybe disappointed. It's just very 
hard for a President to really move things in a different direction. 
Ms. Psihoda: And if you would sum up the areas of good cooperation between 
the US and Europe which ones would you name? 
Mr. Goldgeier: Ahm, well, I mean so far Iran has been an area of good 
cooperation, I think. And piracy, counter piracy had been a good area. I think in 
general in counterterrorism that there has been good collaboration. So, there 
have been areas where there has been very important collaboration but that was 
true even under the previous President.  
Ms. Psihoda: Alright. Well, thank you for your time and thank you very much for 
this extensive interview.  
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Interview with Daniel Hamilton, Ph.D., conducted on September 10th, 
2009. 
Ms. Psihoda: So, my first question would be: How important do you think are the 
transatlantic relations for Obama? And how important were they for Bush? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think for Obama he made it very clear right at the beginning 
of his administration that strong transatlantic relations is essential to getting... to 
tackling a lot of global challenges. Vice President Biden went right away to 
Munich and gave a very strong message about how the partnership was 
changing, not only rhetorically but on the terms of new attention. The President 
travelled to Europe more than any President, I think in memory, in the first six 
month to Europe. They also took immediate actions that were important to 
Europeans. They announced to closing Guantanamo on the first day in office. 
They did the ban on torture. They did a number of things just to simply signal 
including a review of Afghanistan right away with European consultations. 
Announcing the withdrawal from Iraq, I mean, all of these were very important 
signals, I think also to Europeans that it was not just rhetoric but there was actions 
there. There were some differences on economic policy but I think the differences 
were within a framework that was agreed upon, multilateral framework, to try to 
address the economic crisis. So, there are some differences. But many of these 
differences, I would argue, are within Europe as much as between Europe [and 
the US]. There is not a unified European position on any of these topics. And so, 
often it is not a question that the Europeans and Americans are differing at some 
issue. The Europeans are differing on the issues and Americans are sort of in the 
middle of the mix. I think that's more the reality. So, I come back to Obama in a 
minute but for Bush, since you asked about Bush, I think there was a change 
within the eight years of the Bush administration obviously. The first six months 
before September 11, it's important to remember... at the first meeting that Condi 
Rice had with European ambassadors she said, you know, Kyoto is dead, just 
announced it like that. And at that time that was a great shock for them and I think 
you saw a pattern of unilateral sort of decisions before September 11 that were 
quite shocking to some European diplomats. September 11, of course, 
transformed the way the administration was operating. They, I think in a great 
failure, turned down European offers of assistance in Afghanistan, preferring to do 
it by themselves and we wasted many years by that. And lots of other issues, 
obviously Iraq and all the others that we are familiar with. But I do think there was 
a clear recognition for a second term that something had to get back on track with 
the Europeans. And I mean, in terms of the Bush mentality they were blocking so 
many things that it was stopping the US from getting important work done. It's 
important on the other hand to see on the NATO side: NATO enlargement that 
actually proceeded at the same time with great consensus to take in a number of 
other countries. That was a continuation of the Clinton policy. So, there was less 
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controversy. But I think they reached the certain point and the Bush people tried 
to push that agenda in the second term too hard with Georgia and Ukraine. And 
they had abandoned sort of the Clinton approach, which was to put the NATO 
enlargement track in a broader framework of all the institutions of Europe 
enlarging, the EU and everything. NATO was just part of that and there were lot of 
other strategies with the Baltic states and others at the time in terms of 
assistance, economic assistance, law enforcement, help – lots of things, not just 
NATO. And what the Bush people I think failed to do in the second term was to 
have this broad strategy. They made it all “You are either in NATO or you are out” 
and it would become a test for them of sort of allied solidarity. And I think it 
backfired and now, of course, there is not any consensus on that. But I think in the 
second term of Bush to try to at least rhetorically repair the relationship including 
some high profile visits to the Commission and things like that. But, you know, 
really I don't know that they achieved much, it was rhetorically a different sort of 
mood but I don't see where they achieved anything of any substance. They made 
a bit more progress in the area homeland security and cooperation of data piracy 
but, you know, there was no big strategy. There were just some minor 
agreements that moved forward. And I think Europe had frankly written off 
working with the Bush administration already by 2003. So, the second term was 
just a waste of years. And I think that was the momentum to try to restore this 
relationship that Obama has come with. I think actually McCain, he actually was 
making the same case frankly in the campaign. He would say, “You know, these 
are our key allies and we are not working with them”. So, the critique was 
bipartisan. So, if you come to today, I mean, I think that's where we are. 
Ms. Psihoda: What were the reasons for Bush to restore the relationship? I mean 
was it just like the case that things had become bad in the world or were there 
some other reasons? Domestic reasons, public opinion? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think both public opinion and elite opinion were not with the 
administration on that. If you look any public opinion polls... you know, the 
American public, it always favors strong relations with Europe and actually favors 
a strong Europe as well. The idea that some of the United States is opposed to a 
unified… this is not true when you look at public opinion. And also, you know, 
American public opinion is also very multilateralist [sic], they always support the 
UN in all those things. So, the elite opinion, so the Washington world, I think it 
also turned against this idea that you could do things just on your own unilateral. 
You know, I think there was the end of that unilateral sort of view, especially given 
what was happening in Iraq. And the realization in order to accomplish lots of their 
goals, you had to work with others. So, there was that sort of tendency but if you 
look at the substance, really again I don't see that there was much of a change. I 
mean the Republicans will argue differently but I don't see... what did they 
produce in four years in the second term? Not much. They did not use the US-EU 
framework. I mean he went to visit the Commission but did they actually, you 
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know, in the day-to-day work was there any strong US-EU cooperation on most 
things? No. There is a US-EU framework that existed since 1995; basically it is 
not being used. So, I don't see that they really changed. I think it was superficial, 
you know, as in the media a sort of a “feel good”. But on substance, I don't think 
so.  
Ms. Psihoda: Was there a crisis of confidence? Or I also read that hurricane 
Katrina was sort of reason for why Bush tried to get better on with the Europeans 
again? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, again, there is probably the distinction between Bush himself 
and his sort of team and sort of the US government thinking about these things 
and obviously they are driving the process. But we did a study on Katrina how the 
world tried to help the United States and it's a fascinating story because we did 
not know how to get help. The President himself said, you know, we are 
Americans, we do this ourselves, and then realized that's actually not true. And 
there is just all sorts of stories of how we could not set up to actually receive 
assistance. And I think this was kind of eye opening and I think it opens a whole 
new direction of ways we could work together, which is, you know, if one side of 
the Atlantic faces a major disaster, should not the other side of the Atlantic offer 
help. And I think that's an agenda for this administration, which is what I would call 
“resilience”. That is resilient societies that can deal with change and sudden 
disruptions and should not we work on that together as co-partners. Because 
many of the threats we face today are not the old military threats but they are 
network threats: energy or cyber issues or, you know, terrorism, these are all 
networks. They prey on our networks, they use our networks in fact to disrupt and 
kill people and that's not a traditional security threat, that's something new. And 
should not we be working on that together and identify ways to start to think about 
that. I think that is an agenda for this administration. I think they will pursue that. I 
think they are still getting organized but I have argued for that very strongly and I 
think they are listening to that. But we'll see.  
Ms. Psihoda: Would you say that the repair of the damage was already done by 
Bush when Obama came in? 
Hamiliton: No, no.  
Ms. Psihoda: So there is still something to do? 
Mr. Hamilton: There was just a palpable sense of relief, a sort of a breathing-out 
on election night last November everywhere in the world, I think. And I think there 
was a sense of “Now we can do something again”. I mean, I think the other side 
of it is, of course, Europeans have not necessarily just said, “We are going to sign 
up to everything the Americans want now”. I think there are lots of issues. But I 
think the tone and the style are very different. The atmosphere in which you try to 
address these issues is simply day and night. I mean it's just so different.  
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Ms. Psihoda: And how about the new European leaders, Merkel, Sarkozy and 
Brown, how did that change in European leadership affect the transatlantic 
relationship still under Bush? 
Mr. Hamilton: Still under Bush? Well, Merkel seemed to get along with Bush and 
I think she tried... she’s a very good politician, I think. She tried to just downplay 
some of the rougher edges where there was disagreement and tried to find new 
areas to work with them. She proposed this Transatlantic Economic Council, so 
it’s a German idea, not an American, not a Bush idea, it was actually—he actually 
worked with the Germans to get this idea advanced. So there were some 
American thinking of this but, you know, here is where she showed she could do 
some things with the United States that was actually in the US-EU track but did 
not happen before. But it came from her and not from the administration. They did 
not quite know what to do. And I think she downplayed some of the other 
differences on the Middle East and those issues. Sarkozy came in but I think 
there was just not enough time to really get established in terms of relationships 
because he came in towards the end. And so I don’t know that there was really 
much there. I mean he got Bush to come and to agree to the G20 summits and to 
participate in that during the last fall. So I think there were some efforts there at 
the French Presidency and they did some things. I mean he played an important 
role. I think the French did in the Russia-Georgia crisis where the United States’ 
credibility was gone because of the way the Bush administration had positioned 
itself. So, I think there the French played an important role and they used their EU 
presidency to play that role. I think Gordon Brown was simply so hit by the 
financial crisis that his credibility was also low. And it was, you know, the 
Americans and the British trying to figure out to deal with this financial crisis that 
they were both sort of the leading edge of. So I don’t know... you know, the 
relations I think were fine but Brown was, of course, trying to distance himself 
from Bush compared to Tony Blair. And so I don’t think... it was pretty cool, I think 
fairly matter of fact kind of relationship, it was not a strong Anglo-American 
partnership. 
Ms. Psihoda: Why do we have the perception that Merkel and Sarkozy seemed 
to get along better with Bush than with Obama? 
Mr. Hamilton: See I don’t think that’s true. I think that’s wrong. 
Ms. Psihoda: Okay. I got this perception from what we see in the press coverage. 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, I think that is just wrong. I think, I mean it’s just sort of 
incidents and issues and, you know, Obama wanted to come to speak at the 
Brandenburger Gate and she had a big problem with that and it became a 
domestic political issue in Germany. It really had little to do with Obama because 
Steinmeier said that’s a good idea. So the SPD was favoring it and she would 
say, “No, we are running for elections” and she said, “not so good” and “I am the 
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Chancellor and I get to decide these things”. So I mean, you know, that’s kind of a 
funny thing but I mean the fact that he went to Berlin of all places in the world he 
could have gone... I think, no, he sent a very strong message. If you listen to his 
election night’s speech in Grand Park in Chicago, it’s actually a very interesting 
speech because he lists a whole series of American events in history that sort of 
chart the progress of the civil rights movement in America, sort of the idea of 
American frontier. And he only mentioned one non-American event in that string – 
it’s a very American story – it’s the fall of the Berlin wall. And he mentions it again, 
so he again has a reference to Berlin what it means, you know, beyond America. 
So, he has some identification there, which, I think, you know, one should not 
ignore. But I mean, his getting along with Merkel, I think they all benefit popularity 
by being seen with him in Europe. I mean he is more popular than all of them. So 
I don’t know that there is a problem there. I think they are all delighted that he is 
here compared to the alternative. 
Ms. Psihoda: Would you say that the last crisis over Iraq and with Bush in 2003 
is an especially different crisis or is it just another crisis in the transatlantic 
relationship as we have already seen some others? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think, no, I think it was very important and it’s probably the 
worst crisis since the end of World War II with many core allies. There were others 
like Suez and so on. There was the Balkan problems in the early 90ies when 
neither side sort of knew what they were going to do. But it’s hard to find a real 
time when there was such a big break. I mean Suez was maybe the other one but 
with the British and the French, not the Germans. And so this was serious and I 
think each side took some lessons from that. I think the European view is: ‘Don’t 
always go along with the Americans, they are not always right’. You know, you 
have to question their judgment and, you know, it’s not a straight forward 
relationship like that. And the Americans, I think... it extenuates American 
tendency to think the Europeans can’t be counted on and that we have to do this 
by ourselves. So it extenuates the American unilateral tendency. It does not 
dampen it. And that, I think that’s a constant tension: the failure of Europe to 
speak clearly, you know, only exentuates unilateral tendencies in the United 
States. Because if the Americans don’t think the Europeans are with them and 
they have to move on, you know, they will have to do it by themselves, maybe not 
what they want to do but if Europe is not there, you have to do it then. And that’s 
the dilemma.  
Ms. Psihoda: And that’s the whole dilemma with unilateralism, I guess. Because 
we in Europe, we perceive it as very unilateral. If you go to the US, they ask you, 
“So what is unilateral? If the Europeans are saying, “No we are not going to do it”. 
And then the Americans do it, is that unilateral?”  
Mr. Hamilton: Yes, exactly. 
  199 
Ms. Psihoda: And do you think with Obama that there is going to be more on the 
European side? I mean that we would give more or be there or be a stronger 
partner? 
Mr. Hamilton: Oh, yeah, I think so. But it won't be... But it’s not easy and you 
would have to look at each issue, it’s not sort of a straightforward answer to that. 
On the economic side there are some differences and frankly the EU acts 
unilaterally on economics all the time. On trade issues and all sorts of things the 
EU is a major unilateral actor. They just don’t want to ever say that. But they try 
talk about unilateralism in the context of security and defense but when talking 
about trade and economics, the EU is a huge bloc. So, you know, we are trying to 
work out issues on the economic side, which I think there is more of a tendency to 
work together on but there are some differences on how you approach it. On the 
international security issues obviously Afghanistan is a major issue and the 
Europeans basically welcome sort of a new look on Afghanistan but have not 
really stepped up their presence. In fact, I think, most Europeans still don’t 
understand why they are there and their governments have not done a very good 
job frankly of explaining it. And you see that right now in the German controversy: 
their leaders can’t even really explain what even happened with this bombing and, 
you know, it’s just a confused picture. They are blaming an American general 
whose job was to basically go to Afghanistan and do what the Germans always 
said that they should do, which is: stop the civilian casualties; if there are civilian 
casualties, apologize, make sure that people are taken care of; look into, you 
know, investigate it, be transparent and open. This has been the German position 
for years. And so in this one incident when it was the German commander that 
ordered this and it was a mistake and the American general then said, let’s bring 
transparency reporter, let’s apologize, let’s say how awful it was, then they get 
upset. I mean the whole world is turned upside down in terms of what the 
Germans are doing and it’s because they have not provided a context for their 
people about why Germany is really engaged there. So that’s difficult, I think it will 
be continuing very difficult on Afghanistan and I am not sure where we are going 
there. But you see, on Iran you see a new concerted effort, pretty well aligned 
among the allies on Iran. The problem is Iran, as Teheran is not necessarily the 
transatlantic part, but that part is together now. On the Middle East you see lots of 
collaboration now, on the Middle East peace process, I think, the US position is 
very, very close to the Europeans. I think they are all pretty aligned on that. The 
French and Americans are working on some elements, you know, in particular 
with Lebanon and Syria. So, there is lots of momentum on there. You know, I 
think there is no consensus on what to do with Russia but I think that's... a lack of 
consensus is frankly within Europe. The Europeans that can't agree on what to do 
with Russia. I think the US position now is, you know, you go down two tracks: 
you offer the Russians a serious, you know, list of things that one could do 
together and a serious partnership but it has to be based on certain principles. 
And those have to be respected and let's see where we go. And the Presidents 
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started this whole arms control disarmament agenda, which most Europeans 
have been asking for for a long, long time. So, I think that controversies are within 
Europe about, you know, how to approach Russia. It's not a European-American 
difference really. I think there was a difference again with some Europeans from 
Austria on... the President's fairly outspoken position on Turkey joining in the EU. 
And that occasion, you know, that caused some feathers to be ruffled. But other 
Europeans liked the fact that he said it. Again, the fact is that Europe does not 
agree on what it is and the Americans are simply saying, “You know, we think it 
would be a good idea”. But on the same criteria as any other candidate that's 
been a US position for a long, long time. That's nothing new, it's just that the 
President said it so straightforwardly. You could go through the list: there is the 
issue of climate change, again the administration has moved way far toward the 
Europeans have wanted, the problem is that the timing does not work with the 
Copenhagen timetable. 
Ms. Psihoda: Because? 
Mr. Hamilton: Because we have to get a domestic energy bill and we have to get 
a domestic consensus before we start to enter into international commitments. 
We did it the other way around during the Clinton administration. They entered 
into international commitments and then came back to the US Senate and the 
vote was 98 to nothing against. So that's not maybe the best course. And to 
anyone who would want the United States to engaged has to understand some of 
the problems here of simply reversing 8 years of policy within a matter of months 
and getting the US in a place so that it can go to Copenhagen. I think 
Copenhagen is the beginning of a process, it's not going to be concluded there. 
And those who would make the US commitments sort of a litmus test 
[Nagelproble] of seriousness, just have no political sense of how this is going to 
happen. You see what is happening here, the whole debate now is actually is 
health care. If we don't get that done... The next one is climate change, the next 
one is the energy bill. It's number two. But if health care does not get done, the 
energy one gets pushed off. So that's the process. 
Ms. Psihoda: So, we should not expect too much from Copenhagen? 
Mr. Hamilton: I don't think so. I think one should be very realistic about starting a 
process in Copenhagen that would continue. Why not have a, you know, can just 
continue? Like the Doha Round continues on trade talks, have Copenhagen as a 
process, not as a time limited couple of weeks or, you know, whatever it is. That 
will never happen because we don't even have China or India or any of these 
other countries on board.  
Ms. Psihoda: And how about the climate bill that has passed the House? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, but the Senate is, you know, very difficult. 
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Ms. Psihoda:  So it will take the Senate longer to pass it than until Copenhagen? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, right. I think so. Because they are worried about health care. 
So the timing just does not work. I've said, you know, I've said the President has 
two years to reposition the United States and basically the West. He has until the 
next midterm election. So, a year... now a year from November. That's 500 days, 
not 100 days, which everybody talked about. It's 500 days. And if he is successful, 
then I think the next 6 years are quite an exciting time to do a lot of new things 
together. But he cannot get it at putting. If this health care bill fails, he will be 
damaged seriously. And he won't be able to do a lot of other things. So, you 
know, one has to give this guy a little space to do his work. And I think the rating, 
the Marshall Fund ratings on, you know, European perceptions on the US foreign 
policy right now are way, way high. So. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think this is the reason why he is pushing a lot of things 
very fast for the moment? Because he is afraid not to win the majority at the next 
midterm elections anymore? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, that's right. Here is this one window, this very small window. 
You saw it yesterday, I mean it was just nasty, the Republicans in the hall 
[Obama's health care speech in front of the full Congress]. 
Ms. Psihoda: Oh, yeah, I saw that. They even talked into his speech, which is not 
normal, right? 
Mr. Hamilton: No. 
Ms. Psihoda: This should not happen. In this situation it should not happen, 
right? 
Mr. Hamilton: Right. It will happen in different contexts but that a certain type of 
event. But you just see sort of this polarization politically.  
Ms. Psihoda: But it's also a problem with the Democrats, I think. 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, well the real problem is that the Democrats aren't agreed. I 
mean he is spending all his time trying to get Democrats to agree. And again, this 
would not happen in a parliamentary system. But our parties aren't parliamentary 
parties like that. They don't really exist in any serious way. They are a collection of 
politicians.  
Ms. Psihoda: And talking about economics. Can you explore a bit on why the EU 
is unilateral? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, the EU has a... You know, on trade policy the Commission 
speaks for all EU members states. And so it has quite a strong voice there. And 
sometimes it just signs agreements with countries, preferential trade agreements, 
which some would say violate the spirit of the WTO. There are a lot of preferential 
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trade agreements the EU has signed with lots of developing countries and others 
that are discriminatory. So that's just them doing it on their own. You know, it was 
not negotiated multilaterally within the WTO. The WTO should be the framework 
for that. The US and the EU have lots of court cases at WTO against each other. 
The EU just lost last week a WTO case on support for Airbus. This is illegal 
subsidies going to Airbus in violation of all sorts of rules the EU has agreed to. 
There is a counter case against the United States the EU has brought against 
Boeing, which has not been decided yet. So I would not be surprised if they vote 
against the United States too. But at the moment, you asked about the EU, I 
mean this was a violation. So they will be fined or have to change the laws or 
whatever they do. So—or they ignore the WTO and then that's pretty unilateral. 
And there are lots of cases like this—this chicken dispute, this silly chicken 
dispute mainly with the French. I mean every ruling has said there is not problem 
with the way you clean a chicken. But French agricultural lobby is not going to 
hear about it. And so they stopped lots of things from happening. So that's 
ignoring multilateral judgments and just doing what you want. There are a lot of 
cases like that and how the EU works as a trade body. I'm not saying others don't 
as well. But this idea that somehow the EU does not act unilateral is, of course... 
It  acts unilateral a lot vis-à-vis weaker countries in terms of sanctions, in terms of 
imposing certain kinds of restrictions on countries. And it has done that every 
since it was created. 
Ms. Psihoda: It does so also against its member states? 
Mr. Hamilton: No, I mean against other countries. Well, also against certain 
member states. You elected a certain President in Austria there were some 
sanctions as well.  
Ms. Psihoda: Right. And about the economic crisis: Do you think that the EU and 
the US can have a good relationship to get the things working again? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, I think as I said the overall framework is there and I think 
they are working pretty closely. I think there are some differences in approach. 
But as I said I think within Europe there are differences of approach. I mean 
Sarkozy says the European Central Bank is too deflationary and Merkel says the 
European Central Bank is too inflationary. Same policy and they are being 
attacked for doing exactly the opposite. So what's the European policy? And the 
British aren't even part of that. So, you know, if you are sitting here, how do you 
deal with that? I mean, there is no clear message from Europe. So the Europeans 
are not united on many of these issues. I think that we have different structures. 
So the US emphasis on stimulus is because we don't have all these safety nets 
and things. So you have to just inject the money directly into the system whereas 
in Europe some of these things start to happen and cushion people because of 
the nature of the system. So I understand the argument that you don't have to 
inject as much stimulus to stimulate the economy in Europe because these other 
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mechanisms kick in. But there is some differences in the approach on that. They 
just had this debate about cutting bonuses or, you know, cutting salaries, that 
types of things. And there are some differences there but again the differences 
are in Europe too. There are a lot of Europeans that would not agree with that, 
that's a Sarkozy proposal. And this idea, I would say the EU is also unilateral on 
climate change and energy, carbon all those kinds of things. Sarkozy is saying 
they are going to tax every French citizen and also anybody else who comes to 
France and impose a carbon tax. Well, that's a fairly unilateral measure. And so 
the EU did that. They are discussing penalizing airlines that, you know, when they 
come into Europe that don't adhere certain regulations, well, they shut down air 
traffic. So I mean there are lots of things like that.  
Ms. Psihoda: Talking a little bit about Afghanistan: Just yesterday I was at an 
event at Carnegie [Endowment for Peace] where one guest speaker said that it 
would be better if German troops would actually pull out of Afghanistan because 
they are more preoccupied by defending themselves than... I mean he was saying 
that they are wasting their energy by defending themselves than by really doing 
something. And one of the cities... I think there are two cities in Afghanistan in the 
north where you see that there is the Taliban again. And whereas last year it was 
like 15 Taliban, now it's 80 of them. Whereas this should not happen when you 
have German troops there protecting the cities and fighting there. Do you think 
this argument is feasible? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, again I think first of all they are having elections in Germany 
and... So, you know, a lot of this is maneuvering for the next couple of weeks. And 
then you have to see what kind of German government you have. So it's hard to 
predict this right now. I mean if there is a new coalition in Germany that's more 
center-right, they probably send a somewhat different message than if they 
continue the coalition they have now. Their strategy was to... the Bundestag has 
to approve these mandates for German troops under the German law and their 
strategy was position the next vote after the election so that a new government 
could get an easy support. Well, now it probably looks like it's going to be 
problematic and the Bundestag has to approve this right away after the new 
government basically is installed. So this will be hard I think for Germans. That's 
why they are calling for this conference, I think, it's Merkel, that's her way of sort 
of showing that, you know, beyond the elections she is still thinking about all 
these things. I mean I think the core problem is that as I said before I don't think 
that the German government has explained to the German people why it is 
engaged in Afghanistan. It simply shies away from the fact that these people are 
trying to kill Europeans. The greatest single security threat to European lives in 
the world today comes from these ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. I mean it's a very clear statement. Why don't they say that? It's about 
reconstruction and development aid and helping this poor country. Well, that's not 
really what it is about. And, you know, if they can't say that directly they are 
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fooling themselves about why they are there. So if they can't explain their own 
people, they won't have any German support and then maybe, yeah, they should 
not be there. But, you know, if they would be straight forward and this is a very 
important part of Germany sort of, you know, sixty year sort of rehabilitation if you 
will. You have to distinguish when the use of force, you know, when there are 
reasons to use force. And I think this is still a sensitive debate in Germany. You 
know, some, any would say there is no justification to use force any time which is, 
you know... The clear answer seems to be, you know, should not we have used 
force against Hitler if there was never any justification. So this is hard debate and 
there are many sides to it so I don't want to belittle it. But you see how hard it is 
for Germany still to participate even though there are lots of troops there. The 
Germans like to say how many troops they have, does not say what they are 
doing. That's the problem. 
Ms. Psihoda: And do you think Merkel will increase the troop level when she gets 
elected after the elections? 
Mr. Hamilton: I think it will be very hard for her. I think the cover is this 
conference. If they have an international conference that comes out saying we 
need more troops, then again that's a multilateral cover for Germans to make 
some decisions. But I don't think she would announce it on her own. I don't think 
she is that courageous and I don't think she has the political support to do that, 
especially not now after this incident here [referring to the Germans bombing 
Afghanistan and causing civilian casualties that Mr. Hamilton talked about above] 
and with a government that's seemingly corrupt and manipulating the polls.  
Ms. Psihoda: And please clarify, where does the international conference take 
place?  
Mr. Hamilton: They, Merkel and Sarkozy and Brown, suggested this conference 
later this year to sort of have a new sort of look with the UN backing to look at the 
new situation in Afghanistan of what should happen. 
Ms. Psihoda: But this is just the EU-3? 
Mr. Hamilton: No, it's the EU-3 proposing it. There will be a UN sponsored 
conference.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think the outcome of German elections is going to influence 
the transatlantic relationship and the relationship with Obama? 
Mr. Hamilton: No, I don't think so. I mean I have heard one colleague of mine 
once say, “You know, we are all democracies”. Then actually the outcome of any 
election should not matter. That partnership should be able to withstand any... I 
don't see any German coalition that will change this very much. I mean I think she 
will remain the Chancellor. It's just the Chancellor of what kind of coalition. And 
you have basically just a few options and none of them are radical at all. They are 
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pretty centrist. If the FDP comes back in, then you might have Guido Westerwelle 
as German Foreign Minister. I mean he does not really have any foreign 
background. So that will be a little awkward and Germany's voice will be pretty 
weak. And she... and I frankly think people will look to her and not to him. So... 
And if you have a continuation of the current coalition, then it's a continuation. 
Ms. Psihoda: How do you see the situation in Iraq? I mean you see US troops 
pulling and you could say, “Well, now they are pulling out of Iraq and going to 
Afghanistan and after some years they are pulling out of Afghanistan again and 
going into Iraq again”. And how much can the EU do and is doing for the moment 
in Iraq? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think Iraq is not going as well as the Obama people had 
hoped in terms of withdrawal. There are still many problems there. But again this 
notion of withdrawal is probably also a misleading term. There will be US 
presence in Iraq for a long time to come. It's just what kind of presence is the 
issue. Less the fighting force military and more a different kind of presence that 
will include military forces, that just will. I mean it's not an end day when the last 
American leaves Iraq. I mean that's not going to happen for some time. I will just 
be a more modest presence. And, you know, you will have to see if you leave 
behind the instability that apparently we are supposed to stopping. We will have to 
reconsider that. But I think if you are working on Afghanistan you are on very 
different cases and they were premised on different issues and they are being 
waged for different reasons. They are not really alike at all. What they are alike is 
that they are a drain on US resources.  
Ahm, I think the EU has a challenge. You know, now that we are withdrawing from 
Iraq, there is an opportunity here for the EU to have much more of a strategy on 
Iraq and to be engaged. It does not mean sending troops, it means engaged in a 
lot of other things: economic assistance, monitoring of elections, getting back in 
with all the things the EU says it likes to do all the time. So I think the time is now 
for that to happen, it's way past now. And the same in, you know, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, the EU presence in that region is kind of I don't know, I mean it's a little 
odd frankly. For a region that is such a... I have one, I think one reference and I 
don't know if it's quite right but the EU assistance in Pakistan is less than to like 
Uruguay. I mean I am not sure that's true. And, you know, Pakistan where all 
those troubles are – probably the most dangerous place in the world at the 
moment – where is the EU? And I asked a group of EU colleagues frankly, some 
senior people, you know, pretty straightforward question, “What's the EU strategy 
on Pakistan?” and the table erupted in laughter. There was not even a beginning 
of an answer, they were just laughing, you know. It's mainly assistance, throwing 
money into it, but they don't know where the money goes. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do they have a strategy for Iraq? 
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Mr. Hamilton: No. I think it has been, you know, because of the emotions about 
Iraq there was not a coherent EU effort and I think that this has not come 
together.  
Ms. Psihoda:  And do you think that things will change? That the EU will become 
engaged more in these regions? 
Mr. Hamilton: It's hard to say. I think some EU nations, the major nations again, 
the French, in particular, in Iraq will engage. The British, no, had their experience 
in Iraq, so I think they are reluctant about that. So I see more French involvement 
than say EU involvement. And each of the nature European has their own special 
envoys for Afghanistan, Pakistan in addition to the EU envoy. So what they are all 
doing, I don't know. I know what Albright's doing but I don't know what the others 
are doing.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that this will change if Europe has the Lisbon treaty 
ratified? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think you might have a stronger voice and Solana is 
probably ready to retire. I think he seems a bit exhausted these days. So I mean, 
it would be good to have a vigorous person in that role. And if you had a President 
who could also speak on these issues I think that would help. But it's not about 
this or that individual. It's about what kind of resources are you ready to come in, 
to what type of strategy does the EU... You know, how will you have it, do you 
have any strategy, EU strategy in Iraq, how does that come together, you know, 
who defines that. And on Pakistan, same thing, I just don't see it. I just don't see 
the process even for coming together. Europe still does not have that sense that it 
needs to engage in that way so forcefully. I mean there are a lot of Europeans 
who think that but translating that into a EU strategy, you know, with deploying 
people and resources, you know, some defined goal. That's pretty far from that. 
Ms. Psihoda: But you see some EU missions... I mean you see Congo, for 
example, as one of the successful examples and you see that the EU ATALANTA 
Mission fighting against piracy in the sea, which is also kind of a success story. 
So you see some successes. 
Mr. Hamilton: No, I think you do. And I think that's another difference, this 
administration probably welcomes those kinds of efforts. The Bush administration 
did not. I think the challenge now is that okay, what can Europe do in these areas. 
There are some successes but if you look at these cases you mentioned. We 
usually have to fly the Europeans there because they cannot get there on their 
own. So it's a little embarrassing to say it's a EU success. And Americans, you 
know, we are like taxi service, flying Europeans to go to claim their success on 
these issues. So, you know, there are real challenges for Europe if it really 
aspires to conflict and prevention management. It simply has to step up the game 
and has to be more serious about what it means to do these things. Whether it 
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wants to do it with us or whether it's sort of a perverse way to show the Americans 
that Europe can do something too. It's kind of a, there is an odd psychology there. 
I think though on the United States side we should welcome the fact that 
Europeans can take care of some of these conflict issues and it does not come to 
us. And particularly in Africa Europe simply has a greater sense of connectedness 
and relationship than the US. I think there is particularly areas there and which the 
US probably should try to support as much as it could. I think what does not exist 
are good modalities security between the United States and the EU. We always 
talk about this but we are talking about NATO and the EU. But if you are talking 
about these kinds of issues, that's not really a NATO issue. It sometimes can be 
the US and the EU. And for many years that's been a taboo subject: the US-EU 
security. So I think that's a new area that again this administration probably wants 
to explore that previous administrations did not want to touch. And also in Europe, 
you know, the French and others had not a theology about this. I think that seems 
to be gone.  
Ms. Psihoda: And the previous administration did not want to touch it because it 
did not believe in it? 
Mr. Hamilton: 
I think you had a couple of camps in the previous administration. Some of those 
who thought, “Well, if the Europeans can do this, great because it's burden-
sharing”. Especially in the Balkans, Wolfowitz and others at that time and Condi 
Rice and others, they wanted the Europeans... You know, to take over all the 
Balkan issues and the US to get out because that's burgend-sharing. You know, if 
you say you can do it, great, go do it, we'll leave, we got other things to do. So 
there is some support of greater European capacity, not because of building 
Europe or something. It's simply that we have less to worry about. So I'm not sure 
about the real motivation there, if that's a good thing. You know, the term that the 
EU was using at that time was 'back-filling'. I don't know if that's a clear term but it 
means, you know, we have a problem, we have to move on, you can take care of 
things behind. There were others who opposed all of this because they thought it 
would challenge NATO. That our main security relationship with Europe is through 
NATO and this EU thing starts to build a caucus within NATO that is against the 
United States. So they were very skeptical about that.  And, you know, those were 
strong voices. And then there were others, I think, particularly in military who 
thought this is all just silly and that the Europeans just aren't serious. It's all a 
waste of time to even talk to them because they can't even fly people anywhere. 
You know, it's just a waste of time, so why are we... You know, they are not 
capable, they can't fight with American soldiers anymore, they have no tradition, 
they are even debating where there should be places. So, why waste our time? 
Let's go do that ourselves. I mean I think that school as I said particularly the 
Pentagon during the Bush administration had a strong appealing. I think much of 
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that has gone away these days and whether that turns into something, that's the 
question. 
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think it is still a US-European relationship or are there also 
some parts where you can see US-EU relationship? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, no, I think there is a big agenda for the US-EU relationship. 
It's just the EU is not all of Europe, which is hard sometimes to tell people on the 
EU. I mean, you know, Europe... The continent of Europe is not whole, free and at 
peace. This one little... You know, the Western part of Europe might have that 
feeling but if you go a little East or South it is not. And I think the challenge for the 
EU is what is its responsibility. Shouldn't the EU still have that goal of a Europe 
that's whole, free and at peace? And what's its responsibility to help achieve that 
goal? That's a hard conversation to have in Europe these days because people 
are so inward looking, they don't want to deal with people to their East and, you 
know, it's not moving ahead. But you have to come up with some answer to the 
Turks and the Ukrainians and the Georgians, all these frozen conflicts that are not 
frozen conflicts. They are conflicts waiting to explode as they did last summer. 
You know, this is a turbulent region, you know, it is not settled. And history, you 
know, Europe's tragedies of the last century were unsettled regions of Europe. So 
there is still a lot to do. 
Ms. Psihoda: But is not that keeping us away from pursuing strategies outside of 
Europe? Like if we are still looking to enlargement, if we are still trying to fix the 
troubles that we have at the Eastern border and within Europe. Maybe this is one 
of the main problems that keeps the European Union from pursuing strategies for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other dangerous regions in the world.  
Mr. Hamilton: Yes, no one picks these challenges. They are all there, that's... 
The task of leadership is where are your priorities, limited resources, what do you 
have to do. Frankly you have to do all of it. The instability that could come from an 
unsettled part of Europe is serious. The direct threat to European lives coming 
from ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan and Pakistan is also serious. It's not an 
either-or-choice. I think the tools you have to deal with each of those are very 
different. But to simply say, “We'll deal with our own borders and let the 
Americans deal with that [Afghanistan, Pakistan]”. Well, that... First, of all you 
can't complain about unilateralism then because you basically said, “Go do it”. 
You are a free-rider, you basically let the Americans die so that the you can deal 
with your border issues. That's not usually a good support for a healthy 
transatlantic relationship. This idea of division of labor which one hears a lot. You 
know, the Europeans do the civilian stuff and the Americans do the military stuff. 
Well, that's not sustainable because again you are asking Americans to die for 
Europeans to say that they are all peaceful people. So you have to do something 
of all of that. And that's where we are. 
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Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that this is ever going to happen? Because we see the 
European Union being defined as social or civilian power. If scholars define them, 
and I'm pretty sure Europeans define themselves as this, then it's very hard to see 
them ever going to be a military power. 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think that's... You hear that a lot. I'm not sure that it really is 
a consensus view. I think in academics it sounds nice but I don't know what it 
means really because the EU is being engaged in lots of different things. It is 
building a European Security and Defense Policy, it is building Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, it does have European defense agencies created, and I don't 
know if it was really put the test in open debate whether the notion of Europe as a 
civilian power would survive. It might survive in a country like Austria but... you 
know, I think... I'm not sure... I don't think the concept holds up frankly. I think it 
was a nice way to distinguish not what Europe is frankly, but what it's not. It's not 
the United States. That was the only way at the time for some analysts to come 
up with this. I know... We are all friends, I know them all. Frankly a lot of it came 
out of the German debates because Germany had to decide what it was. And it 
preferred to think about itself as a civilian power that somehow civilian tools were 
morally better. And I think that disrespects lots of questions that are, you know, 
more serious questions. When the first gulf war happened, there was the big 
debate in Germany about what to do. You know, and the most interesting voices 
at that time were not the civilian power people. But it was the Greens like Joska 
Fischer who said, you know, we have to think about this and, you know, we do 
have to stand up and get over these old taboos that simply using is bad and not 
using force and being civilian is good. And you see debate, it's a very long drawn-
out debate, it's understandable that they had to had this debate. But the British 
aren't having that debate, you know, they have a different tradition. The French 
have a very different tradition. They would reject immediately the notion that they 
are a civilian power. So...  
Ms. Psihoda: And how important do you think are European Union actors? Like 
the President of the Commission or the Foreign Minister, if we could name this 
person it like this, or the first President of European Union if we have Lisbon 
treaty pass. Do you think they have an influence in the transatlantic relationship or 
will Obama still look to Merkel, to Sarkozy, to Brown? 
Mr. Hamilton: I mean the reality is you look to all of them. I think you somehow 
think you are only going to have one interlocutor is, of course, not the reality of 
Europe. I mean the Europeans won't do that, so why would you expect the 
Americans to do that? I mean, you know, Americans have interest in Europe and 
with Europeans. So when you want to advance your interests, you advance them 
on all fronts. You advance them in Brussels and whatever structure Brussels has, 
you advance them in national capitals, you do what you do. I think the issue is 
that the Bush administration, they did that with the intent of dividing Europe and 
stopping Europe from coalescing and, you know, breaking them apart. It was very 
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easy to do actually. It was almost a child's job to do it. So it shows that if the 
United States really wanted to destroy the European Union, you could do it pretty 
easily, I think. It does not want to do that. And certainly, I think, at this moment 
time it does not want to do that and it's not...  I think one has to realize US support 
for EU, you know, is based on certain American interests, it's not based on sort of 
just wishing Europeans well. And I mean I do these little speeches but I can tell 
you what I usually say is if you think about throughout history American interests 
in Europe, I think they are pretty simple. And I think it shows how the US would 
react to efforts to deepen European integration. We are not always in favor, it 
depends on what the proposal is. But, you know, we want a continent that is not 
dominated by some country or group of countries that are hostile to the United 
States, pretty simple. We fought a few wars on that principle to stop that from 
happening. So we would, of course, want to resist any sense of some entity there 
that would be clearly antagonistic to the United States. I don't see that but it's an 
enduring, you know, 200-year-principle. I think we want an open Europe where 
we can have our ideas discussed, we can have our goods sold or our services 
provided, you know, Americans want an open market. We are good at open 
continental markets. So if we see the EU doing some of these things I was talking 
about, we are not going to like it. So just the fact that the EU is the EU is not 
necessarily… The US interest is what it is doing. And I think a Europe that's at 
peace that can deal with its own conflicts frankly. The idea that the Americans 
come over to solve European problems for them, I think, should be the greatest 
embarrassment to Europeans. The Americans don't want to do that. So, if we had 
any confidence that Europe could handle it's own civil wars if you will, we would 
be the greatest supporter of Europe that would do that. We tried to do that after 
the Cold War, you know. We thought Europe could handle the Balkans, the 
Europeans told us they could handle it and it was a disaster on both sides. And I 
think we realized, you know, we are still in this together. And as I say, that's what 
disturbed me a bit about this sort of complacency in Western Europe, the other 
part of Europe is still not settled. It is still a challenge, and it is a challenge where 
Europe needs the United States to be there. So, we still have things to do. 
Ms. Psihoda: What is the perception of EU enlargement like in the US? Are they 
supportive? 
Mr. Hamilton: Oh, yes. We are more supportive than anybody in the EU. 
Ms. Psihoda: I mean I know... Turkey is obvious because it is the gateway to the 
Middle East but I mean how about Ukraine and Georgia? Ok, we don't know if it is 
ever going to happen because the EU will have to define its geography once. But 
is it more perceived in the US as an issue that the Europeans themselves have to 
solve or does the US care about it.  
Mr. Hamilton: I think, again, public opinion is supportive about this whole process 
but it is shallow. You know people don't spend much time thinking about this. If 
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you talk about the people that early work on it, I would still say that we the 
strongest supporter of EU enlargement and, you know, how you define EU 
enlargement these days is probably the debate. But extending the space of 
stability and prosperity in Europe where war does not happen clearly has to be 
our common interest and extending it as far East as we can certainly should be 
what we should be doing. I am surprised that this is still an issue but it seems to 
be because unless [inaudible] means to build some new walls, Europe is open. 
And if you don't spread this stability eastward, the instability will come westward. It 
is a pretty simple proposition. So, you know, with what priority and instruments 
and vigor are you going go do that? I think the problem is that the Bush 
administration reduced the whole of NATO in or out, the EU has yet to define a 
way to include countries within its orbit short of, you know, what it now calls 
membership. I mean it was seemed to me, you know, my two sense, the variable 
geometry is the new way of thinking about the EU. If the EU can get the Lisbon 
treaty done, why not have some core, you know, again that is ready to move to 
further integration and then allow others to come it. But coming in now means 
something a little bit different. It means maybe what the EU is today but the 
deeper core could still move ahead. Why not think about it in much more flexible 
ways? And I think that would revolutionize certain parts of Europe just as it did for 
Central Europe at the end of the Cold War. I mean, it's still that the EU is greatest 
success.  
Ms. Psihoda: How do you see the situation in Iran? And do you think that we will 
have some success there? Is there going to be a progress or is the situation to be 
more or less deadlocked? 
Hamiliton: It is hard to know without knowing the details. I mean the fact that our 
ambassador in Vienna yesterday said that Iran is close to having materials for 
nuclear weapons is pretty stark. So, I don't know what the end of the proposal 
yesterday… It was to start some discussions but I have not seen them… I don't 
think that they were public… but what it was about… It does not seem like it's 
going well. And, know you, you have to face the prospect that the Iranians are 
going to have some nuclear capability and if they can project that capability in 
distance… couple of statements of their President… I think one has to be very 
concerned about this. The Israelis in particular but we are all committed to Israel 
and to… you know, it's a tough issue. So if we want to have the option of some 
military response that would not solve the whole lot. But if they have some nuclear 
capability and we allow that to continue then countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Egypt and others might also consider, you know, what they need to do and the 
whole regime can collapse. And you would be faced with a whole nuclear 
deterrent regime in the worst part of the world you could imagine. It's a very hard, 
tough issue, it's very hard and I don't see it moving in a good way.  
Ms. Psihoda: So, the EU-3+3 talks are not showing any progress? 
  212 
Mr. Hamilton: It does not seem so. I mean their discussion of what I just heard… 
Again I am not following it with enough details, so I might be wrong. But their 
discussion of cutting off Iranian gas imports, imports into Iran, because they 
actually import gas, that would be serious. But the problem it's often that 
Europeans don't want to do that... 
Ms. Psihoda: Yeah, because of the economic advantages they would lose, right? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah, but this is serious now. I mean at some point you have to 
think clearly what you are risking. And the Russians have their own 
arrangements, which will be hard. But the Russians and the Chinese are on board 
here at the moment. It's very hard. 
Ms. Psihoda: How do you see the EU participation in Israel/Palestine? Do you 
think that there are some EU efforts to help to do something or is it still a US 
issue? 
Mr. Hamilton: Well, I think the interlocutor has been the United States and the 
EU was not credible and decided seen from the Israelis as an evenhanded 
partner. So I think the EU lost its ability to be the interlocutor. And with the US 
basically that was absent then from negotiations for a number of years that 
became part. Now, you know, you have a different difficult position that the United 
States is aligned with a lot of European views but we have an Israeli government 
that basically does not want to be part of that. So, I think what Summer is saying 
is that Netanyahu can do a bit more on these settlements despite everybody is 
saying he can't, he might be willing then to start some other type of negotiations. 
He has to show first that, to his own supporters that he is strong, and then he can 
maybe do something. That is assuming a lot, that is assuming whether he even 
wants to do this, which he might not want to do. So I think it's hard. I think where 
EU support is, you know, to be supportive of a US driven process, to look at some 
of these other illnesses, like I said, with Syria and with Lebanon and to support, 
provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians. To work with the Palestinians, to 
understand the dilemma therein, they are not... There is no partner there either. 
They are fighting each other. So I mean we have still problems with Hamas, you 
know. We have different news whether it is a terrorist organization or not. So that 
stops some EU-US cooperation.  
Ms. Psihoda: On the issue of international terrorism is there a lot of cooperation 
with the European partners? 
Mr. Hamilton: Yeah. Yeah, I think intelligence cooperation has been strong. It's 
still a bit uneven because frankly U.S. intelligence does not believe European 
agencies can keep secrets. So, that's a problem. But I think with some European 
countries it's very strong and good. And as I said on some of these other areas of 
prevention or resilience I think there is a good whole agenda there that could be 
advanced, which would be very attractive. And they had been signing some 
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agreements already, but bilaterally not with the EU, with various countries. But I 
think this Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements and the… What's the other one? 
There are two agreements that have been held off from the Congress for a long 
time, which are I think supposed complete ratified this fall. So, they will go on into 
effect and also implemented into all EU member states. These were agreements 
signed early on with the Bush people, Mutual Legal Assistance and, it's not, I was 
saying Transatlantic Arrest [inaudible], it's not that but that would be an idea. 
There is European Arrest [inaudible] but not a transatlantic Arrest [inaudible]. That 
means somebody apprehended anywhere on that space could be sent then 
somewhere else. We still have some issues because of death penalty and 
Guantanamo. You know, we saying we are closing it but we need some help and 
then question is which way are they going to help. And then the Congress 
themselves they are not going to help. So, these are problems. 
Ms. Psihoda: How important do you think is the Congress for U.S. foreign policy? 
Mr. Hamilton: Oh, very important. I think most foreign observers just don't 
understand the role of the Congress and we are not a parliamentary system. It's 
two legal branches of government and our treaty system… For instance, you 
know, two thirds of the Senate has to approve these treaties. Well, that's very high 
bar. That is why we try to avoid treaty ratification, you know, if we can or it takes 
us so long to get these things done. We just have a different system. So that 
makes… You know, U.S. Senators have quite a role. And in money… You know, 
the oversight the parliament has over budget is also significant. I mean the 
President can propose but the Congress has to really approve this. So, there are 
lots of ways in which the Congress has an important role.  
Ms. Psihoda: So if you would rap up the core areas of cooperation between the 
US and Europe, what would be good ones and what would be ones that did not 
work?  
Mr. Hamilton: Well, we are in a new administration so it's hard to see right now. 
But I think the main premise, at least my premise, would for forty, fifty years this 
relationship was about stabilizing Europe. When we said transatlantic relations, 
we meant stabilizing the European continent. So it was about stabilizing Europe 
itself, the continent of Europe and all its problems. And the central issue of 
American foreign policy for a hundred years was Europe's instability and conflict 
rooted in Central Europe. There is still part of that agenda there today, the wider 
Europe that I was talking about, but that is not 90% of our agenda. It's maybe 
30% or less. So there is still an agenda in Europe as mainly wider Europe. I+It's 
this unsettled space between the EU and Russia. So that's an agenda where I 
don't think we quite know how to work together on that yet. But the real agenda 
and how this relationship is challenged is the agenda beyond. You know, are we 
able to have a partnership that allows to work together to address the whole 
series of third issues that NATO is not going to resolve on its own? And I think 
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that's where the challenge for the relationship is. Because do the Americans have 
the patience to deal with all the complexities the Europeans [have] when we are 
dealing with Iran, for instance, or climate change or, you know, all this stuff? And 
do the Europeans have the will, even the desire or the ability to be that type of 
partner? Do they really want, like do they really want to be engaged in 
Afghanistan or do they want to leave it to the Americans while complaining at the 
same time? I think that's the challenge, do we have this kind of, can be build this 
kind of global partnership or not? I would argue we have to and that is the real 
task, it's finding out the new mechanisms and allow us to do that. The default is, 
you know, the Americans do it badly on their own and fail and the Europeans 
carping on the sideline and suffering then from that failure. So I think that is the 
agenda. We have an agenda partly in Europe, mainly wider Europe, we have this 
global agenda and the third [agenda], the other third I would is there is an agenda, 
which you should not talk about this in foreign affairs, but globalization also 
means that the connections across the Atlantic are closer not loser. Economically 
we are very dependent on each other. I think if the recession showed us anything, 
it should have shown us that. The idea that you can decouple from the United 
States as some European politicians were saying couple of years ago is 
nonsense. And the same we have to understand while we are talking about China 
and everything, we are still actually investing in Europe, half the profits for 
American companies in the world come from Europe, not from China or Mexico. 
So, we have to, you know, understand that. And so the real tensions we have 
they are not trade barriers because we don't have any trade barriers, it's domestic 
regulations and things that stop, you know, our two systems from working. We 
have friction because the two systems are different. That's a huge agenda and it 
occupies a lots of agencies in government, it's not a very sexy agenda, but it's a 
big part of the agenda. What kind of standards do you have on products, what 
kind of, you know, consumer standards, you know, what is the responsibility of the 
United States and Europe to have high standards for their people. If we don't have 
a common high standard, we'll have a Chinese standard, that's the choice. In fact 
we have one right now, talking about children toys. If we don't agree on what the 
standard needs to be on those kinds of products then lowest common 
denominator wins and we import toys from China, that's what happens. So, there 
is another agenda there. It's not quite the same as the traditional foreign affairs 
agenda but it's the rest of the world [inaudible] on our domestic societies now. 
And all of this is happening first across the Atlantic. It's not happening with Japan 
or with, you know, Brazil. It's happening between us. I think that's a good agenda 
to look at.  
Ms. Psihoda: Do you think that this agenda has changed from Bush to Obama? 
Mr. Hamilton: I think it will. 
Ms. Psihoda: And in which aspects? 
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Mr. Hamilton: Well, first in recognizing that there is something to be done here. 
Secondly, it's not just about… The Bush agenda was about deregulation, just 
deregulate everything, a free market… And there were some Europeans that 
wanted that as well. I think the Obama administration is about high standards and 
aligning our standards at a high level. Well, that's actually much more a European 
agenda, right? High safety standards, consumer protection, all those kind of 
things. Let's have an agenda about that. And I think, you know, that could be 
attractive.  
Ms. Psihoda: 
And the areas of cooperation remain the same, I guess. I mean from what I have 
heard and read, terrorism is very good and then climate change we still have to 
wait... 
Mr. Hamilton: 
Well, I mean, so. Okay, on economics [we are] working together, have some 
differences. But I think, you know, working it out and we seem to be coming out of 
a recession sort of. On international security challenges, Afghanistan, we are sort 
of together but Europeans have not stepped up and the commitment is 
questionable. On the Middle East and the other sort of international security 
questions, I think, you find some agreements there. The problems have not gone 
away but there is a better transatlantic dialogue and interaction. I think the 
question, the open question is about Iraq. If you look at… I would look this issue 
what I call transatlantic resilience, societal security, how do we protect our own 
people, our societies from these kinds of network dangers and threats and 
disasters? And should not we do that together? I think that's a new area… That's 
actually a good area to work on. Climate change, the US has changed course but 
it will take longer than the European schedule allows. So there will be some 
problems. And that's the top list. I mean there is lots of issues, wider Europe I 
think is another one. 
Ms. Psihoda: Alright, thank you very much for this extensive interview. 
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B. Abstract 
This thesis has been written for the purpose of making a contribution to the 
academic discussion of the transatlantic relations between Europe and the United 
States in the field of foreign and security policy. With its main focus on the 
relations between the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and France after the Iraq 
crisis in 2003, this thesis aims to analyze what impact the disagreement over the 
Iraq War had on their relationships. The study addresses the factors, which 
influenced the rapprochement in the U.S.-German and U.S.-French relations, the 
roles that the personalities in office as heads of government in Germany, France 
and the U.S. played, and the effect, which the change in leadership in Germany 
and France had on the rapprochement between Europe and the U.S. Moreover, it 
will be analyzed which effects the 2003 Iraq crisis had on the military cooperation 
between the United States and its European allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
study found that the Iraq crisis had short-term effects on the relations between 
Germany and the U.S. and France and the U.S., which resulted in a deep rift 
between these strategic allies. However, it is argued that there has not been any 
serious rupture as the relations between these countries are too important to 
allow for any long-term estrangement. It is therefore concluded that a 
rapprochement set in with the beginning of the second term of the George W. 
Bush administration.  
 
 
 
 
 
  217 
C. Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Die Diplomarbeit stellt einen Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen Diskussion 
über die transatlantischen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den USA dar. Sie 
untersucht welche Auswirkungen die Irakkrise im Jahr 2003 auf die außen- und 
sicherheitspolitischen Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Deutschland und den 
USA und Frankreich hatte.  
 
Im Zuge dessen befasst sich die Studie mit den Faktoren, welche für die 
Annäherung in den U.S.-Deutschen und U.S.-Französischen Beziehungen 
verantwortlich waren. Es wird analysiert welche Rolle die politischen 
Führungspersönlichkeiten in Deutschland, Frankreich und den USA spielten und 
welche Auswirkungen der Wechsel der politischen Führungsspitze Deutschlands 
und Frankreichs auf die Annäherung in den Beziehungen hatte. Des Weiteren 
wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen die Irakkrise auf die militärische 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen den USA und ihren europäischen Verbündeten in 
Afghanistan und Irak hatte.  
 
Es konnte die Schlussfolgerung aufgestellt werden, dass die Folgen der 
Unstimmigkeiten über den Irakkrieg zwar kurzfristig in einer tiefen Kluft in den 
Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Deutschland und den USA und Frankreich 
mündeten. Allerdings kam es zu keinem größeren Zerwürfnis in den U.S.-
Deutschen und U.S.-Französischen Beziehungen, da diese Beziehungen von 
beiden Seiten als zu wichtig erachtet werden. Hingegen wird die These 
aufgestellt, dass es mit Beginn der zweiten Präsidentschaft von George W. Bush 
zu einer Annäherung in den transatlantischen Beziehungen zwischen den USA 
und Deutschland und den USA und Frankreich kam. 
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